United Kingdom Law and Policy

On the early release of prisoners

30th July 2026

The political-media addiction to lengthy sentences, and its consequences

Perhaps the greatest problem with our prisons policy is that of addiction: the addiction of those in politics and the media to demanding lengthy sentences of imprisonment.

Those in politics and the media cannot help themselves: every relevant news event means they have to shout louder for “tougher” punishments and shout down those who say or act otherwise.

But there are at least two further problems which flow from this problem.

First, and more urgent, is that of capacity: we simply do not have the capacity to imprison all those whom those in politics and media want imprisoned.

Second is a deeper social and cultural problem: imprisonment for reasons other than public protection or for the most serious of crimes is not a public good.

As I once set out in an article at the Financial Times:

Please use the sharing tools found via the share button at the top or side of articles. Copying articles to share with others is a breach of FT.com T&Cs and Copyright Policy. Email licensing@ft.com to buy additional rights. Subscribers may share up to 10 or 20 articles per month using the gift article service. More information can be found at https://help.ft.com/faq/gifting-and-sharing-an-article/what-is-a-gift-article/. https://www.ft.com/content/14628747-057b-3a97-be9f-7ba7ead51a42 Here is a thought-experiment: imagine that you have asked some mischievous demon to conceive the most counter-productive way of dealing with crime. What fiendish scheme would this diabolic agent devise? The demon could suggest a system where offenders are kept together with more serious and experienced criminals for months or years, and so can learn from them; where the offender is taken away from any gainful employment and social support or family network; where the offender is put in places where drugs and brutality are rife; where the infliction of a penalty can make the offender more, and not less, likely to re-offend; and where all this is done at extraordinary expense for the taxpayer. A system, in other words, very much like the prison system we now have in England and Wales, as well as in many other jurisdictions.

“Here is a thought-experiment: imagine that you have asked some mischievous demon to conceive the most counter-productive way of dealing with crime. What fiendish scheme would this diabolic agent devise?

“The demon could suggest a system where offenders are kept together with more serious and experienced criminals for months or years, and so can learn from them; where the offender is taken away from any gainful employment and social support or family network; where the offender is put in places where drugs and brutality are rife; where the infliction of a penalty can make the offender more, and not less, likely to re-offend; and where all this is done at extraordinary expense for the taxpayer.

“A system, in other words, very much like the prison system we now have in England and Wales, as well as in many other jurisdictions.”

One day, perhaps, we will look back at routine mass incarceration in the same ways most of us look back at the institution of slavery and witchcraft trials: what were they thinking?

But even if not, and this exercise in futurology is misconceived, there is still the immediate practical problem of there not being enough prison places.

Over at Arguably, the former (Conservative) justice secretary and author of the 2025 sentencing review David Gauke has a sensible and well-informed article on this practical problem. You can read it here, and it is worth taking the time to read.

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“The best time to fix a roof is…”

28th July 2026

We have three years to protect our constitutional arrangements before a possible radical illiberal majority at the next General Election

There is enough time left, just about, to fix parts of our constitutional arrangements before the next general election. This is important, as there is a non-trivial possibility of a radical illiberal majority at that general election.

Of course, given our (largely Victorian) doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and given the general deference our courts give to the executive, there is little which could be ultimately done to prevent the damage which a radical illiberal majority could do.

But the damage could be slowed down significantly.

For example, our current constitutional arrangements make it easy for ministers and departments to change and make law by statutory instruments, without any meaningful parliamentary involvement.

Making such secondary legislation subject to a distinct process involving parliamentary consideration would at a stroke check any attempt by an incoming government to inflict a raft of Trump-style executive orders on day one. Eventually a new administration could get round this obstacle, but it would reduce the speed of the assault.

Similarly, making it easier for citizens to challenge disproportionate executive decisions and secondary legislation would similarly make it harder for a new government to push through excessive measures.

And there many other things that could be done too, from making public procurement more transparent, to giving teeth (or even a tooth) to freedom of information laws, to limiting the powers of a new Prime Minister to create peers.

We could do so much strengthen the roof before this incoming storm. There may not, of course, be a storm. Maybe everything is going to be ok. Nonetheless, it would be worth doing anyway.

But we will not do any of this, even with three years to go of the current parliament, a period which provides more than enough time to force things through the House of Lords if need be.

Over at Prospect I have reviewed an interesting paper by the Constitution Unit at University College London: Safeguarding the Constitution: Key Steps to Strengthen UK Democratic Resilience.

It is a paper well worth reading, and if TL;DR you can read a summary here.

There are some good proposals in there, and some nice-to-haves, but as I set out at Prospect, I think the recommendations are incomplete.

And as aver at the end of that article: our constitutional arrangements are vulnerable, and it is complacent to think otherwise.

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No, the Justice Secretary does not need to be a lawyer

21st July 2026

Why it is far more important to have an effective politician as Lord Chancellor, rather than somebody who happens to be legally qualified.

From time to time, and from cabinet reshuffle to cabinet reshuffle, some politician is appointed to the combined role of Justice Secretary and Lord Chancellor who is not a lawyer.

It happened again yesterday.

And each time this happens, and it has happened a few times now, there is an adverse reaction, a groaning of some lawyers.

This post sets out why it really does not matter it the Justice Secretary and Lord Chancellor is not a lawyer, and why it is far more important that they are an effective politician within cabinet.

Back in 2007, nearly 20 years ago, a huge and horrible policy and administrative mistake was committed.

This huge and horrible mistake was the creation of a “Ministry of Justice” – created by bolting together the old Lord Chancellor’s Department (at that point called the Department of Constitutional Affairs, which ran the courts, with the prisons and probation parts of the Home Office.

Thereby a small “spending” department came into being, but with out he heft of the Home Office in Whitehall spending rounds.

(The old Lord Chancellor’s Department was not big enough to be a “spending” department, as such.)

So in Whitehall this new Ministry of Justice joined the back of the spending queue, behind health and education and defence and indeed behind the now security-and-immigration dominated Home Office.

And within the Ministry of Justice, courts – and legal aid – joined the back of the spending queue, behind over-crowded prisons and under-resourced probation.

The supposed justification for this move was to heave a more “Holistic” justice system, from courts to probation and punishments.

But, as is usually the case, the word “Holistic” signified woolly thinking.

And since 2007, almost every problem faced by our court system and legail aid budget has been caused by this folly of the then Prime Minister Tony Blair and the then Lord Chancellor (and first Justice Secretary) Lord Falconer.

It was a structural fault from the beginning, and one which gets worse over time.

The creation of this Ministry of Justice also meant that it would be a department no longer necessarily headed by some eminent lawyer.

Until then it was always a former judge – or a QC/KC usually appointed to the House of Lords as a peer, if not already a lord for other other reasons.

The old Lord Chancellor could sit on the House of Lords appellate committee (and did so until the days of Lord Irvine as Tony Blair’s first Lord Chancellor); they also presided over the House of Lords and sat in the cabinet.

They were a one-person rebuttal of the notion of a separation of powers.

But by 2005-7, this constitutional oddity was no longer sustainable, at least in the face of European Convention of Human Rights caselaw on a fair trial: legislators and members of the executive really should not also be judges.

And so the practical judicial role of the Lord Chancellor came to an end (though some ornamental aspects remain). The Lord Chancellor was also replaced in presiding over the House of Lords by the new role of Lord Speaker.

As an ancient office, however, the office of Lord Chancellor itself could not simply be abolished by prime ministerial direction. It would require an immense legislative exercise, and the Blair government ducked this.

And so they combined the office of Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary, as a work-around.

Here we get to one of the daftest and least useful provisions on the constitutional statute book, section 2 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.

This is the provision which some lawyers groan about whenever a non-lawyer is appointed as Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary.

Section 2 provides:

Lord Chancellor to be qualified by experience

(1) A person may not be recommended for appointment as Lord Chancellor unless he appears to the Prime Minister to be qualified by experience.

(2) The Prime Minister may take into account any of these—

(a) experience as a Minister of the Crown;

(b) experience as a member of either House of Parliament;

(c) experience as a qualifying practitioner;

(d) experience as a teacher of law in a university;

(e) other experience that the Prime Minister considers relevant.

You will see that section 2(2) is not limited to lawyers. If that had been the intention of parliament, then it would have said so. But it expressly provides other possible bases for the appointment.

Section 2 is also only a weak “may take into account” provision – the list that follows is not binding.

And section 2(2)(e) then renders even that provision moot, as it all rests on the subjective view of the Prime Minister. Theoretically, this may prevent a Prime Minister in some appointments if “Wednesbury” unreasonable, but it is difficult to imagine a court intervening in reality to quash any appointment.

So we have had various non-lawyers as Justice Secretary: including Chris Grayling, Michael Gove, Elizabeth Truss.

And here, as they were former ministers of the crown, the Prime Minister did not even need to resort to section 2(2)(e) with those appointments.

The lawyers who have been Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary have often been less than impressive.

Kenneth Clarke, an experienced QC, pushed through severe legal aid cuts.

Few would commend the periods in office of Dominic Raab, a solicitor, and David Lammy, a barrister.

A Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary having a legal qualification or legal experience has not helped one iota.

There is nothing about running prisons and probation that requires a Justice Secretary to be a lawyer.

Indeed, there is nothing in running the court system which requires a Justice Secretary to be a lawyer – indeed many of those that keep our court systems running are not themselves lawyers.

There is also nothing in fighting and winning Whitehall battles for funding that requires a Justice Secretary to be a lawyer.

And there is nothing in managing a small, back-of-the-queue spending department that requires a Justice Secretary to be a lawyer.

The Justice Secretary does not give legal advice, neither do they act in court.

The ornamental aspects of the job can be done (and have been done) by a non-lawyer.

Attorneys General and Solicitors General, with their quasi-legal roles, should be lawyers.

But there is no good reason for a Justice Secretary to be a lawyer, and we have not been well served by some of those who have been.

It is far more important that they are an effective politician within cabinet.

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Another new Prime Minister…and another new former Prime Minister

20th July 2026

Regular readers of this blog will recall that there is nothing unusual and indeed nothing wrong with our political system’s capacity to eject Prime Ministers from office.

As set out in a previous post, it is that we keep appointing poor Prime Ministers that is the problem, not that we are deft at getting rid of them: an input issue not an output issue.

In essence – our body politic retains an admirably efficient discharge system for getting rid of poor PMs, it is the diet which is at fault.

And regular readers will also recall that changing Prime Ministers mid-term is pretty much the norm and not the exception.

Every Prime Minister since 1974 has either gained office or left office mid-term (and sometimes both).

It is important to remember that we have a parliamentary system and not a presidential system.

And so what is happening today, with the appointment of Andrew Burnham to replace Keir Starmer is not even a constitutional drama, let alone a constitutional crisis.

That said, one remarkable feature is that, notwithstanding 650 members of parliament were elected at the last general election, the new Prime Minister had to be shipped in from outside parliament. One would hope that, in a parliamentary system, at least one elected member of parliament would be up to the job of having the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons (the constitutional test).

But, no.

The new Prime Minister appears to have a genuine belief in devolution and perhaps also electoral reform. This is, of course, welcome, though it is unlikely that substantive constitutional reforms can be enacted this side of a general election, especially if not in the manifesto.

On the other hand, not all constitutional reform needs primary legislation and endless parliamentary time. Let’s see what, if anything gets done to repair our constitutional arrangements before the next general election.

Looming behind all this, is that there is still a realistic prospect of an radically illiberal government being returned at the next election and, as this blog has previously averred, our constitution is in poor shape to withstand any radical illiberal assault.

Parliament really should be fixing the constitutional roof while the sun shines, especially in terms of delegated legislation.

Otherwise, today’s news means another former Prime Minister is now added to the pile.

Suppose They Held a By-election and Nobody Came

9th July 2026

The Farage stunt by-election in constitutional context

“Suppose They Gave a War and Nobody Came”

– a 1960s slogan and a title of a 1970 film

The current leader of the Reform Party has resigned his parliamentary seat so as to force a by-election in his Clacton constituency, in which he will stand for re-election.

This is, of course, a stunt.

For a few wonderful hours yesterday it seemed we might have had the constitutional excitement of this by-election either being delayed or denied.

This is because – somewhat oddly – a Member of Parliament cannot directly resign their seat.

This is a constitutional fiction – a daft piece of political-legal make-believe.

The notion is that – like, say, with jury service – being summoned to attend parliament is a civic duty. Indeed, in the past it was a onerous duty which the knights of the shires and the burgers from the boroughs would often not like to do – and would get out from doing if they could.

And so if you were selected for attendance at the Commons then you had to go – at your own expense, in lodgings in that London (well, Westminster), and without payment: a chore not a privilege.

Once a Member of Parliament is returned, the expectation is that they serve out their term.

But.

There were – and are – means of a Member of Parliament rendering themself (or being rendered) as disqualified.

The old joke was that lords, lunatics or bankrupts that were exempt.

(Or all three, ho, ho, ho.)

And also exempt were those who were appointed to offices of profit under the Crown.

In fact there is now an entire schedule of exempt offices – a long, long list.

And to maintain the daft fiction, two historic offices were included on the schedule just so Members of Parliament could pretend that they are not actually resigning.

It really is very silly.

But what this means is that it is not within the sole power of a Member of Parliament to resign.

Unless they are appointed to a genuine exempt outside job (like being a judge) they have to apply to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (and thereby a government minister) for appointment to one of the make-believe offices.

The convention is that such applications for the Chiltern Hundreds or the Manor of Northstead are accepted.

But that is a mere convention: if the Chancellor of the Exchequer said no, then that decision could not be easily gainsaid.

According to the House of Commons library there have been (at least) two instances of the application being refused:

(Note the almost early appearance there for Nathan Barley.)

But even if the application is granted, there is then the distinct and separate question of moving the writ for a by-election, which is a matter for the House of Commons. And, again, it is only by convention that this is usually done promptly.

And so, an MP like Nigel Farage who resigns to fight a by-election can be denied or delayed in two ways: by the government, and by Parliament.

Alas, however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer denied us any constitutional fun.

The bin, of course, is joke candidate Count Binface, for all the other main parties said they would not contest this pointless by-election.

This morning the writ was moved – a by-election is likely in August.

Farage should be careful: the Brexit referendum of 2016 was itself an election which those who called thought would go one way, but the voters did not vote they way they were “supposed” to.

Also in 2016, there was the example of Boaty McBoatface.

Constituents and voters, like tribunals, do not like being taken for granted.

Farage appears to have been adopting political tactics that might have come from S. Baldrick.

Farage has created an embarrassing situation for himself, entirely by himself.

And he will gain no advantage in the the face of the current House of Commons investigation, which can simply resume even if he is re-elected with a “mandate” against a sentient rubbish bin.

In a news interview today, the muddled thinking can be indicated by his party saying the Commons committee is a “kangaroo court” but him also complaining about committee delays that may drag on until October.

That is a mighty slow kangaroo.

Of course, complaints of “kangaroo courts” and “witch hunts” by politicians like Farage, Boris Johnson and Donald Trump are often of painfully elaborate but procedurally fair processes, from which they know there is no easy escape or evasion.

That is why the processes have to be rubbished in the most colourful way, in the hope that the easily bored will nod-along.

“Kangaroo court!”

“Witch hunt!”

The (lack of) thinking here is also that Farage could somehow head off a further by-election caused by an adverse Commons investigation report (in which the main parties would compete), with this by-election.

But he did not think things through, nor take account of foreseeable risks.

Like other insurgent politicians, he can only think about one chess move ahead.

Now, even if if he wins, he has lost any advantage and instead gained ridicule and discredit.

And he is left to reflect on what could have bin.

(Sorry.)

By-elections can have great power in our political system.

The two recent by-elections in the north of England have altered the course of the politics of the United Kingdom.

But this year looks as if there will be a third by-election, if not of great power but of equally great lack-of-power.

For Farage has somehow called a by-election, and nobody came.

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Constitutional change and a new Prime Minister

6th July 2026

Why fundamental reform is more likely than before, but still unlikely

The United Kingdom is about to have a new Prime Minister.

As this blog has pointed out many times, changing Prime Minister mid-term is the norm in British politics. Since 1974 every Prime Minister has either entered office or left office between general elections, sometimes both. And there is nothing wrong or unusual with this, for we have a parliamentary and not a presidential system.

But the one thing a new, mid-term Prime Minister cannot point to is a fresh mandate, with a manifesto endorsed by a general election result. They are pretty much stuck with the same mandate.

Sometimes a new Prime Minister will break with the mandate they inherited. In 1990 John Major dumped the community charge (poll tax) notwithstanding it having been detailed in the 1987 Conservative manifesto. No sensible person doubted that was the right thing for him to do.

Generally, however, any proposed big change will be put off to the next election. There is often too much to do which is more urgent.

The new Prime Minister is likely to be Andrew Burnham, who has been open about supporting constitutional change and even now is expressing support for devolution and electoral reform.

But the eternal problem about constitutional reform is that it means those with power giving some of that power away.

Burnham has nice intentions about giving real power away, and maybe he will actually do something in office. And so on that basis it is more likely than before, but one suspects there is more than enough for a new Prime Minister to do, with the economy and taxation and defence and foreign affairs and so on. So constituional reform is still, on balance, unlikely before an election.

Over at Prospect a couple of weeks ago, I set out more thoughts on this.

Let’s see what happens.

Independence day

4th July 2026

A republic, if they can keep it – as Franklin said

The worst Prime Minister vs the worst mistake by a Prime Minister

25th June 2026

This is a short post occasioned by this piece in the Guardian ranking the worst Prime Ministers we have had since 2016.

The worst at being Prime Minister was, of course, Elizabeth Truss. But she is second. And that is actually, counter-intuitively, the correct placing.

As it is possible to have been the worst Prime Minister since 2016 without being the worst at being Prime Minister.

For David Cameron made the worst mistake as Prime Minister – of risking the future of the United Kingdom on one turn of pitch-and-toss, and losing. In other words, of having a needless Brexit referendum which the government did not enough to win and which the government made no preparations for if it lost.

And as such, Cameron’s one big mistake is worse than Truss’s calamitous few weeks.

That the worst politician of the six – that is, the person whose approach to politics was the most cynical – should only be the third worst on the list is indicative of just how bad the top two were.

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How a county council has obtained an injunction against those hoisting flags on the public highway

24th June 2026

A guided tour of the High Court injunction against “persons unknown”

Jun 24, 2026

UPDATE – since the post below, the Council has now published other legal documents regarding the injunction here.

Yesterday it was reported that Oxfordshire County Council had obtained a High Court injunction against those placing St George’s flags on the public highway.

This followed the earlier news of the council’s application.

The council itself published a helpful and detailed post on the injunction on its own site, which is worth reading in full (excerpt below).

This blog has now obtained a copy of the Order of the High Court, and it sets out below what the Order says and what can be inferred about the case from the Order.

Although the Order is a public document, and so can by obtained by anyone reading this post, this blog does not propose to publish the Order in full as it names various natural persons, and this is not the sort of legal blog to name natural persons caught up in litigation unless necessary. This blog is more concerned with the legal issues.

THE PARTIES

The applicant for the Order was, of course, the council.

The respondents were four named individuals, but also as a fifth respondent “persons unknown” who are

“intending to

(i) attach flags to highway structures or mark flags on the highway in the county of Oxfordshire,

(ii) harass members of Oxfordshire County Council or

(iii) obstruct or harass employees or contractors of Oxfordshire County Council involved in the removal of flags from highway structures”

The Order is thereby only against the “persons unknown” as three of the four named respondents all gave undertakings to the court on the terms of the injunction, and the fourth respondent indicated that they too would give an undertaking.

An undertaking generally has the same legal consequences for a party as an injunction, and with similar sanctions for breach. A court will often allow a respondent an opportunity to give an undertaking in lieu of an injunction, and that is what happened here. The four named respondents will be as bound legally by their undertakings, as if an injunction was made.

(And giving an undertaking has beneficial costs consequences for the respondent, rather than them refusing and requiring the court to make the respondent to be a party to an Order.)

That the Order was still required despite the undertakings was because of the “persons unknown” element.

THE MAKING OF THE ORDER

The Order was made by Mr Justice Dexter Dias of the King’s Bench Division of the High Court, and it was sealed on 23 June 2026.

The Order does not refer to any particular legislation (for example highways legislation) under which the Order is made, and so it may be presumed that it is under the general jurisdiction of the High Court.

And although the claimant is a public body, it appears that the Order was made not by the Administrative Court, but by the (general) King’s Bench Division of the High Court which deals with (general) civil and private law matters.

It is an interim Order, and there is a further hearing listed for 9 July 2026. This means that, in theory, this Order is not the end of the matter and that the Order “holds the ring” (to use the usual phrase) until the claim of the council can be tried. In practice, however, many claims end once an interim Order has been secured.

When making such an interim Order, a court usually has to have regard to the “balance of convenience” of the parties, and here the court says expressly that it found the balance of convenience against “persons unknown”.

WHAT IS ORDERED?

Until a trial takes place (which may or may not take place), or until the court orders differently, “persons unknown” (as defined above in a quote):

“shall not:

(a) attach any flag or cause any flag to be attached to any highway structure;

(b) paint or mark any flag on any of the highways;

(c) obstruct the Claimant’s officers or contractors from removing flags from highway structures;

(d) cause harassment, alarm or distress to the Claimant’s members or to officers or contractors of the Claimant who are or have been involved in the removal of flags from highway structures, including the decision to remove them.

(2) Persons unknown (as defined above) shall not encourage any other person to act in away prohibited by [the paragraph above].”

If “persons unknown” do any of these things they will be in contempt of court, which may mean imprisonment or a fine, or the seizure of assets. This is set out in the important penal notice on the front page of the Order.

The “highway” and “highway structures” are defined in the Order as follows:

“In this Order (1) references to highways are to highways in the County of Oxfordshire for which the Claimant is the highway authority; (2) “highway structures” means lampposts, lighting columns, street signs, trees, barriers, railings and other physical structures in the highways.”

As such, this Order does not cover the placing of flags on any private property.

The Order does not mention any points about freedom of expression or expressly conduct any balancing exercise under the Human Rights Act. It looks like it was treated as a straight private law claim by the council.

HOW ARE “PERSONS UNKNOWN” TO BE BOUND BY THE ORDER?

This raises an obvious question of how are “persons unknown” to be made aware of this Order? The general rule is that a person cannot be bound by an Order unless they have notice of it. This notice can be actual notice or what is called constructive notice.

The Order deals with this as follows (hyperlink added):

“Service of the claim form and this Order on persons unknown (the Fifth Defendant)

Pursuant to CPR rr 6.15 and 6.27 the claim form, interim injunction application and this Order shall be served on the person unknown by the following means:

(1) The Claimant shall set up a dedicated webpage on its website giving access to the claim form, particulars of claim, supporting evidence, and this Order.

(2) The Claimant shall notify the groups known as Raise the Colours, Raise the Colours Oxfordshire and Oxfordshire Flying Squad of this Order by email, giving notice that the documents relating to the claim and this Order have been placed online and providing a link to the relevant webpage.

(3) The Claimant shall publish details of the claim and Order on LinkedIn, Bluesky, Facebook, Nextdoor, WhatsApp and the Claimant’s fortnightly newsletter for residents “Your Oxfordshire” and the Claimant’s news page with links to the relevant webpage.

The claim form shall be deemed served on the Fifth Defendant 3 days after steps (1) to (3) above have been completed, which shall be done by 4pm on 24 June 2026.”

(Interestingly paragraph (3) does not include X, formerly Twitter.)

The council does not appear to have set up a dedicated webpage yet, but this blog will add a link to it when it does.

A guidance note to the Order adds:

“Effect of this Order

A Defendant who is an individual (including persons unknown) who is ordered not to do something must not do it himself or in any other way. He must not do it through others acting on his behalf or on his instructions or with his encouragement.

A Defendant which is not an individual (including persons unknown) which is ordered not to do something must not do it itself or by its directors, officers, partners, employees or agents or in any other way.

Parties other than the Claimant and Defendant

Effect of this order

It is a contempt of court for any person notified of this Order knowingly to assist in or permit a breach of this Order. Any person doing so may be sent to prison, fined or have their assets seized.”

And so it is by a combination of the Order and the Council doing what it can to publicise the Order that “persons unknown” are to be bound by the Order.

Given this appears to be an Order of the High Court in respect of its general jurisdiction in respect of a general private law claim, it would seem what Oxfordshire County Council has done here could be done, in principle, by any other local authority.

This page will be updated as more material is available.

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Getting rid of six Prime Ministers in ten years is a sign of a working political system

23rd June 2026

It is that we keep appointing poor Prime Ministers that is the problem: an input issue not an output issue

There is an old adage that a litigator should not be “surprised” (or similar) by what their opponent does in litigation – one may be disappointed perhaps, but one should never be surprised. If a litigator is genuinely surprised by what their opponent does, they are probably in the wrong job.

A similar thing may be said about political commentators who are “baffled” (or similar) by a politician losing substantial support. A number of commentators seem bewildered by why and how the current Prime Minister Keir Starmer has lost political support so rapidly and widely that he announced his resignation yesterday, despite winning an emphatic majority at the last general election only two years ago. Again, if a pundit is genuinely baffled by a politician losing substantial amounts of political support they too are probably in the wrong job.

(The quick answer is that the current Prime Minister alienated his backbenchers and other political supporters by a sequence of decisions and indecisions, many of which were unforced errors.)

The question for this post is whether yet another Prime Minister going is a sign of a political system functioning or dysfunctioning. We will soon be on the seventh Prime Minister since the Brexit referendum ten years ago today, and such a turnover suggests something is not right.

Yet it is less obvious to say what is not right, as each departure can be explained and indeed justified on its own terms.

Cameron resigned because his government lost the Brexit referendum.

May resigned because she lost the confidence of her party and parliament regarding the Brexit exit deal.

Johnson resigned because the loss of support with his parliamentary party notwithstanding the huge majority (like Starmer) he had won a couple of years before.

Truss resigned because her and her Chancellor created an economic crisis.

Sunak went because he lost a general election.

And Starmer is going because he too has lost the confidence of his parliamentary majority.

Which of these particular departures can one object to or even quibble about?

If each departure can be justified on its own terms, the suggestion must be that the departures are signs of a political system working rather than not working.

But aggregate numbers change minds – or at least perspectives.

Yes, each of the departures makes sense by themselves, but six? In ten years? Surely that cannot be right?

Not long ago we had the premierships of Thatcher (eleven years), Major (seven years), and Blair (ten years).

If each departure was the right thing to happen, then the better question is why our political system keeps producing Prime Ministers who soon lose the confidence of their parliamentary supporters?

One could blame party members – for example, for Johnson and Truss.

But that explanation does not fit all.

Another answer is that we have had a run of prime ministers who could not or would not manage their parliamentary majority. Here May was in an impossible situation, but it is obvious Johnson, Truss and Starmer did not have happy relationships with their backbenchers.

The answer this blog will offer as to whether losing six prime ministers in ten years is a sign of our political system functioning or dtysfunctioning is that, given each departure was justified, it is a sign of a working polity.

But the constant production of prime ministers who so quickly lose their support is, in contrast, a sign of the system not working.

It is not that we keep getting rid of poor Prime Minister that is the problem, but that we keep appointing them.

It is an input issue, not an output issue.

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