Litigation settlements and public policy

3rd September 2026

How settling litigation is being (wrongly) used for broader political goals

There have been two interesting examples of litigation settlements in the United States being used for wider political goals.

In respect of one example, the liberal minded may go Boo!

In respect of the other example, the liberal minded may go Hurrah!

This post sets out why one should go Boo! to both.

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The first example is President Trump’s supposed settlement of his claim against his own government. You may recall that one proposed term of this settlement was the creation of a huge slush fund for his political supporters.

Boo!

Of course, such a move was illiberal and misconceived. It is not the proper purpose of a settlement agreement to set up arrangements by which over a billion dollars of public money can be distributed to those who broke the law in their political support for Trump.

This is instead the sort of thing for which legislation should be used – or not used.

Using what is, in essence, a private agreement to set up such a scheme is far more than a compromise between parties settling a law suit.

And the fund seems to have got little traction and looks like it has been abandoned.

It was an ingenious ploy – and quite, quite wrong.

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The second example is the settlement by which various states in the United States have forced Meta to make widespread changes to its platforms in respect of child protection.

Hurrah!

Meta has thereby been obliged to make changes which it has long resisted and in respect of which it has lobbied politicians to oppose.

The state governments nonetheless worked out a means be which they could get their way.

As part of the agreement to end the litigation, Meta undertook to make wide changes in its commercial and technical practices.

But again, a settlement agreement is not the appropriate means to effect such wider changes.

One may clap and cheer at the result – a mighty corporation tamed – but we should also tut at how it was achieved.

Litigation is not an exact science and cases can and do go against expectations. The dynamics of a case change over time, and developments in the course of litigation can swing in various directions and at a range of speeds.

In this case, it so happened that Meta saw an advantage in settling on such terms. But that may well not have happened. And any settlement could have been on far less attractive terms to the government.

And public policy should not really be set by one lot of litigation lawyers in a contest with another lot of litigation lawyers.

Forcing such changes on a corporation like Meta is instead the job of laws and law-makers, governors and decision-makers.

That Meta and other corporations are so effective in stymying such rule making and decision making does not change this basic constitutional point.

In this case, yes – there was a good outcome for those who wish corporations to be more responsible.

But it would be better if such wider changes were done by those actually elected to make and implement public policy: by politicians after deliberation, and not by opposing litigation lawyers in a deal.

Over at Prospect I have developed this argument further.

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Just like setting up public inquiries are often an admission of the failure of accountability of institutions that should have dealt with matters in real time and at the time, looking to litigation settlements to push through wide changes is also an admission of the failure of institutions to deal with matters as they should.

Settlements of litigation cases should have the narrow purpose of, well, settling a dispute between parties.

Settlements of litigation cases should not be used to settle wider political and policy issues.

Why Trump’s lawsuit against the BBC is not going well for him

4th August 2026

How he has fallen into a discovery trap of his own making

One point which was emphasised in the litigation department of where I was a junior litigator was to always prepare for trial.

Each step of the litigation process, from pre-action correspondence onwards, was to be regarded to be part of a whole. Each part related to another part.

Everything had to fit together.

This meant that, say, shooting off letter before claim with no real regard to what would – or could – happen later on was an absolute no-no. You do not just send a threatening letter, still less issue and serve a claim, just to press the other side into settlement. You had to assume that the case could go all the way, and plan accordingly. Sending threatening letters as an end in themselves could be left to other law firms. Only when you had thought through every contingency should any legal letter be sent or any claim brought.

Perhaps paradoxically, this meant cases did tend to settle early. As military theorists aver, for peace prepare for battle. The other side’s lawyers (if competent) can often tell if a threat or a claim is serious, and they will advise their clients appropriately.

This policy tied in with the maxim from the same litigation department: we may be disappointed by what the other side do in a dispute, but we are never, ever surprised.

(Always beware of the litigation lawyer who says in correspondence that they are “surprised” by something the other side do, for they are doing the wrong job.)

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President Donald Trump does not adopt this cautious thought-through approach with his litigation.

He instead seeks to press the other side into an early settlement. He assumes that with a big enough threat that the other side will cave. For him threatening and issuing lawsuits are about creating and using leverage. It can be fairly described as bullying.

And in practice it often works. There are many law firms as well as other entities and institutions that duly surrendered at the prospect of a legal assault. Such appeasement may have good reasons or bad reasons, but it means that Trump does not need to do any more that raise his litigation standard. The other side do the rest – and do it to themselves.

But what happens when the other side does not give in, and they instead make a fight of it?

Then such a front-loaded tactic can come a cropper, for it is a tactic without a strategy. Like a chess player who can only think one move ahead, an aggressive litigator can quickly be placed at a disadvantage. For what can seem a good idea when launching a claim can soon be exposed as a very bad idea.

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And so we come to the pratfall, the utter clustermuck of President Donald Trump’s lawsuit against the British Broadcasting Corporation.

This is an example of a front-loaded claim which is now coming apart because of its own contradictions. And we can watch this happen in real time. The admirable United States practice of publishing dockets online mean we can see the progress (or otherwise) of this lawsuit, document-by-document.

The circumstances giving rise to the claim are well known. The BBC showed (in the UK) a documentary about Trump where footage of a speech was misleadingly edited. This was a significant editorial mistake for which the BBC apologised. Executives even resigned.

Trump smelt blood. Trump often brings cases when there is an actual wrong. What he then does is use that wrong as a basis for far-reaching and excessive demands. In his case against his own Treasury there was a wrong about his wrongfully disclosed tax records. He is adept at spotting weaknesses and exploiting them.

And so Trump is suing the BBC in respect of this editorial error. The error was enough for a pretext for a claim, so as to exert pressure on a major media company. But there are problems with the claim. There seems to be, for example, no evidence that anybody in the United States even saw the documentary, let alone that the programme caused him any damage.

Yet when he brought the claim, he put the demand at five billion dollars (or ten billion dollars depending on how the claim is constructed, though the two amounts seem to be duplicated).

How could he possibly justify such an inflated demand?

Well, Trump asserted that the BBC documentary at issue had made him suffer “extensive economic harms” and “injury to [his] business and personal reputation inflicted by [the BBC]… thereby causing massive economic damage to his brand value and significant damage and injury to his future financial prospects”.

He further pleaded that this damage resulted in “direct harm to his professional and occupational interests, including, without limitation, the value of his brand, properties, and businesses, and severe diminishment and tarnishing of his reputation as a politician, leader, and businessman in the eyes of the American public and around the world.”

This, of course, is all twaddle – preposterous flapdoodle.

But it served the immediate purpose of rendering plausible the amount demanded. It was not just harm to him personally, but to his business. There was not just economic harm, but “extensive” economic harm. There was not just economic damage but “massive” economic damage. And so on. The claim could not be put higher.

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Such bombast and bluster in support of an inflated claim has now brought problems to Trump, for the BBC did not fold but are defending the claim. Trump now has to evidence the claims of “extensive” and “massive” economic harm and damage.

The BBC are seeking discovery – disclosure – of documentation and other materials that are relevant to whether Trump has suffered any such economic harm and damage.

Discovery is an important pre-trial stage in any litigation case. What comes out in discovery will often make a break a claim or a defence, long before any trial date. No sensible plaintiff (as they are called in the United States, and still should be called here) should ever embark on a claim without an assessment of its own evidence base.

And similarly, no defendant should ever oppose a case hoping, Micawber-like, that something will come out in discovery. Discovery should always be a servant and not a master. But if a defendant is having to defend a case, discovery is a fair and effective weapon in the litigation arsenal.

Because of the wide-ranging claims of commercial damage, the BBC are entirely justified in seeking discovery of documents relevant to the claim. And such discovery is not limited to evidence in support or defence of the claim, but it covers any relevant material. The material does not even need to be admissible. The only exception is privileged documentation.

Trump does not want to disclose this evidence, even though the claimed damage is an element of the claim being brought. His lawyers resisted the application. His lawyers argued that the request is improper as well as disproportionate and unduly burdensome. The lawyers even said that such commercial damage could just be dealt with by a simple expert report at trial.

In essence, Trump and his lawyers were trapped between the broad terms of the initial claim and the direct consequences of those broad terms. What must have seemed a bright idea to force the BBC into early settlement is now a very real problem for them at this disclosure stage. They have to put up, else they may face a court order to shut up.

Because of the refusal to disclose the evidence, the matter went before the court. And in a readable and interesting Order, the judge sides completely with BBC. In paragraph after paragraph the judge hoists up Trump and their lawyers by their own petard.

This, of course, may not be the end of the case. Trump may appeal. Trump’s lawyers may come up with some ingenious device to get past this obstacle. Or the BBC may choose this moment to offer a face-saving sop to Trump so as to extract itself from this daft but dangerous litigation. This case is unlikely to have a clean break.

But until and unless something else happens, Trump and his lawyers have a problem – and it is a problem entirely of their own making.

Always prepare for trial.

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A judgment for the ages, and my Prospect article

17th July 2026

Do read this judgment – and my Prospect comment

Yesterday this blog published a post, but it had a borked link to the judgment mentioned. Although this was quickly corrected online, it meant those who only read emails would not have the link.

That judgment of the ages is here – and you really should read it in full.

And my Weekly Constitutional article at Prospect on the case is here.

I should be publishing a fuller post on here on the case soon.

Trump’s most extraordinary abuse of court comes to an end

16th July 2026

A judge has made a splendid Order, which should be read in full.

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There has never been a case like this one.

That is not just the view of some passing legal blogger, but of the judge herself. As Judge Kathleen M. Williams said in her latest, highly significant order:

“But perhaps the most startling misstatement advanced by Plaintiffs is their characterization of this case as “ordinary.” […] There is nothing “ordinary” about this case; it is the very definition of sui generis.”

Sui generis” is a legal phrase, meaning a thing is unique.

As a biologist would say, a thing has a genus all of its own.

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The case is, of course, the (supposed) litigation between President Trump and his own government, which was (supposedly) settled in a way so as to lead to a huge slush fund for political allies and wide ranging tax immunities for Trump.

And that has come to a halt, with this wonderful piece of legal writing, which you should read in full.

 

I will do a longer piece on here when I have fully recovered from an irksome illness, and thank you for your patience in the meantime.

Independence day

4th July 2026

A republic, if they can keep it – as Franklin said

The Trump slush fund appears to have been aborted – but the real problem about the ‘settlement’ remains

3rd June 2026

The root cause of this outrage is not addressed by this pruning

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The proposal for a ‘anti-weaponisation’ fund seems to have been dumped.

The acting Attorney General of the United States said at Congressional meeting yesterday that:

“We are not moving forward with the fund.”

Nor indeed moving in any direction with the fund.

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But the fund was a consequence of a more fundamental abuse of power which is still in place, and until that is hacked out there will be other problems.

As set out in previous posts, a contrived and inflated legal case was brought by Trump (and his son and his company) against the United States government, which was then purportedly ‘settled’ between the parties, though without court approval or even recognition.

The settlement – that is a contract – was then used as a legal basis to create rights and obligations of an extraordinary nature.

To allude to the eminent jurist Meat Loaf, one can do many things with settlement agreements, but one cannot do that.

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One provision of the supposed ‘settlement’ was the creation of the ‘anti-weaponisation’ slush fund to benefit various supporters of Trump. This audacious move now appears to have been aborted.

But other extraordinary provisions with a basis on what only a private contract are still in place.

This is an addendum to the supposed agreement:

This is a wide immunity for the plaintiffs – and others! – from more-or-less any action the United States treasury or revenue service could take against them. If the provision had effect, it would fetter the tax authorities, preventing them from doing a whole range of actions.

Such an immunity should, if it exists at all, have a solid legal basis – and should be approved or overseen by Congress.

But to base such an immunity on the shaky-flimsy basis of a private contract without any court recognition is, well, inappropriate.

One suspect that one purpose of the litigation was to get in place a ‘settlement’ agreement, where the opportunity would be taken to place wide-ranging obligations and restrictions on the tax authorities.

As reported in yesterday’s post the court has re-opened that litigation. If the litigation is now stuck out then there will not even be nominally a dispute, and without a supposed dispute there cannot be a settlement.

That would mean the above immunities would go too – to the extent they even exist at law.

So a lot still rides on what the court does with this re-opened case.

The slush fund seems to have gone, but will the rest of the ‘settlement’ go too?

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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How a new court Order means Trump’s slush fund is now in peril

2nd June 2026

The judge has re-opened the supposed ‘settled’ case

In a significant development the court has now re-opened the litigation which had ended in the supposed ‘settlement’ of a slush fund for President Trump’s political supporters.

You may recall that this blog has previously covered this extraordinary case.

The story so far in essence:

– Trump (and his son and company) brought a largely contrived case against his own government for inflated damages of $10 billion;

– the court rightly doubted that this was an actual dispute between the parties, and so required further submissions on jurisdiction;

– just before the deadline for those submissions, Trump and his co-plaintiffs pulled their claim, leading the court to formally end the case;

– there was then a supposed “settlement” between the parties but without any court recognition which purported to set up a $1.776 billion slush fund and also to grant legal immunity for Trump and others;

– but this ‘settlement’ has been challenged by former Capitol police and also by a group of former federal judges.

Well, the action brought by the group of former federal judges has actually gained some traction.

The judge has now re-opened the case.

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Here is the online docket, and sometimes dockets are a form of poetry.

Online docket showing the case closing and reopening.

You can see on 18 May 2026 the case was closed, and then on 27-29 there was an application and then an Order to re-open the case.

You may recall from an earlier post that the former judges are attacking the ‘settlement’ from the perspective that there was an abuse of process in pulling the case and then purporting to settle it.

The judge now has re-opened the case, and she is now asking for even more submissions from the parties.

re-openedOrder asking for even more submissions from the parties

This places the parties in a far worse position than they were on the eve of the case being pulled. And here there seems to be no way out for the parties by trying to pull and ‘settle’ the case again. They have to come up with the submissions, else presumably the the case will be struck out.

You will see that those challenging the ‘settlement’ can, in turn, make submissions in reply.

This is a huge set-back for the parties setting up this slush-fund on the back of a ‘settlement’. If the case is struck out, there is nothing to settle, and so there cannot be any kind of ‘settlement’.

The rug is being pulled.

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There is so, so much wrong with this case, from every angle. It is like an implausible exam question for law students. This is not what litigation is for and this is not what settlements are for.

But at least now there is a chance for the court to self-correct the excesses of the parties, for if the case is struck out there cannot be a ‘settlement’ – either recognised by the court or otherwise.

Let’s keep watching.

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The two interesting legal challenges to the Trump legal “settlement” slush fund

28th May 2026

How two cases show how a problem can be attacked in two different ways

This blog has previously covered the extraordinary legal suit brought by Donald Trump against his own government and then the extraordinary supposed “settlement” of that law suit.

That “settlement” purported to use a private agreement (not placed before a court) to establish a high-value fund to benefit political allies of the president – including the insurrectionists who attacked the Capitol.

It looked as if the legal side of the case was over, and it was now a matter for politics.

But the legal side is not over.

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There are (at least) two legal challenges to what has happened, from different perspectives. Both are legally interesting, as they attack the problem from different legal angles.

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One challenge is from two police officers who were at the Capitol during the attempted insurrection.

You can read their challenge here.

The police Plaintiffs are applying for orders and other court relief to quash the establishment of the fund – primarily on the basis that the federal government does not have the legal authority to do what it is purporting to do.

List of the Orders and other relief applied for by the plaintiffs.

This appears to be essentially a public law action against the federal government. It is exactly the right sort of case to bring against public bodies exceeding their powers.

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The other case is far more legally ambitious and imaginative, and it has been brought by a posse of retired federal judges, who are “Movants” (lovely legal word) of a motion for the court itself to re-open the case.

A description of the Movants' case.

This is also exactly the right challenge to bring – but in respect of what appears to have been the abuse of process which led to the supposed “settlement”.

If the Movants succeed then the court will re-open the case and continue with its inquiry into whether there was a real dispute.

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Some abuses of the law are straightforward, and when they occur they usually lend themselves to an obvious remedy.

But the more extraordinary the abuse, the more any remedy has to be especially fashioned.

Here the police Plaintiffs and the federal judge Movants have worked out two different ways to approach the instant situation – one by attacking the outputs (the setting up of the fund), the other attacking the inputs (the way the supposed litigation ended).

I am not an American lawyer, and so I do not know if either case has merit and/or will have traction. But both are interesting ways to get the courts to weigh back in an utter outrage that had looked as if it had escaped the courts.

The odd setting up of what appears to be a corrupt slush fund for the allies of President Trump

22nd May 2026

In which a settlement agreement is pushed far beyond any proper legal limits

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Contract law is a fascinating subject: it is about how parties can create legal obligations and rights between themselves which otherwise would not exist.

Constitutional and other forms of public law are, of course also fascinating: for they set out what can and cannot be done by those charged with public power.

And when contract law and constitutional law mix, then the results are even more fascinating.

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The legal suit brought by President Trump (and his son and his corporation) against his own government is extraordinary for many reasons.

In particular two things stand out.

First, there does not seem to be a dispute capable of being adjudicated by a court.

Second, there does not seem to have been a settlement in any legally recognisable form.

To adapt a famous techie saying: bizarre in, bizarre out.

In reality the whole exercise is brazen corruption. Everyone knows this, though many do not seem to care. It is the sort of thing that should (but will not) lead to Trump’s immediate impeachment and removal from office.

But, this being a law and policy blog, let us go though the motions of looking at this racket from a legal perspective. If anything, it will show what an odd thing is going on.

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As this blog has already set out (as well as at this Prospect piece), the law suit was a rum affair.

That is not to say there was not an underlying legal wrong: the leaking of the president’s tax returns (even if in the public interest) was an unlawful act and indeed the leaker has been prosecuted under the criminal law.

And generally (if not universally) speaking where there is a criminal offence there is usually a civil wrong – what lawyers call a tort.

The records of Trump were leaked by a government contractor and so, in principle, there is both blame and a claim.

But on this basis, Trump and his co-plaintiffs constructed a demand for an extortionate amount – far above what would be the level of damages for such a wrong – and brought the claim at a time when Trump was in effect the head of the defendants. Trump thereby would have effective control of both sides of the case.

The plaintiffs, however, encountered a problem. The court was not convinced it could hear a claim where one person controlled both sides. And if there is not an actual dispute between parties in disagreement, then the court would not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.

At this point the judge could have simply stuck out the suit for want of jurisdiction (though that probably would have been appealed). Instead, the judge invited the parties to make submissions on the jurisdiction point – and she also appointed independent lawyers as “friends of the court” to make submissions which the parties may selfishly not wish to make.

The deadline for those submissions was last week. But the plaintiffs did not make submissions. They pulled the case instead. The claim was dropped.

Court order with highlighted text ORDER CLOSING CASE THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice (“Notice”) (DE 52). In the Notice, Plaintiffs state that they are voluntarily dismissing the instant litigation with prejudice

 

We will never now get to know how the court would determine the issue.

And if you looked at the court record – the online docket is publicly available here – that is the end of the story.

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But the story does not end there.

There is a supposed “settlement” – click here.

Title of settlement agreement

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This is not a settlement agreement which the parties put before the court to be endorsed. It is thereby not an agreement that has been recognised by the court, still less are its terms enforceable by the court before which the relevant litigation was brought.

It is instead a private agreement between parties to, among other things, bring the litigation to an end.

Such private side agreements are possible, though the parties lose any benefit of the relevant court recognising and enforcing the terms of the agreement.

The remarkable thing about the supposed settlement agreement is not that it ends the law suit – it is what the agreement purports to do as well.

In essence: a private settlement agreement is being used as a basis for legislating for a lucrative fund for the benefit of third parties and immunity from criminal prosecution for the plaintiffs.

Contracts – including settlement agreements – can be used for many complex and imaginative things, but this goes beyond the extremes for what any contract can properly be used for.

This is instead the sort of stuff that legislation is for, passed by Congress – not a settlement agreement which has not even been placed before a court for endorsement.

The settlement agreement even purports to provide for the tax status of this fund, a fund which is intended to benefit those allies of the president who have been accused of and convicted of crimes against public officials.

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We are in strange times and so nobody can say with any certainty that this slush fund will be held to be unlawful if not unconstitutional.

The scheme should, of course, be quashed on the spot.

The cynical audacity of the proposal, and the means by which it has been contrived, warrant gasps – though not of admiration.

Over at Prospect – click here – this week’s Weekly Constitutional post is about this example of sheer charlatanism.

And that post concludes by saying that if this sort of thing can be imagined by Trump and his cronies, whatever will he and his cronies try to get away with next.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The purpose of processes and policies and law in government is not to make things better, but to stop things being even worse

5th May 2026

The real reason we need rules and procedures in public administration

It is a paradox that in the weeks and days before an election people tend to become less interested in law and policy. The focus instead turns to politics and personalities, and the soap opera of who is up and who is down, and who is in and who is out.

And in the days after the elections, those who could not predict the outcome will confidently assert that the result proved them right all along.

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This is not really a politics blog, and it has no party-partisan preference. Indeed, the general view of the blog is that governments tend to be illiberal, regardless of which politicians take power, and that the politicians who affect to be liberal in opposition tend not to carry that liberalism over into office.

As the eminent jurists the Bonzo Dog Band aver, it can seem that no matter who you vote for the government always gets in.

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But.

We have in popular opposition not only those parading their liberalism, but the illiberalism, and so voters have a choice between the possibility of liberalism (and likely disappointment) and the certainty of illiberalism (and likely despotism).

And so it is at times like that we should take more interest in the actual workings of government and now public administration works. We should watch how public administration is conducted with anxious scrutiny.

This is why, perhaps counter-intuitively, the whole Starmer-Mandelson-Robbins affair is important.

In respect of political drama, the matter may not be of lasting import: the media caravan has moved on, and the attention-spans of the easily bored have been exhausted. The Prime Minister is still in office and if he is to be deposed, then it will because of a further political drama and not the one which has just passed.

The importance of what happened is otherwise than of immediate political effect. It was instead in the rare insight we had into how ministers and officials actually do make decisions (or don’t make decisions). The sort of thing which is usually hidden from public view.

An excellent balanced and informed account of the matter has now been posted at the Substack of the estimable former civil servant Martin Stanley. That post is required reading for anybody with an interest in our government in action (or inaction).

What I can add from the perspective of a former central government lawyer is that the informal-formal inexact process and lack of process is not unusual in Whitehall. The only difference here is that a stone has been lifted and we get to see what was teeming underneath.

(Public administration is more about teems than teams.)

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Sometimes one can fall into the error of thinking government and administration is about the neat, almost-Euclidean geometry of decision trees and straight lines on a grand plane of an organogram. No, it is often a mess, both at the time and when there has to be an account of it afterwards.

This is why one the purpose of processes and policies and public law is not so much to make things go well, but to help stop things being worse. For example, the law of public procurement is not really there to help public authorities to make good purchasing decisions, but to stop public authorities making worse purchasing decisions than they otherwise would do.

And this is the significance of the Starmer-Mandelson-Robbins affair: we got to see under the rock. From that we can take the wider understanding that this is how important decisions and indecisions are made more generally. And that, in turn, helps explain why we have such an accountability gap in the government of the United Kingdom.

There is a general disconnect between how ministers and officials take decisions and how those decisions are accounted for to parliament, and to the media and public.

Certain executive-minded pundits and activists want to reduce even further the role of processes and policies and public law in government – to get rid of impediments and barriers.

They think that will make public administration better and more effective, but it is more likely to make public administration even worse than it already is.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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