Why the United States attack on the school in Minab matters

23rd March 2026

The facts of the incident point to a breach of international law

 

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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Let us assume the following facts:

1. that there was a guided missile;

2. that this guided missile had a pre-selected target; and

3. that this guided missile struck that pre-selected target as it was intended to do so.

If the missile was not a guided missile, or that it struck a target that was not the pre-selected target, then one or more of the facts posited above would not be true. But let us assume those facts are the case.

Let now assume the following additional facts:

4. that a school was the pre-selected target;

5. that the guided missile struck that pre-selected target as it was intended to do so; and

6. that over one hundred schoolchildren were killed in that strike.

If these facts are also true then there is a question about fact (4): was the school a deliberate target? Was the building selected for the strike by someone (or something) knowing it was a school?

If so, then there would be a war crime, as schools are protected from such attacks under international law – on this see the able article by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown here.

But what if the school was selected by someone (or something) without realising it was a school?

Then the question becomes whether that someone (or something) should have known it was a school.

And if they did not do everything feasible to verify the status of a targeted object then the targeter is also culpable and in breach of international law.

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Over at Prospect – click here – I have done a post on whether the attack by the United States on a school in Minab is a breach of international law.

It would appear that from 2016 onwards, public domain and open source information would have shown that the school was no longer part of an adjacent compound of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

screengrab of new report on opensource material

This means that anybody (or anything) that bothered to check what they were actually doing with this $3.5 million piece of hardware, of which the United States only has a limited number, would have realised that the school was not a military target.

On costs grounds alone one would have thought they would check whether a missile would be ‘wasted’ – let alone humanitarian grounds.

But, as this New York Times report reveals, it seems that the United States did not bother to check up-to-date information. Instead the United States relied on out-of-date information, and so over one hundred schoolchildren were killed.

screengrab of NYT article

And Reuters now reports that United States military now realise they have a problem over this strike and have elevated the status of their internal inquiry.

At least the incident is being investigated.

Of course, few will feel confident that such an inquiry will lead to any open admission of culpability or any sanction against any individual.

You will probably have the Jean Charles de Menezes sort-of-situation where there was an overall, system failure – a lethal failure – but no particular person will take any blame.

But as the Prospect article concludes: in the current context of Artificial Intelligence, it would seem the application of human intelligence to public domain, open source information would mean over one hundred schoolchildren would probably still be alive today.

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This post is also cross posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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But what about international law – continued.

4th March 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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From time-to-time this law and policy blog touches upon international law.  The last time a post was devoted to it was only in January this year, though that already seems a long time ago.

The argument put forward in that post was that even if international law cannot readily be enforced, it still nonetheless can be recognised.  This means international law, like any body of law, still exists, even if it is being disregarded.

The tree still makes a noise when it falls in the forest.

But.

It is also fair to say that many are sceptical and dismissive about international law, and even some (eminent) lawyers regard it as essentially a fiction.

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One problem about international law is that it can often seem one-sided.

Take for example the inability of many (though not all) European countries to say plainly that the attacks on Iran by Israel and the United States were not in accordance with international law, let alone in breach.

When a European territory (like Greenland) and a European country (Ukraine) are threatened or attacked, then European leaders are ready to invoke international law.

But when it is not a European territory or a European country at stake, there is an awkward silence.

Of course, the United Kingdom government know that the attacks on Iran were illegal – it is the necessary implication of the stated position on the validity of “defensive” attacks.

And, of course, we know why as a matter of realpolitik the United Kingdom government thinks it cannot say this aloud.

No sensible person is under any illusion on either point.

But.

One can also see why elsewhere in the world many do not take the West’s professed attachment to international law seriously.

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Iran’s scattergun retaliations against those not concerned with the American and Israeli attacks are plainly against international law.

And that these retaliations are against international law is said aloud, including by the United Kingdom government.

We thereby have one without the other.

We openly say one thing is against International law, but are closed-mouthed about the other.

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Yet unless international law applies to all nations (the clues are in the words “international” and “law”) then it can hardly be called international.  Or law.

But in something akin to “victor’s justice”, it is a standard we only seem to invoke plainly against some countries and not others.

From the perspective of this liberal blog, international law is a good thing.  In general the more international law is recognised and even enforced the better.

But international law will never get real traction when it is deployed in such a one-sided way.

A thing cannot be both universal and partial.

And so to condemn Iran for breaching international law in its reckless retaliations to attacks, but not the countries making those attacks, means you end up with a position that is neither coherent nor compelling.

Yet for international law to gain purchase in the world, the case for it needs to be coherent and compelling.

Else, like the cynics maintain, it is (or will be seen as) little more than fiction.

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This post will also be cross-posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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But what about international law?

6th January 2026

What happens to an international legal order when a superpower goes rogue

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The notion of international law prompts strong opinions.

(Here is meant what lawyers call “public international law” – in general, the law which governs nation states and international organisations. There is also “private international law” which is generally dull and uncontroversial – cross-border contracts and what-not.)

Some even doubt international law exists.

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I once heard a very distinguished legal academic – whose name is on the spines of volumes in every law library throughout the land – aver the following:

“In court, the laws of England and Wales are a matter of law. You just have to show the relevant legal authority or instrument and the court should accept that as what the law is.

“Foreign law – say the law of France – is different. This is a matter of evidence – expert evidence. You get an expert in that foreign law and their evidence is put before the court.

And international law, well. (Pause.)

International law is a matter of fiction.”

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There is perhaps no other branch of law which is the subject of such scepticism, if not outright denial, among even lawyers themselves.

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From one perspective, this rejection is perhaps understandable.

A great deal of what is called (public) international law will never be determined or enforced by a court of competent jurisdiction – it will never be litigated, and the nation state (and head of state) breaching that law will feel confident there will not be any consequences.

As one famous jurist once put it: “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”

And if there ain’t a court that will “do” international law then it is little or nothing more than a polite political fiction – a set of normative assertions with no positive existence.

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But.

There is more to law than its determination or enforcement by a court.

Even domestically, the vast majority of statutory provisions – and indeed many statutes – have never been litigated and will probably never be litigated. Yet they are still the law.

And this is because – in very general terms – they are recognised to be the law and parties regulate themselves accordingly.

As the greatest of all contract law academics G. H. Treitel put it in his classic definition of a contract (emphasis added):

“A contract is an agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognised by law.”

Enforcement – and thereby the possibility of enforcement – is not the only test of whether a thing is a law or not.

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In (public) international law, many of the obligations are created and agreed by nation states themselves. These are usually in the form of treaties.

There can be treaties between states for particular purposes – and there can be treaties of general of general application. Sometimes the latter are called conventions, as in the Geneva convention. And there can be charters to which member states subscribe – sometimes to create international organisations. There are many ways in which obligations in public international law can be created and agreed.

And then there is what is called customary international law – the international laws which are said to govern nation states regardless of whether the nation state agrees to those laws.

Taken together all these laws constitute (public) international law.

The problem is, however, very little of that law can or will ever be litigated.

But it is treated generally- that is, recognised – by many nation states as law nonetheless.

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One may have sympathy with the view, to adapt the famous aphorism attributed to Gandhi about western civilisation, that international law would be a good idea.

And generally, when nation states recognise it and regulate their conduct accordingly, it is a good thing as well as a good idea.

But what happens when a nation state – a superpower no less – goes rogue?

Where just because it can – like a dog licking itself – it breaches international law again and again, with barely a shrug?

One response is to say that such (mis)conduct discredits the notion of international law entirely – that the polite fiction of international law has been undermined by the (to say the least) impolite.

It is certainly the case that the current administration of that superpower – the United States – do not seem to care less about international law when it would restrain them.

(No doubt they would plead international law against another country if it suited them.)

But the notion of being in breach of international law is not the same as international law not existing.

International law is still there – it is just not being complied with.

International law is still there – it is just not capable of being enforced in these instances (at least not yet).

Other nations will recognise and abide by those laws even if the United States will not.

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An eminent professor may say international law is a matter of fiction, but unfortunately the many breaches of international law by the United States are a not a matter of fiction.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Recognition of Palestine is ultimately a political not a legal question

23rd September 2025

International law should provide guidance but not a barrier to the recognition of a State

Palestine has now been recognised as a State not only by the United Kingdom, but also by Australia, Canada, France, Belgium, and other countries.

This means about 156 States (out of a total 193 member states of the United Nations) recognise Palestine.

This is all notwithstanding a warning not long ago that such recognition would not be compliant with international law (though that warning could not bring itself to say such recognition would be in breach of international law, as I pointed out at Prospect).

There is perhaps no greater a “political” question than the recognition by one polity of another polity.

And although international law may provide guidance and criteria for what constitutes a State capable of being recognised by other States, the law must be careful not to intrude into what are ultimately political questions.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The recognition of Palestine – a footnote to yesterday’s post

19th August 2025

More heat and a little light from a further exchange of letters

Following the post on this blog yesterday on recognition of Palestine, a further two letters have been published on the substack of Joshua Rozenberg.

These two further letters are to and from the Attorney General.

The letters do not take the discussion much further, but it is interesting to see that the government not only states that it will comply with international law but also – expressly – that the government considers that a decision to recognise Palestine would be “entirely” in accordance with international law.

The government does not state what international law rules and obligations are relevant.

The government does not even state that it will comply with the Montevideo criteria – or even if it sees that criteria are relevant to this decision.

And the government does not really need to do so, for it is a political decision.

If the government decides to recognise Palestine there is no court of competent jurisdiction that can gainsay it, unless such recognition is in breach of an applicable rule or obligation.

And even after all these letters, no applicable legal rule or obligation has yet been identified in any of the published letters of which the United Kingdom would be in breach if it recognises Palestine.

That is not to say that the government is proposing to take the recognition decision in a politically wise way (and the current approach of the government seems irrational) – but it is a decision that should be taken within the realm of politics, and not of law.

For the recognition of one polity by another is – literally – a political question.

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Comments Policy

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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On the recognition of Palestine: a close look at an unconvincing letter from “distinguished” UK lawyers

18th August 2025

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Back in 1990, the late academic authority on legal statehood James Crawford wrote:

“It seems to be difficult for international lawyers to write in an impartial and balanced way about the Palestine issue. Most of the literature, some of it by respected figures, is violently partisan. It is true that this only reflects much of the political and personal debate about Palestine. Still, such a level of partisanship in legal discourse is disturbing.”

Thirty-five years later it still a subject beset by partisanship.

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A couple of weeks ago a letter was put together in response to the possibility that the United Kingdom may recoginse Palestine. It was signed by some well-known lawyers, some of whom I know and admire.

The authors of the letter were called “distinguished” by various media sources.

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The published letter was addressed to the Attorney General, and it said:

“In relation to the announcement that the Prime Minister intends to recognise Palestine on certain conditions, we call on you to advise him that this would be contrary to international law.

“As you must know, Palestine does not meet the international law criteria for recognition of a state, namely, defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. This is set out in the Montevideo Convention, has become part of customary law and it would be unwise to depart from it at a time when international law is seen as fragile or, indeed, at any time.

“It is clear that there is no certainty over the borders of Palestine. Could the government continue to recognise millions of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as “refugees” (and claiming the right of return to Israel) even though the effect of UK recognition would be that they are on their own territory?

“There is no functioning single government, Fatah and Hamas being enemies. The former has failed to hold elections for decades, and the latter is a terrorist organisation, neither of which could enter into relations with other states.

“You are on record as saying that a commitment to international law goes absolutely to the heart of this government and its approach to foreign policy. You have said that a selective, “pick and mix” approach to international law will lead to its disintegration, and that the criteria set out in international law should not be manipulated for reasons of political expedience.

“Accordingly we expect you to demonstrate this commitment by explaining to the public and to the government that recognition of Palestine would be contrary to the principles governing recognition of states in international law. We look forward to your response.”

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What is striking about this letter is just how weak it is as a piece of legal reasoning.

If you are partisan – either pro-Israel or pro-Palestine – you may overlook the letter’s merits or de-merits, and you can decide it is a good or bad letter because you either support recognition of Palestine or you do not.

This is the very partisanship to which Crawford was referring in the quote at the head of this post.

But for the rest of us, seeking to make sense of a difficult issue at a dangerous time, we do not need to just cheer or jeer as partisans.

We can look at the merits and the substance of a case instead.

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Over at Prospect I have set out a brief post about this letter, but on my own blog – where I have more space and can use a more discursive style, I would like to show why this letter is weak stuff – even if it is a very carefully worded letter.

(Below I will quote parts of the letter, and in each quotation the emphasis is added.)

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First, let us look at a couple of fillers:

As you must know, Palestine does not meet the international law criteria for recognition of a state […]”

It is clear that […]”

These are the sort of things lawyers say when they have not got anything stronger. As such they are indications – no more – that we need to be on our guard.

If the authors of the letter were confident they would not need to rely on such stock phrases – and if you read the letter without these fillers it would actually be stronger.

(Indeed the letter does not read like a final draft.)

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Now let us move to content.

What does the letter say – and what does it not say?

The letter is very careful to use the phrase “contrary to international law”:

“[…] we call on you to advise him that this would be contrary to international law.

“[…]

“Accordingly we expect you to demonstrate this commitment by explaining to the public and to the government that recognition of Palestine would be contrary to the principles governing recognition of states in international law. We look forward to your response.”

To those less used to reading the glorious prose of lawyers, this may seem that the authors are saying that the United Kingdom is breaching international law – that the United Kingdom is proposing to act unlawfully or even illegally.

(Sick birds aside – ill eagles, ho ho – “unlawful” tends to mean there is not a lawful basis for a thing, and “illegal” tends to mean that a thing is in breach of a rule or obligation.)

But the letter does not say the United Kingdom is proposing to act unlawfully or illegally.

The authors of the letter could have said this had they wanted to do, but they chose not to do so.

The letter does give the impression that the authors are saying that the United Kingdom would be in breach of international law – and that is certainly how it was reported:

But again, the letter does not say this.

(One can only hope this misleading impression was not deliberate.)

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What the letter does say is that a proposed recognition would be “contrary to international law” and “contrary to the principles governing recognition of states in international law”.

The second quotation here is telling: the authors of the letter do not even cite any rule or obligation of which the United Kingdom would be in breach if it were to recognise Palestine.

And the reason they do not do so, as Professor Marko Milanovic avers, in this short but devastating refutal (and not merely a rebuttal) of the published letter, is because there is no rule or obligation of which the United Kingdom would be in breach if it were to recognise Palestine.

(One of the authors of the published letter took Milanovic to task on this refutal, but as Milanovic replies in a comment “the core problem that my post identified with your letter – that you labelled the UK’s future recognition of Palestine as being ‘contrary to international law.’ This created the impression – that was the gist of the whole letter, and that’s how it was portrayed in the media – that the UK would be acting illegally if it recognized Palestine. The basic argument of my post is that there would be no such illegality, and I don’t see how you’ve addressed it. In particular, whose rights, exactly, would the UK be breaching by recognizing Palestine?”)

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So what is the difference between saying the United Kingdom would be breaching international law (which the authors of the published letter were careful not to say) and the United Kingdom acting “contrary to the principles governing recognition of states in international law” (which the authors of the letter did say) ?

Are these angels malarking on a pinhead?

Is it a distinction without a difference?

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Well.

There is certainly enough of a distinction to deter the authors of the published letter from saying that the United Kingdom would be acting unlawfully or illegally.

And here we need to look at what the authors of the published letter are emphasising.

For them, the Montevideo Convention is central. They do not provide a date – it was signed in 1933 – nor do they state that the United Kingdom was not a signatory to the instrument.

It was an agreement of states in the Americas:

Article I of the English version of the convention provides:

“The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications : (a) a permanent population ; (b) a defined territory ; (c) government ; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other States.”

These are certainly four criteria for what would constitute a state – and, to borrow a word from the provision itself, they should be four things that a state *should* have, if it is allowed to do so.

But this is not an exhaustive list: there are other qualifications and features of a state, such as there being (a right to) self-determination.

And nor is it a explicitly a compulsory list: there is nothing in the Montevideo Convention which expressly binds non-parties.

Yet it is a list and a useful one – and it was adapted and used, for example, by the Badinter committee dealing with the question of states from the former Yugoslavia.

It is handy list of possible criteria which states may use when recognising other states.

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But that these are criteria in a 1933 convention which have been usefully applied elsewhere does not mean that they bind the United Kingdom in 2025.

At its highest it means that these are recognised as general principles that may apply – and if you read the published letter carefully, that is all the letter actually says: “principles governing recognition of states in international law”.

The word “principles” here is well-chosen. The authors of the published letter could have said here “rules” or “obligations”.

But they did not, because they could not.

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In essence, there is no rule or obligation of which the United Kingdom would be in breach if it were to recognise Palestine.

And this is not a surprise.

The recognition of a polity is, literally, a political question.

If the United Kingdom wants to recognise Palestine then it is not breaking any legal rule or obligation.

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Had the published letter merely told the Attorney General that in any recognition of Palestine by the United Kingdom, regard should be had to the Montevideo criteria of 1933, then nobody could have really objected.

But the letter then asserts that not only that these principles can apply, but their application can only mean that Palestine cannot be recognised.

Here the authors of the published letter go one or two steps too far.

There is, for example, no judicial determination or even advisory opinion they can rely on for that proposition. They have – in simple terms – no authority. It is a bare assertion.

As Milanovic notes:

“It can reasonably be argued that Palestine does not meet the Montevideo criteria, and that it does not currently exist as a state. But it can also reasonably be argued otherwise. This is not an obvious issue – this is why, for example, both the ICC and the ICJ have (so far) avoided pronouncing on Palestine’s statehood under general international law, one way or the other. Yet it is crystal clear that the Palestinian people have the right to establish their own state, by virtue of their right to self-determination, which has twice been authoritatively reaffirmed by the ICJ. Curiously, this is a right that the letter authors do not even mention.”

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Here there are three possible positions:

– the Montevideo criteria can apply to whether Palestine should be recognised as a state;

– the Montevideo criteria do apply, and no other criteria;

– the Montevideo criteria when applied mean that Palestine cannot be recognised as a state.

The published letter deftly uses the first (undeniable) position and makes it seem, by careful drafting, that it extends to the second and third positions.

It is a clever piece of legal writing: but it does not say what it seems to say.

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Stepping into the real world from the land of legal writing, over 140 countries have recognised Palestine as a state.

That is about three-quarters of the United Nations.

On a quick count, almost all of the states that actually signed the Montevideo Convention of 1933 – those formally bound by that definition of a state – recognise Palestine.

But according to the authors of the published letter, each and every one of these 140-or-so countries, the vast majority of states in the world, acted contrary to the principles of international law in recognising Palestine.

That is an extraordinary proposition.

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Nothing in the post above was written on a partisan basis.

My own liberal view is that a two-state approach, respecting the existence of both Israel and Palestine to exist, is the most likely way to address if not resolve the current dire situation.

And as I set out in Prospect, an equally unconvincing letter could be published the other way on this issue.

The intended import of the post above is instead twofold.

First, one should be wary of statements of law that rely on how “distinguished” the author/authors is/are. One of the great things about law is that it is curiously egalitarian – like many sciences and also computer coding – and so it does not really matter how eminent the pundit, it always comes down to substance.

(As a general rule, the more reliance which is placed on how “distinguished” a lawyer is making a point, the weaker the legal point being made.)

And second, one should also be wary of the trend for statements of law by lawyers to be used for publicity and campaigning.

The published letter was not an opinion or an advice for a client, and it was not a pleading or other submission for a court.

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And finally: nothing in the post above is an endorsement of the position of the United Kingdom.

The position of the United Kingdom on recognition of Palestine is confused.

This is the official statement:

“We are determined to protect the viability of the two-state solution, and so we will recognise the state of Palestine in September before UNGA; unless the Israeli government takes substantive steps to end the appalling situation in Gaza and commits to a long term sustainable peace, including through allowing the UN to restart without delay the supply of humanitarian support to the people of Gaza to end starvation, agreeing to a ceasefire, and making clear there will be no annexations in the West Bank.”

There is no logical or conceptual connection between the question about whether Palestine should be recognised and a ceasefire. It is thereby an irrelevant condition.

Either Palestine exists and should be recognised or Palestine does not exist and so cannot be recognised.

Palestine does not suddenly exist just because there is gunfire, and then suddenly not exist when the gunfire has ceased.

If the authors of the published letter put forward an unconvincing argument against recognition of Palestine, the government of the United Kingdom is hardly putting forward what can be called any argument at all.

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If international law suddenly did not exist, what difference would it make?

27th June 2025

There was once an eminent and erudite law professor – whose name is on the spines of books on the shelves of legal practitioners and academics throughout the land – who said in a lecture:

“In court, the laws of England and Wales are a matter of law.  You just have to show the relevant legal authority or instrument and the court should accept that as what the law is.

“Foreign law – say the law of France – is different. This is a matter of evidence – expert evidence. You get an expert in that foreign law and their evidence is put before the court.

And international law, well. (Pause). International law is a matter of fiction.”

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This is not an uncommon view in legal circles, though often said off the record.  International law, this view insists, is essentially made up: it is whatever you believe it to be.

This is not the view of this blog, but there is an important distinction to be made between the recognition of international law and its enforcement.

And some will maintain that if a law ain’t enforceable, it ain’t law – just like some say that there is no such thing as alternative medicine, just medicine that works and medicine which does not.

Anyway, I have written about International law at perhaps its lowest post-war point at Prospectclick and read here.

You can also discuss the post in the comments below.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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Oh Canada

What explains the timing and manner of the Chagos Islands sovereignty deal?

20th October 2024

Towards resolving a puzzle about how and when the decision was announced

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Perhaps the best place to start for a blogpost or any other writing is a sense of puzzlement. A thing does not immediately make sense, and so you find out more and try to work it out.

The news about the Chagos Islands provided such a puzzle.

Why did the United Kingdom this month decide – if that is the correct word – to transfer sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius?

Over at Prospect is an attempt at answering this question. Please click here and read the post.

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That this has been a long-lasting dispute is not, by itself, a reason for it to be resolved. Disputes can last a very long time and may never be resolved.

And that the United Kingdom was on the backfoot both legally and diplomatically also, by itself, did not explain the move.

The United Kingdom – if it was able – would have carried on playing for time.

So what happened?

Well it looks like the matter was taken out of the hands of the United Kingdom – even though it is nominally the sovereign power.

The explanation which best fitted the available evidence was that the United States and Mauritius did a deal and then told the United Kingdom that it had to be announced.

What prompted this explanation was something said in the House of Commons debate by the Speaker – which seemed more significant than anything said by minister or backbenchers (emphasis added):

This indicated that this excuse had been given to him by the Foreign Office – either by the minister himself or by a civil servant.

And although, of course, there are upcoming presidential and congressional elections in the United States, there happened to be a general election coming up in Mauritius.

Taking this evidence along with the (very) warm, detailed statement from the United States indicated that both Mauritius and the Unites States were well prepared for this news, even if the United Kingdom was not:

The lack of preparatory media briefing (and leaking) by the United Kingdom government also then made sense. Usually there would be attempts to frame such upcoming news, especially if it looked bad for the United Kingdom.

And because the United States were (so) happy with the news, this rather took the wind out of the sails of those who have been warning that transferring sovereignty would be against American interests or undermine the strategically important base on Diego Garcia.

Warnings such as this one from Johnson in 2023:

An article which, if you read carefully, shows that the former foreign secretary (and prime minister) had an inkling that such a direct deal was in the offing (emphasis added):

The problem is that the highlighted admission rather undermines the alarmism of the article’s title. The Americans were relaxed about a direct deal as long as they retained a long lease for their base.

And it seems the Johnson article correctly describes that the Mauritians and the Americans indeed cut out the “middleman” – and that is the role to which the United Kingdom was reduced, even though we were (nominally) the sovereign power.

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A look at the relevant public domain materials also shows how weak the United Kingdom’s position was becoming.

A little-known 2015 arbitration ruling was devastating in its detail:

(Legal geeks may appreciate how that tribunal deals with estoppel in paragraphs 434 to 448.)

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It was also striking how support for the United Kingdom fell away once the International Court of Justice delivered its 2019 “advisory” opinion.

In 2017, the United Kingdom had a plausible-sounding nod-along objection to the court taking on this case.

But once the court handed down its opinion, it seemed that plausible objection fell away. Support vanished.

Even most commonwealth members, as well as other former colonial powers and/or European Union member states, could not bring themselves to vote with the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom had been shown to the UN assembly to be in breach of its general decolonisation obligations: and so this was not just another bilateral territorial dispute.

And so the United Kingdom’s position was legally and diplomatically weak: so weak that, at a time of the choosing of Mauritius and the United States, a supposedly sovereign power had to announce during recess it was ceding sovereignty.

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This week’s skirmish between the European Commission and X

And from time to time you will have visible contests between those with different types of power. The job of law and politics is then to regulate such contests so as to ensure that tensions do not harden into the contradictions that undermine the health of a polity.

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These contests of power, when they happen, are fascinating.

Over at Prospect I have written a post about one such contest: the European Commission v X.

The latter has considerable media power: so much so that the content of its platform can often have a considerable real-world impact.

But the former also has considerable power – in the formulation of the laws that apply to the platform in the European Union and in the application of those laws in particular circumstances.

It is quite the stand-off.

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When the European Commissioner responsible for the Single Market tweeted a letter last week, it reminded me of an earlier stand-off.

It evoked the stand-off in 1930-31 between the then government of the United Kingdom and the then popular press over tariff reform and imperial preference (the Brexit issue of its day).

That was a stand-off which, at least in the short-term, the government won.

(Tariffs were introduced later in the 1930s, though not directly because of media pressure.)

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Often these tensions are hidden and managed out of public view, and so it is always interesting – and instructive – when they are done in public.

Something is up.

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Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.