On FIFA overturning the Balogun suspension

7th July 2026

A parable of a clever lawyer and a wise lawyer

*

Scene: the legal department at FIFA headquarters.

A room with two desks. At the desk nearest the door is the CLEVER LAWYER. At the desk by the window is the WISE LAWYER drinking her tea.

Suddenly a FIFA FIXER comes in.

*

FIFA FIXER:

Guys, we have a problem. We need to overturn the Balogun suspension. Orders from upstairs. You need to find us a solution.

CLEVER LAWYER:

Tough one. It was a direct red card? One match automatic suspension. Look here, see what it says.

And see that word “automatically”? That is there for a reason. The provision would also make sense without it, and so it is there for a reason. it is not just that “they will be suspended” but that they “will automatically be suspended”. No hearing, no investigation, no review, no appeal. Nothing more is needed. One thing shall follow the other.

For example, look at this other provision:

Just as the USA automatically qualified as being a host, a player with a direct red card is automatically suspended. “Automatically” is a strong word. We cannot pretend it is not there.

FIFA FIXER:

There has to be a way round it?

CLEVER LAWYER:

Well, there is another provision.

FIFA FIXER:

Go on…

CLEVER LAWYER:

…it is another code, see here. It says that a suspension may itself be suspended.

FIFA FIXER:

Brilliant! Let’s suspend the suspension.

CLEVER LAWYER:

You may face a challenge. So you will need to make it water tight – evidence, a process, published reasons, that sort of thing. Especially as you are interfering with an “automatic” process. It is not a get-out-of-jail card of general application.

FIFA FIXER:

Does it actually say there needs to be a process or reasons?

CLEVER LAWYER:

Well, no…

FIFA FIXER:

…then we can just assert we invoke it, and we have a solution.

CLEVER LAWYER:

Belgium may complain.

FIFA FIXER:

We can give them something to keep them quiet, keep their silence. [Pause.] What about a peace prize?

[Long pause.]

CLEVER LAWYER:

Ahem, if a Belgian challenge is successful, then the default is that the United States may itself face sanctions for fielding an ineligible player.

FIFA FIXER:

Ha ha, we can just suspend that sanction too, and so on. All the way down. Brilliant guys – so we can suspend the suspension?

CLEVER LAWYER:

Well, technically, perhaps but…

FIFA FIXER:

And should we suspend the suspension?

WISE LAWYER [puts down her tea]:

No.

 

 

***

Epilogue:

The Rwanda relocation scheme ends in a mess

8th June 2026

A lucky arbitration win for the UK brings the programme to its conclusion

There was recently an international arbitration award: a lucky arbitration award.

Front page of arbitration award.

 

The lucky winner was the United Kingdom, the unlucky loser was Rwanda.

The dispute was about that relocation scheme for asylum seekers which the then-government of the United Kingdom sought to put in place before it was defeated at the last general election.

Over at Prospect (click here) I have done a piece on that scheme and how this arbitration ward finally brings the scheme to an end.

That piece emphasises the costs: in essence, it cost about £250,000,000 to send just four asylum seekers to Rwanda, and they went voluntarily.

The overall amount would have been even more, had it not been for the lucky arbitration victory in respect of unpaid fees under the agreement.

The point that can be added in this post is that the very fact this even went to arbitration is a bad sign.

The negotiations which brought the scheme to an end were, in a word, messy.

Flurries of diplomatic notes and correspondence – a bit similar to the classic “battle of the forms”.

There was no clear and shared understanding set out in a discrete document.

And one can see why Rwanda felt it had an arguable case for payment.

Adopting a wince like the eminent jurist Alan Hansen, the lawyering was atrocious.

The financial position should not have been left so uncertain that the dispute had to go to arbitration. The paperwork should have been so precise that neither side had any doubt as to the legal position.

Reading the narrative in the judgments of the exchanges one could imagine the result going the other way. The United Kingdom was lucky.

And it was fitting that the scheme ended in a mess – for it was always a mess. It was always inherent and misconceived and unpleasant to contemplate.

About ‘The Empty City’ as a title for this blog

3rd March 2026

As you may have noticed this blog has a new name to go with its new domain. The name is the same as my Substack, but I thought I should explain it as the title of a blog about law (and lore) and policy.

*

(Spoiler warning for Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities.)

*

Compare and contrast these two paintings.

The first is one of the Renaissance “ideal city” paintings.

Nobody knows for certain who the painter is, so I will call them “the Renaissance Master” for this post.

You will notice that the painting has regular lines of perspective and a set vanishing point; it also has proportionate, idealised architecture; and it has welcoming and well-lit colonnades and arcades.

And you will notice it has no people.

Nor shadows.

For me this painting conveys a place (and polity) in its idealised form: how it should be, at least to some people.

*

The second painting is Mystery and Melancholy of a Street by Giorgio de Chirico.

Here there are no regular lines of perspective and no vanishing point; the architecture is not idealised and not proportionate; and the arcades are dark and sinister.

The painting has people (or at least a person), and you are scared for who is playing with the hoop, as the shadow of another person (or of a statue) is foreboding.

And the shadows generally don’t quite add up.

(Curiously, the sky is not that different.)

This is also a painting of its time: 1914, as Europe and elsewhere fell into the Great War.

For me this paining conveys a place (and polity) in its actuality: how it is – confusing and incoherent.

*

I use both paintings regularly as banners and avatars and so on.

Taken together they seem to show the job of a commentator on law and policy: explaining things as they are, but with reference to how rules and principles insist those things should be.

But…

…it was not until recently I realised something about the two paintings.

And this realisation was triggered by re-reading Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities.

In that book some fifty-five cities are described in all their vivid variety.

But, as the narrator reveals midway in the book, they are all depictions of the very same city (Venice).

And so I realised that the Renaissance Master and Giorgio de Chirico were also not painting different cities…

…but painting the very same city, but with a different outlook.

*

Thank you for following this blog as it transforms into The Empty City.

Trump v BBC – a guide to the case

13th January 2026

This resource page sets out the key developments in the case, with links, and it will be updated from time-to-time

*

This post sets out the key developments in the case of President Donald Trump vs the British Broadcasting Corporation. It is a copy of the post on Substack.

The intention is to update it from time-to-time. New additions will be marked **.

Please note that I am not an American lawyer and I am thereby open to corrections of terminology and substance about the United States litigation.

 

*

 

Other pages to keep an eye on are:

The online court docket

A Wikipedia page on the original BBC bias allegations

The United Kingdom parliament Culture Media and Sport select committee (CMS Committee) news page

 

*

 

November 2024 – the original broadcast **

The relevant Panorama programme was broadcast on 7 November 2024 **, a week before the presidential election.

The BBC page for the programme is here.

The page shows the following information about the broadcasts:

There is no direct evidence that anyone in the United States saw the programme when broadcast and BBC iPlayer is not formally available to United States viewers. (Yes, we all know about VPNs etc.)

The full programme is not (properly) currently available, but the following shows the spliced footage at the centre of the case:

 

*

 

November 2025 – the leaked Prescott memorandum

The next development is one year later **, with a Telegraph newspaper report about the leak/disclosure of a memorandum written by Michael Prescott, a former external advisor to the BBC’s Editorial Guidelines and Standards Committee (EGSC).

The memorandum appears undated, but it was considered at a meeting of the BBC EGSC on 17 October 2025, and it appears Prescott raised his concerns on the programme internally within the BBC in or before May 2025.

A copy of the memorandum can be found as an appendix to this later BBC letter to the CMS select committee.

In respect of the Panorama footage, the memorandum stated:

 

*

 

November 2025 – the UK parliament takes an interest

Things then move quickly.

The UK parliament’s CMS Committee write to the BBC chair on 4 November 2025.

The letter is here.

It states:

The following day the CMS Committee also announces it will take evidence.

On 10 November 2025 the chair of the BBC responds, setting out the BBC position and appending the Prescott memorandum.

 

*

 

November 2025 – the Trump legal letter

On 9 November 2025 – the day before the BBC respond to the CMS Committee – the BBC receive a letter before action from Trump’s lawyer.

The letter is here and it states:

My initial commentary on the letter is here – and the letter I suggested the BBC could send back is here.

 

*

 

November 2025 – resignations at the BBC

The same day as the legal letter, the BBC director general and CEO of news both resign.

Their resignation letters are here. The Panorama programme is mentioned only once, in the CEO of news’s letter.

The departing director general does not mention the Panorama programme at all in his letter and he attributes his departure to other things.

Two days later the CMS Committee widen the scope of the evidence they are seeking.

 

*

December 2025 – the BBC apologise – but do not offer damages

On 13 December 2025 the BBC do two things.

First, they issue a statement:

Second, treating it any other complaint with validity, this is published on their corrections and clarifications page:

The BBC itself reports these developments under this headline:

We do not have access to the copies of the letters sent by the BBC directly to President Trump and to his lawyers.

But the BBC itself reported the following:

My posts on these developments:

Why the BBC is right not to pay damages to Trump

The BBC is right not to pay damages to Trump (New Statesman)

 

*

 

November 2025 – the FCC’s odd intervention

Next, on 19 November 2025, is an odd intervention by the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requesting information from the BBC on the extent of any broadcast or publication of the programme in the United States. The letter is here.

My post on this eccentric intervention, suggesting that it indicated evidential problems for Trump and his lawyers, is here.

There seems to be no trace of a formal response by the BBC.

 

*

 

November 2025 – A parliamentary witness session

On 24 November 2025 the CMS Select Committee interview various witnesses including the chair of the BBC and Prescott. The transcript is here.

Follow-on correspondence between the committee and the BBC is here and here.

 

*

 

December 2025 – Trump suggests AI is to blame

On 15 December 2025 President Donald Trump says: “I’m suing the BBC for putting words in my mouth… I guess they used AI or something.”

AI however seems to be not part of the case brought by his lawyers.

 

*

December 2025 – Trump files his complaint

Also on 15 December 2025 Trump and his lawyers file their 33-page legal complaint.

My posts on this filing:

A guided tour of President Trump’s 33-page, $5 billion lawsuit against the British Broadcasting Corporation 

Donald Trump v the British Broadcasting Corporation: the battle begins The president filed a claim this week more about exerting leverage than legal niceties (Prospect)

 

*

 

December 2025 – the UK parliament seem to wrap up their investigation

A few days later on 19 December 2025 the CMS Committee appears to being its investigation to an end, welcoming proposed reforms:

The BBC, in turn, publish those proposals and other documents on the Prescott memorandum.

 

*

 

January 2026 – The BBC file their first motion, for a stay

On 12 January 2026 the BBC file a motion to stay discovery of evidence pending a forthcoming motion to dismiss.

 

[To be updated.]

 

** UPDATES

13 January 2026 – date of Panorama programme corrected and consequential changes

 

A guided tour of President Trump’s 33-page, $5 billion lawsuit against the British Broadcasting Corporation

16th December 2025

Over at my Substack I have done a post on the Trump lawsuit against the BBC.  It is currently behind a paywall.

I have also posted it on Patreon for those of you who subscribe there.

If you support my work by other means, like PayPal, reply with details below and I can email the post to you. Your reply will not be published.

 

Why ‘A House of Dynamite’ is a good film about how those with power make decisions

28th October 2025

This unconventional nuclear thriller does something rare in movies

What follows are some thoughts about A House of Dynamite (Netflix).

*

This is not a review as such, but the response of someone who regularly commentates on decision-making by those with political power to a rather good film depicting a decision-making process.

This is a film where spoilers really do need to be avoided, so please be careful with what follows if you intend to watch it.

*

SPOILERS BELOW

*

A House of Dynamite is a film about decision-making by those with power during a crisis.

The crisis is that an intercontinental ballistic missile is suddenly discovered heading towards the United States from the north Pacific – more particularly, heading towards Chicago.

The launch of this missile was not detected at launch – it is instead discovered mid-flight over the Pacific – and we join the action minutes away from impact.

*

Often thrillers follow a conventional beginning-middle-end structure, with a resolution, one way or the other.

This film does not.

It instead has a middle-middle-middle structure, with no (clear) resolution.

We are not told how this crisis arose. We never find out who fired the missile, or why.

We are also not expressly told how the story ends. There is no explicit confirmation of whether the missile strikes Chicago or not.

(Though one can perhaps infer what happens from the final two scenes.)

The film is entirely about the middle bit: from the discovery of the missile to moments before the expected strike.

We are told the story of what happens in this middle bit from three overlapping perspectives – hence middle-middle-middle – with each segment concentrating on particular decision-makers, advisers, and providers of information.

*

Usually thrillers about those in power attribute a great deal of autonomy to those at the top.

In this film, however, we are shown how information flows from the bottom, about what information is shared and reported upwards, and that information can be incomplete or even misleading.

We also do not have one decision-maker, but several in video conference, jointly and urgently sharing and assessing incomplete information.

And in assessing this information they resort to established processes and policies. Books and folders are pulled out, charts and graphics are used to illustrate options.

But these processes and policies involve choices to be made – they are not railroads, and so it is then back to the individual decision-makers struggling with only having incomplete information.

Various decisions are made: the coin-toss firing of interceptors (which miss), the triggering of a continuity protocol and various evacuations (which interfere with efficient decision-making more than anything), and so on.

(These formal decisions are dramatically placed alongside personal decisions where the same individuals, with the same information, decide to break protocols and contact loved ones.)

When the strike on Chicago becomes a virtual certainty it becomes apparent that one ultimate decision needs to be made, and that decision can only be made by the President: whether to retaliate – and, if so, to what extent and against whom, and on the basis of what (if any) information and for what purpose.

The President is kept off-screen until the final segment – but when he appears we see him dealing with the incomplete information we have watched being put together, and the policies and processes and options that have been briefed to him.

We are not told what ultimate decision he makes.

But we know what materials he has before him. We have seen those materials being pulled together from the bottom up. We know what he has been told and not told. We know what decisions he could make at that point given what evidence has been provided and the choices put to him.

To have this as the end of the film, rather than whether the missile strikes and whether there is a strike-back, is a brave and good way to bring the film to an end.

And it means that it is this final predicament which lingers – an unsettling end, rather than a means to a neater end.

*

What was for me satisfying about this film is how it showed the ongoing interaction between information and processes and human agency. Not one of these three things ever took absolute priority. This balance is rare in any political or indeed legal thriller.

Sometimes a film will come down to the individual brilliance (or otherwise) of a key character, or to the (sometimes suddenly) revealed information being overwhelming, or to the leaden deadening deployment of laws and rules or of bureaucracy.

The full spectrum from a Perry Mason trial to Franz Kafka’s The Trial.

But for there to be a constant balance (and imbalance) between information and processes and human agency from beginning to end is as rare in fiction as it is common in reality.

In practice: information will point in various directions; procedures require the use of discretion with no clearly correct answer; the human beings involved will often be all too human when faced with the horrible predicament they are in – and force of personality will usually only have a limited effect.

As one key exchange in this film puts it, a practical but grave political (or legal) crisis can seem to those involved to be a unstable mix of insanity and realism.

*

This is not a film review blog, and so there is little for me to say about the acting and cinematography other than they were of the high standard you would expect of a production with such resources.

But there was one dramatic detail which the film got right again and again.

Much of the action in this film was in big wide interior spaces – situation rooms, conference rooms, a large politician’s office.

But for those practically in those settings the rooms do not seem large – their perspective is not that of the establishing shot. Instead, being in such spaces quickly becomes closed and claustrophobic.

If you are busy (and stressed) in, say, the grand conference rooms of Westminster and Whitehall, or in the ornate court rooms of the Royal Courts of Justice and Supreme Court, you very quickly forget the quaint environments. You instead become focused on what is immediately in front of you and beside you. The grand and ornate setting is quickly out of mind.

This film similarly shows those in situation rooms and conference rooms from a close perspective – what the individuals can see and hear (and not see and hear).

Films which show a political (or legal) exchange in wide-span can be misleading, for none of those involved will be thinking or acting in wide-span.

To understand decision-making it helps to see what it looks like to the decision-maker, and the information before them.

*

Of course, what does not ring true with this film is that you have a president and a US defense secretary agonising about anything – and it is significant that production of this film began well before the current incumbents of those offices were in place. This is more a Obama or Biden era film rather a Trump one.

One wonders what a similar film with a Trump figure and company would would be like.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

The Kneecap prosecution collapsed because police and prosecutors did not take terrorism law seriously

29th September 2025

Where “a technicality” hides a fundamental error

There is an old chestnut of a phrase: “off on a technicality”.

What this usually means – or at least is usually intended to mean to mean – is that but for some procedural or evidential error, a person would have been found legally liable for a thing.

The term even has its own page at TV Tropes

The wording has become so common, however, that it now can cover the ending of any case, even if it would not be the case that a person would have otherwise have been found guilty or civilly liable. It now just means that a case has come to an end without any substantive finding either way.

It is a journalistic shorthand which can obscure as much as it explains.

*

Last week the prosecution collapsed of Liam Og O hAnnaidh (Anglicised as Liam O’Hanna). The defendant is, of course, part of the Irish rap group Kneecap.

And according to the judgment which brought this case to an end:

On 21st November 2024, the Defendant performed as part of the rap group, Kneecap, at the O2 Forum, Kentish Town, in London. It is alleged that, as part of this performance, the Defendant displayed a Hezbollah flag in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a supporter of a proscribed organisation.

Hezbollah (also known as Hizbollah) is a proscribed terrorist organisation under schedule 2 of the Terrorism Act 2000:

Hizbollah listed as a terrorist group in a statute

The group was added to the schedule, it seems, in 2019.

Under secton 13 of the 2000 Act a person in a public place commits an offence if he (or she) wears, carries or displays an article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he (or she) is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation:

The section 13 offence in the statute

On the face of it it, if the prosecution can show that a defendant wore such a prohibited item the prosecution would be straightforward.

But.

The Terrorism Act – being terrorism legislation – imposes an additional burden on a prosecution when such an offence has been committed for a purpose wholly or partly connected with the affairs of a country other than the United Kingdom.

The Terrorism Act provides that there is a safeguard.

Before a prosecution can be brought the consent of the Attorney General (or his or her deputy the Solicitor General) should be obtained – a consent which should (at least in theory) not be taken for granted.

This is not a trivial tickbox, but an important requirement set by parliament.

For terrorism legislation is special – it provides a powerful body of law in addition to the general criminal and civil law of the land. In principle, it should only be used sparingly and carefully, when the general law of the land is insufficient.

And because terrorism law is so powerful -especially in respect of how it can interfere with fundamental rights – it has these additional safeguards.

One such safeguard is that it not enough for the police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to want to bring a prosecution in respect of a person who is a member or a supporter of a foreign proscribed organisation, it also needs the consent of the government’s most senior law officer.

*

Terrorism law is important and it should be taken seriously, not least by the police and CPS.

But in this case, the police and the CPS did not take it seriously.

As Joshua Rozenberg helpfully sets out in his post on this case, the decision to prosecute was left to the very last minute of the six-month period (endind 21 May) to bring a prosecution:

Timeline of prosecution

There was then, on 22 May, what must have been a “oh XXXX” moment for the police and the prosecutors as it seems to have suddenly dawned on them that they needed the consent of the Attorney General (or his/her deputy the Solicitor General).

Whoopsie.

And so there was a scramble.

The police and the prosecutors were more like students with an essay crisis, than custodians of the public interest.

This was Keystone Cops stuff.

*

There are errors, and there are errors.

There are technicalities, and there are technicalities.

Some technicalities are about a party not complying with the procedural rules of the court or attempting to put in evidence which is not admissible.

These can be serious errors but they are everyday errors, within the confines of litigation in action.

And then there are errors so fundamental – so basic – that they go to the very ability of a court to even hear a case.

These are jurisdictional errors.

(As Aslan might say, this is the deeper legal magic.)

If a court does not have jurisdiction, it cannot hear a case at all.

*

If one looks at the judgment you will see that the judge – the most senior magistrate in England of Wales – is at pains to emphasise that his decision has nothing with the merits of the case:

4. This ruling is not about the defendant’s innocence or guilt rather only whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the case.

5. Therefore, this ruling is confined exclusively to the question of jurisdiction. It concerns whether these proceedings were lawfully instituted within the statutory time limit prescribed by section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 and, crucially, with the necessary consents as required by S 117 Terrorism Act 2000.

6. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Court, at this stage, to engage with the merits of the underlying allegation, or to determine whether the offence is in fact made out from the evidence.

And the Chief Magistrate ruled that the court had not got jurisdiction:

75. Thus, I am satisfied that proceedings against this defendant were instituted on 21st May 2025 when the written charge was issued. At that time, the necessary consent and permission required by law had not been obtained. As such, the proceedings were instituted unlawfully and are null.

76. I therefore hold that the Crown has failed to establish jurisdiction. The proceedings instituted in this case are invalid and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear them.

*

A jurisdictional challenge is not easy in any area of law. To bring such a challenge means telling the court they cannot even hear the case. These are often “brave” submissions.

And so it is no surprise that the defendant in this case instructed not one, not two, but three King’s Counsel, as well as a junior barrister:

List of three KCs

Such a challenge would require resources not normally available to a defendant.

One wonders how many cases where there has been no jurisdiction have been brought where the defendant could have challenged jurisdiction but did not have the awareness or the means to do so.

*

Some cynics have opined that this was a convenient way for the British state to get rid of what may have been an embarrassing case.

Not so here.

The judgment shows that the prosecutors worked hard – indeed were desperate – to get the judge to accept jurisdiction, and indeed they also knocked out the alternative basis for jurisdictional challenge.

This is actually a highly inconvenient ruling for the prosecutors, meaning they can no longer get by with retrospective consents.

They really will not like this.

Indeed, as Joshua Rozenberg reports at his post, an appeal by case stated is being seriously considered by disappointed prosecutors.

We can bet it is.

*

At the bottom of this mess is a simple point: the police and the prosecutors were careless with terrorism law and careless about its express safeguards.

Things were left to the last minute and a consent (which may or may not have been given) – a step imposed by parliament as a crucial step – was not obtained.

And this mishap meant that the Chief Magistrate of England and Wales had no jurisdiction to hear what was on the face of it a terrorism case.

Police and the prosecutors should remember that this is terrorism law that they are dealing with.

Terrorism law should be taken seriously.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

Has the government overreached in using terrorism law against Palestine Action?

19th September 2025

A disclosed MI5 document indicates that the basis for proscription may be weak, by me over at Prospect.

The “open” MI5 assessment document can be read here.

You can comment below (though note comments are pre-moderated and may not be published).