Some preliminary thoughts on the Court of Appeal decision on Palestine Action

16th June 2026

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Why it is important to understand how (bad) law is structured

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Yesterday the Court of Appeal handed Palestine Action a heavy defeat, reversing a favourable High Court decision.

The Court of Appeal decision is here.

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This blog does not support Palestine Action or any other proscribed organisation, but this blog often looks at the use and misuse of terrorism and other coercive laws. And on the face of it, it does look like terrorism law is being misused, at least in respect of the mass arrests of people for merely holding signs expressing support for Palestine Action.

For hundreds, if not thousands, of people are facing criminal sanctions for a speech act: according to the judgment 2,000 have been arrested and “there are currently over 700 cases pending in the criminal courts of England and Wales, and many more at the pre-charge stage”. This would appear to be a ludicrous situation and not a use to which one would expect terrorism law to be put.

(Terrorism law is a special body of law, in addition to the general civil and criminal law of the land, which provides the state with powers, rights, and obligations for the particular purpose of dealing with terrorist threats.)

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On a preliminary reading of the judgment, and having watched (in a boon for the public understanding of law) the Court of Appeal’s decision on YouTube (watch here), these are some preliminary thoughts which this blog may develop further in another post.

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First, this decision is more in accordance with the deferent general policy of the courts on national security than the somewhat surprising High Court decision. In essence, Palestine Action were lucky at first instance and it was perhaps unrealistic to expect that luck to hold before the Court of Appeal.

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Second, the fundamental issue is that the restrictions on free expression (for expressing support for a proscribed organisation) is just one of many aspects of proscription. Proscription of an organisation confers on the state a whole range of powers, of which prohibiting expressions of support is just one. So if a proscription is quashed, then the state loses all these other powers.

This means that if a court holds that a proscription has a disproportionate impact on the free expression rights of individuals there is perhaps nothing a court can really do but quash the proscription for other purposes too. A court will be hesitant to do this.

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Third, if a court can somehow decide that free expression rights are not being disproportionately interfered with, it can avoid quashing the proscription. Here the Court of Appeal stated: “That said, however, as a matter of law, the Proscription Decision will not prevent public expressions of support for the Palestinian cause or opposition to Israel and to the Israeli Defence Force, or demonstrations targeted at Elbit.”

And so the Court of Appeal found that the impact on free expression of the proscription was not disproportionate. The problem was avoided.

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And this leads to the fourth point.

The real problem here is that section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (which was only added in 2019) should not be in the Terrorism Act at all.

Section 12(1A) of the Terrorism Act prohibiting support for proscribed organisations.

This prohibition on simply expressing an opinion is, of course, problematic generally.

But if a court quashes a proscription because the effects of the section 12(1A) prohibition is disproportionate then all the proscription powers go too.

A court will then strain, as it seems the Court of Appeal did here, to find that the proscription does not have a disproportionate effect.

From time to time a court, such as the High Court at first instance in this case, will quash such a proscription decision for its disproportionate effects on free expression, but such a quashing order is unlikely to survive appeal.

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Fifth, this appeal decision looks balanced in form (with lots of consideration of opposing factors) but in substance it seems fairly appeal-proof.

(And the current Supreme Court is also not likely to go against the government on national security.)

The Court of Appeal had what was a ‘strong’ bench, with the Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the Vice President of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, and two other senior appeal judges. Usually an appeal bench is of three judges, but here it is of five, and they were unanimous.

Unless this case goes to Strasbourg then this decision looks like the end of the road.

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And finally, the Court of Appeal in this case made, in passing, some ill-advised historical generalisations about the Suffragettes and other groups.

This historical dabbling will rile anyone with the relevant knowledge of history, and it should have been avoided by the judges, unless it was relevant to a question they had to decide. But to make such points for the purpose of illustration simply made the judges seem historically illiterate. The judges may well come to regret making those points.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The Palestine Action proscription case and the botched prosecution of Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh – how the Home Office, the police, and the prosecutors, are not taking terrorism law seriously

13th March 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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Terrorism law is important and should be credible

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Let us start with the most basic point about terrorism law.

Terrorism law should be credible and taken seriously.

Terrorism law is a special body of law, in addition to the general laws of the land, conferring special powers and creating special rules in respect of the threat of terrorism.

As such, of all areas of law, it should be taken seriously and it should be credible.

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The United Kingdom never really used to have terrorism law, at least in permanent form.

Instead we had, for example, a succession of temporary Prevention Of Terrorism Acts, of deliberately limited duration, renewed as and when by parliament.

And it was on this improvised legal basis that the United Kingdom dealt with the the terrorism that flowed from the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, which came to an end to a large extent with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

Somehow those threats had been dealt with and a sort of resolution achieved without the need for any permanent terrorism legislation.

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And then something changed.

And after 2000 the United Kingdom, year-on-year, created a body of permanent terrorism law, creating a security state within the state.

This was partly because of 9/11 and what followed – though the 2000 Act received royal assent before that dreadful tragedy.

And it was partly because of (perhaps counter-intuitively) the Human Rights Act 1998, which required all interferences with the fundamental rights of individuals to have an express legal basis. In other words, some of this stuff had been going on before, but there had been no statutory framework, as it had not been needed.

But after 2000, and for whatever reasons, permanent terrorism legislation grew like topsy.

Looking at the titles of the primary legislation, you may think that the “anti-terrorism” and “counter-terrorism” Acts would cancel out the “terrorism” Acts, but: no. The effect is accumulative.

In addition to the eleven Acts listed above from 2000 to 2025, we have had other extensive primary legislation on surveillance and data retention and national security.

According the the legislation website we have also had 163 items of secondary legislation with “terrorism” in the title since 2000.

Huge piles of new legislation on terrorism since 2000.

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But, still, terrorism legislation should be taken seriously and be credible. Even if one can be concerned at the ever-growing extent of terrorism law, it serves – or should serve – an important legal purpose.

Terrorism legislation provides – or should provide – a special body of law for dealing with terrorism which cannot be done with the general law of the land.

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The problem is that recent events have shown that terrorism legislation is not being taken seriously – and it is not being taken seriously by those who should take it seriously: the government, the police, and the public prosecutors.

And this is obvious from how section 13 and related provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended) are treated by those with public power.

Here are three examples.

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First, the proscription of Palestine Action by the Home Secretary was been ruled unlawful by the High Court.

(On this, see my posts here and here.)

The details of the High Court judgment show a Home Office that did not take the proscription seriously, imposing the sanction on flimsy or non-existent basis.

Even if the Home Office reverse this ruling on appeal, this is the sort of measure that should not have come anywhere close to a successful legal challenge.

The courts are usually deferent on matters of national security, and the judges were not impressed by Palestine Action, but even the High Court could not buy this proscription.

And this was because the Home Secretary and the Home Office did not take terrorism legislation seriously.

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Second, the botched prosecution of Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh, the Kneecap rapper, shows the police not taking terrorism legislation seriously.

(See my Prospect post from yesterday here.)

The police did nothing about an alleged incident for six months, even though supposed breaches of terrorism law should presumably be dealt with swiftly and diligently.

And then the police panicked at the six-month deadline for the relevant offence – and royally mucked up because they had not got the relevant consent in time.

From Kneecap to Keystone.

These are the same anti-terrorism officers who, of course, are supposed to be keeping us safe.

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And then we have the public prosecutors in the same case.

When the defendant’s lawyers rightly pointed out that the prosecution was void for want of jurisdiction – because the requisite consent was not in place in time – the Chief Magistrate of England and Wales (no less) threw out the prosecution.

But the public prosecutors could not accept this decision.

Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh simply had to be prosecuted for the alleged incident, no matter the cost to the public purse, and no matter the effect on settled case law.

The Director of Public Prosecutions resorted to the rarely used appeal by case stated to get the High Court to reverse the decision of the Chief Magistrate of England and Wales.

One would think that given the substantial delays and backlogs in the criminal justice system – some now lasting years – and which are seemingly so bad that the jury system itself may be dismantled – would mean that the Crown Prosecution Service would have better things to do.

But no, Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh simply had to be prosecuted.

The High Court, however, were not impressed with the appeal.

The High Court pointed out that siding with the Director of Public Prosecutions in this matter would disrupt plain statutory provisions and settled caselaw.

The High Court even went to the extent of stating its “concern” at the “mistake” for which there should be “blame” in a classic passage of judicial understatement (emphasis added):

“It is a matter of concern that a charge which both the DPP and the Attorney General considered met both parts of the Full Code Test for Crown Prosecutors will never now be determined. There was, they decided, a realistic prospect of conviction and the prosecution was in the public interest. We have not investigated the reasons for this failure and nor do we seek to attribute blame. That is not because these circumstances are not worthy of consideration but because they are irrelevant to our decision.”

Ouch.

The Director of Public Prosecutions, of course, should not have wasted their department’s scarce (and valuable) resources on this hopeless appeal. The Crown Prosecution Service should concentrate on putting cases together, not trying to cover its back for when a mistake was made.

By the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service pretending no mistake had been made (with an appeal based on an extraordinarily unconvincing case theory with no basis in any authority), they too showed they did not take the applicable terrorism law seriously.

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By saying terrorism law should be taken seriously one is not denying that there is a purpose to terrorism law.

It is to say that terrorism law should not be taken lightly.

Credibility of any area of law can be fragile, and terrorism law deserves better than recent antics of the Home Office, the police, and the public prosecutors.

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This post is also cross posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

What the Palestine Action judgment means – and what it does not mean

13th February 2026

The High Court rules against the government, but not with enthusiasm

This morning the High Court handed down its judgment in the Palestine Action proscription challenge.

I wrote a quick commissioned piece at Prospect within a couple of hours of the judgment being handed down – and I just want to add and develop a few thoughts.

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First, the judgment shows the independence of the High Court in two ways.

A ruling against the government by definition indicates the independence of the judiciary from the executive.

(For what it is worth, I thought a decision against the government was possible when it switched from being a single judge to a three judge panel headed by the President of the King’s Bench Division – a “strong bench” – for a strong bench would be more likely to rule against the government on a matter of national security than a single judge. That said one can never “read” any High Court judge(s).)

But the judgment shows the independence of the court in another refreshing way.

For if you look at the judgment it is plain that the court is not impressed by Palestine Action.

It is always heartening to see a court side with a party with which it has little or no sympathy. It means the court has not got carried away with motivated reasoning in favour of the party it wants to win.

The court said bluntly:

“[Palestine Action’s] campaign is intended to close down the operations of a company pursuing a lawful business. The campaign has not been pursued with restraint. The wide range of targets is significant. It lays bare that Palestine Action’s campaign and pursuit of criminal damage is designed to intimidate the persons and businesses targeted so they end their commercial relationships with Elbit. Palestine Action is not engaged in any exercise of persuasion, or at least not the type of persuasion that is consistent with democratic values and the rule of law.”

Anyone coming across that passage early on in a judgment might have expected Palestine Action to have lost the case.

But no.

The court found in favour of Palestine Action anyway.

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Second, it was an impressive legal win – even if the court was not impressed by Palestine Action.

To win any judicial review against the government on a terrorism-related matter is difficult.

And to win any challenge to any statutory instrument (such as the one which proscribed Palestine Action) is difficult, as opposed to challenging a mere exercise of discretion by an official or a minister.

To do both is remarkable.

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Third, the government really only has itself to blame.

Here I mean both the government in general as well as the current administration.

In 2019 the government widened the scope of the relevant Terrorism law to include expressions of support for a proscribed organisation. (Technically this was done by parliament, but at the government’s behest.)

It must have seemed a good, illiberal idea at the time.

But it meant if an organisation was proscribed for one purpose – to target its organisation, membership and fund-raisers – it also criminalised expression of support too.

It became a one-size fits all provision which meant any proscription automatically infringed the right to free expression of those who were not organisers, members or fund-raisers.

This in turn meant that a court – like today – would look at any proscription with anxious scrutiny.

By wanting to prohibit more and more, the government made any proscription more exposed to legal challenge.

It was a very daft move by the then government.

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The government has also only got itself to blame in another way – and here it is the current administration.

It is hard to read the judgment and see the then Home Secretary and her officials as anything other than hapless.

For although legally the High Court decided against the Home Office on two pleaded grounds – in reality the reason the Home Office lost the case was because the proscription was botched.

One gets the sense from the judgment (and from the surrounding news of the time) that those at the Home Office wanted to push terrorism law to its limit – against a group which, even if not peaceful protesters, did not really fit the definition of terrorism – knowing that this would, at a stroke, criminalise not only those involved but anyone who expressed support for the group.

Those at the Home Office knew this was a stretch.

It must have been obvious that the information before them did not substantiate the proscription.

And the court today ruled it was a stretch too far.

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Fourth, the judgment today – in and of itself – does not change anything.

The law is the same today as it was yesterday – and at the time of the various mass arrests for those expressing support of Palestine Action.

The reason for this is that the court has not yet made an Order giving effect to its judgment.

And until and and unless an Order is made the legal positions of all involved stay the same.

This is because judgments – per se – do not normally have any legal effect until they are encapsulated by an Order.

(Orders are the sausages which come out of the judicial sausage factory, in the same way statutes are the sausages which come out of the parliamentary sausage factory.)

The court deliberately has delayed making an Order, and it would seem that the law may stand until and unless the government seeks an appeal.

And so Palestine Action remains a proscribed criminal organisation and expressing support for it remains a criminal offence.

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Finally, the government will no doubt throw everything at the appeal.

But the government threw everything at this hearing – and it still lost.

Perhaps the government will win on appeal.

The judgment today was balanced on both grounds on which the Home Office lost – it may not take much to shift those balances.

But a more sensible government would not appeal.

As I set out back in September 2025, the government is over-reaching with using terrorism law in this case.

But if the government really wants to proscribe Palestine Action it should put a two-clause bill through parliament making it that a proscription of an organisation, its members and fund-raisers does not automatically criminalise expressions of support for that organisation.

If the government keeps over-reaching, it may fall flat again.

And an adverse appeal judgment will be more damaging for the government than this judgment at first instance.

Nothing the Home Office will throw at the appeal will take away the fact that this was a botched proscription based on incomplete material.

The Home Office mucked up.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

The correct way to go around reviewing the ECHR – and the incorrect reasons for doing so

15th December 2025

The European Council met “unofficially” to review the European Convention on Human Rights in the context of migration asylum. This news prompted, for me, mixed feelings.

The mixed feelings meant my response was not entirely negative.

But what could possibly be positive?

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The good thing is that any changes are being done by discussion and deliberation. That signatories are not threatening to leave or to break the convention.

The convention and other constitutional and human rights codes are often called “living instruments” – though this is usually taken to mean that the scope of that code and of its provisions can be adapted and expanded by courts and tribunals from time to time.

But for any legal code to be a “living instrument” also means it can be amended and restricted (or expanded) by the codifiers from time to time – that is the legislators that wrote and ratified the code.

This is the rough that goes with the smooth if you sincerely believe constitutional and human rights codes to be “living instruments”.

No legal code, whether drawn up in 1950 – or 1215 or 1688-89 or 1789 or whenever – should be treated as unalterable: written in stone as opposed to on parchment or paper (or now in an electronic template).

Politicians revisiting constitutional and human rights codes is the price we pay for judges being able to develop those codes and their provisions.

Of course, it may well be (as is the case here) that the politicians are up to no good, that what they want to do is illiberal and misconceived.

But that is a separate and distinct argument to be had to whether the codes should be immune from political review.

As it is, the expressed “legitimate concerns” (such a cant phrase) about can and should be met by other means, rather than rigging the convention so that member states win cased which they are currently losing.

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One example, which should be better known but is not because the United Kingdom government did not want to shout about it, was the case of Abu Qatada.

His extradition to Jordan to face terrorism charges was blocked because evidence against him had been extracted by torture.

Ministers and the media huffed and puffed and threatened to blow the United Kingdom out of the ECHR.

But in the end – quietly – the governments of the United Kingdom and Jordan agreed a treaty that torture-gained evidence would not be used in such case.

Abu Qatada was extradited and then…

…he was cleared of terrorism charges.

Similar arrangements could be made in respect of other individuals who are resisting being sent to inhuman and degrading conditions.

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Anyway, I have set out the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, about this European Council deliberation over at Prospect – please click and read.

You can leave any comments on that piece below.

Extremism, conformity, and the problem of law

9th December 2025

How the law can (attempt to) regulate extremism, but it can really do nothing about conformism.

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Let us start with this thought-provoking passage:

When I visited Auschwitz many years ago, someone in our group said that this is what happens when extremism flourishes.

Our tour guide replied:

“This place is not explained by extremism. It is explained by conformity.”

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That exchange was in a recent post by Ian Dunt, which you can read here.

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The state can have a good go at regulating extremism.

The state can seek to define it, for definitions are often the starting point for law and policy.

In the United Kingdom we have the following official definition of extremism:

Extremism is the promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred or intolerance, that aims to:

(1) negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; or

(2) undermine, overturn or replace the UK’s system of liberal parliamentary democracyand democratic rights; or

(3) intentionally create a permissive environment for others to achieve the results in (1) or (2).

The types of behaviour below are indicative of the kind of promotion or advancement which may be relevant to the definition, and are an important guide to its application. The further context below is also an essential part of the definition.

If you look at the government’s webpage, you will see that this definition even has footnotes:

A definition with its own footnotes that define terms within the definition: this is serious stuff.

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The term “extremism” is even used in statutes and statutory instruments:

And once you have a term defined officially, and used widely in legal instruments, you can do legal and policy things in respect of that term:

And so we have things like the Prevent Strategy which seeks to stop extremism becoming terrorism:

And we have Crown Prosecution Service guidance which refers to extremism:

And so on.

Extremism is a bureaucratic category and, as such, a government can have laws and policies that deal seek to deal with it.

Those laws and policies may have limited or no effect, or indeed counter-productive effects, but at least the state can have a good go at addressing extremism.

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Now let us turn from extremism to conformity – the thing which the passage quoted at the head of this post warned us against:

When I visited Auschwitz many years ago, someone in our group said that this is what happens when extremism flourishes.

Our tour guide replied:

“This place is not explained by extremism. It is explained by conformity.”

What can law and policy do about conformity?

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There is perhaps nothing the law can do to counter conformity.

This is because – maybe literally, maybe logically – the law actually requires conformity.

Maybe a law against conformity is even a contradiction-in-terms, if you think about it.

One premise of law is that, well, people comply with it.

A law which sought to counter conformity would no doubt be rather self-defeating.

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The same can be said about policy: again one point about policy is that officials and the public are supposed to abide by it.

Policy, in general terms, provides what officials and the public should and should not do in certain situations. There may be exceptions in specific circumstances, but policy provides the general thrust of public action.

And on this basis, a policy against conformity is perhaps also a contradiction-in-terms, if you think about it.

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There is probably nothing law and policy can do to counter the threat of conformity.

Indeed, once illiberals and authoritarians have public power, and so can determine law and policy, conformity will reinforce illiberalism and authoritarianism.

And, as and when illiberalism and authoritarianism slide into extremism, then conformity will reinforce that extremism.

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The problem of conformity cannot thereby be solved by law and policy.

The danger needs to be addressed by other means.

And that other means is, of course, politics.

One may not be able to have a law or a policy against conformity, but one can certainly be politically opposed to it – to campaign and vote or otherwise mobilise against extremists who want to take control of the state.

And this includes resisting the temptation to conform – that is to nod-along with what is happening.

There are always extremists.

But what gives them power is not the appeal of their extremism, but the comfort others have in conformity.

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When I visited Auschwitz many years ago, someone in our group said that this is what happens when extremism flourishes.

Our tour guide replied:

“This place is not explained by extremism. It is explained by conformity.”

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

Freedom is just another word for “a gap in the law”

7th October 2025

Two glimpses of Conor Gearty – a master in promoting the public understanding of law

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Remembering the late Conor Gearty.

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Two events in the City of London: separated by twelve years in time and by a few hundred yards in distance.

Yet the events were in quite different worlds.

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It is 2000, and the Human Rights Act 1998 is about to have full effect. The Law Society have warned all solicitors in England and Wales that the legislation will have a profound impact and it would be negligent not to know about it. Law firms are scrambling to get information on this strange and supposedly powerful new statute.

And so in a conference room of an international law firm, hardened corporate and commercial lawyers are about to find out about the law of human rights.

The speaker is Conor Gearty.

And instead of talking at the assembled City lawyers, he goes around the room engaging with them, with genuine curiosity asking about transfers of types of property and the operation of trusts and pension funds. He then ties the responses into practical examples of how the European Court of Human Rights has dealt with (or not dealt with) the rights to property and to privacy and to a fair hearing.

Beside themselves, the audience become fascinated.

And in an extraordinary exercise in exposition he even conveys the then novel doctrine of proportionality and how almost every right under the Human Rights can be interfered with, and how the 1998 Act is likely to work in practice.

A session which could have gone so badly could not have been done better.

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It is now 2012, and just around the corner and up the road from that law firm there are mass tents outside St Paul’s Cathedral.

It is the time of Occupy London.

And in one of the larger tents there is a speaker meeting on protest and the rule of law, and one of the speakers on the panel is Conor Gearty.

Again he engages with everyone, talking about the big legal case then before the courts on the legality of the “occupation”, but also about protest and the rule of law generally.

He explains, again with illustrative detail, about the how the European Court of Human Rights and our domestic courts have dealt with (or not dealt with) the rights to free expression and to free assembly and to a fair hearing.

And he talks about how the rule of law can bind the powerful, as well as the powerless. He wrote about the event here (where he was characteristically generous and kind about the other speaker).

In his write-up of the event he concluded:

Last night’s event was full of hope – hope that society can be transformed; hope that our culture can find the levels of solidarity that it so desperately needs; hope that equality can be achieved rather than merely spoken about.

But this hope never collapsed into utopian illusion.

Nor did it threaten at any time to morph into a cynical aggressiveness towards a public who refuse to share the dream.

There was an intelligent awareness of the time dreams take to be realised, of the hard work that utopia demands and of the need to be there for the long haul. Minds are not changed by singular actions, however singular. They are changed when society comes to regard these singular actions as the rule rather than the exception, when common sense shifts onto the side of the erstwhile heretic. This can take a long time or happen very quickly indeed. But it can always happen. No situation is so bad that dreams – with courage, determination and patience – cannot be realised.

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The hopes of 2012 now seem a long time ago.

Occupy London is as dated in its way as the London Olympic opening ceremony.

But he was right – making things better may take a long time, and will require a long haul.

No situation is so bad that dreams – with courage, determination and patience – cannot be realised.”

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Conor Gearty was a genius in explaining often technical law in a way which related practically to whichever audience he was addressing – judges, lawyers, students, protesters, or the public generally.

(Only days before he died he was on the Prospect podcast discussing the Palestine Action proscription.)

He was also the most brilliant – and relentlessly realistic – of all exponents of a liberal and progressive approach to law.

Perhaps constitutional law – including the law of human rights and civil liberties – should be boring, not exciting.

Yet Conor Gearty was always able to make it genuinely interesting.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

A note about injunctions in the context of the Abrego Garcia case

14th April 2025

What courts can and cannot order – and what those injuncted can and should do

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In the United States the constitutional crisis seems to have intensified overnight, with the US government appearing to flout an injunctive order of the federal court to facilitate a deportee’s return – an order which has been upheld 9-0 by the US supreme court.

The case is that of Kilmar Abrego Garcia (as you can see from that Wiki page, his name has various versions, and this is the version which is preferred on that site, and it is there shortened to Abrego Garcia, which is also how the courts refer to him).

On 15 March 2025 he was unlawfully removed from the United States by the US government and deported to El Salvador.

The removal was unlawful as it was contrary to a court withholding order – and the US government has openly admitted that the removal was a mistake.

Abrego Garcia is now in the notorious Center for Terrorism Confinement (CECOT) in El Salvador, despite him not having any criminal record or other determination against him. He has not even been charged with anything.

On 7 April 2025 a federal court ordered that the US government “facilitate and effectuate” his return.

On 10 April 2025 the US Supreme Court unanimously upheld this order in respect of facilitating his return – though the court also held the term “effectuate” was unclear and required clarification.

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Pausing at this point, why did the federal court in Marlyand not simply order the US government to return Abrego Garcia?

Why even add the words “facilitate and effectuate”?

Why not just say that the US government is ordered to facilitate and effectuate the return of Abrego Garcia?

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Here we have to look at what injunctions can and cannot do.

Injunctions are powerful orders of any court.

An injunction typically fixes upon person [x] and if that person does not comply with the order, then [x] is in contempt and can be punished by the court.

The historical roots of the injunction in England go back to the old days of equity where the court, on behalf of the crown, would order that a person act in accordance with their (supposed) conscience – to do what was conscionable.

Of course, like a lot of equity, it was a fiction – those injuncted may or may not have any conscience about doing or not doing something – but that was the legal theory.

It is an order to ensure a person does what the court considers they should be doing.

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In simple cases, an injunction will be along the lines of [x] should or should not do something.

The assumptions here are that [x] is subject to the jurisdiction of the court and what [x] is being ordered to do (or not do) is within the control of [x].

But sometimes things can get more complicated.

What if [x] is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court?

What if [x] is being ordered to do something outside of their control?

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Consider the following situation:

[x] is in control of another person [y]

[x] removes [y] from the jurisdiction of the court by deporting [y] to country [z]

[x] no longer has control of [y]

[z] now has control of [y]

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In this situation the court cannot order [x] to return [y] because [x] no longer has control of [y]. Returning [y] is no longer within the power of [x].

But the court also cannot order country [z] to return [y] because [z] is outwith the jurisdiction of the court.

Therefore the court cannot simply order [x] to return [y].

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But what happens if [x] has acted unconscionably? Is the court impotent?

Well, the court can order [x] to do what they can to return [y].

In England, for example, a court may order [x] to use their best endeavours to procure the return of [y]. [x] may not be capable of being ordered to return [y] but they can be ordered to do everything they can do.

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Going back to the Abrego Garcia case, the federal court was no doubt aware that they could not simply order his return.

That is why the court ordered the US government to facilitate his return. The court also ordered the US government to “effectuate” his return, though for many this is a less clear word, though it is not absolutely unclear.

But the word “facilitate” was probably enough – anything covered by the one word would generally be covered by the other.

If the US government, for example, had contractual or other powers to insist to El Salvador that Abrego Garcia be returned, then that should be done.

The fact that he is outside the jurisdiction of the federal court does not mean the US government can now just shrug and not do anything.

The US government is required to do what they can.

And by further order of the court, the US government is now also required to give progress reports on what they are (not) doing to facilitate the return of Abrego Garcia.

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The US government does not want to do this.

As reported overnight by Aaron Reichlin-Melnick:

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It would appear from the news reports that the US government is not taking the court orders in this case seriously – that they are flatly refusing to facilitate the return of Abrego Garcia.

The US government submission is here.

You will see they are not saying that they are breaching the order – but one would expect that.

You will see that they are quibbling about what the word “facilitate” means.

Formally, at least, the government claims it is not in breach – they say that the order has no application.

The US government also do not seem to be giving the updates required by the court – at least not in any meaningful way.

The impression conveyed is that the US is flouting the order – and that, even if it were within their power to “facilitate the return of Abrego Garcia that they will not do so.

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What will happen next?

If the US government is flouting the order, which appears to be the case, then the constitutional crisis in the United States is intensifying.

Perhaps the US government will successfully appeal to the Supreme Court and that court construes the order and the word “facilitate” to mean something other than the ordinary meaning of the order and indeed the word “facilitate”.

Perhaps the court will punish those responsible at the US government for contempt.

Perhaps even Abrego Garcia will be returned.

It is in the nature of a constitutional crisis that one cannot predict the next events to unfold – for if one could predict what will happen next then it would not be a crisis.

Perhaps nothing dramatic will happen at all – and this will be another quiet tug on the fabric of the constitution the effects of which will worsen over time.

But it is hard to see anything good coming of this.

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