13th April 2026
The immense significance of the defeat of Orbán’s illiberal political machine and methodology
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The late Tony Benn set out five questions about power.
In his final speech to the House of Commons he said that on meeting any powerful person, one should always ask:
What power have you got?
Where did you get it from?
In whose interests do you exercise it?
To whom are you accountable?
And how can we get rid of you?
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Of these five questions it is the last which is the ultimate question for any democracy – or indeed for any political system.
How can we get rid of you?
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In a general election yesterday, the electorate of Hungary got rid of Viktor Orbán. It was an overwhelming defeat, and an overwhelming victory for his anti-corruption opponent Péter Magyar.
And it was a significant defeat for illiberalism, possibly the most significant defeat of illiberalism in recent years.
This is not to say that Magyar is necessarily a liberal hero. He was a colleague of Orbán in the ruling party until fairly recently, and it may well be that his views on a range of issues are nearer to Orbán than to his urban voters.
It may well be that Magyar is simply a non-corrupt version of Orbán.
But.
And it is a big but.
For Magyar to defeat Orbán meant he also had to defeat an extremely powerful and successful illiberal political machine and methodology.
A political machine and methodology that seemed, again until fairly recently, relentless and invincible.
The basis of this political machine and methodology was simple: motivate an electoral bloc with grievances, fear and cruelty.
If one motivated and then exploited this bloc of support then one could gain and retain power against the fragmented centre and the left, who will be demonised and marginalised.
One then rigs the media, legal and political systems to entrench this political machine. The constitution will be made to yield – either formally or by cowardice of those who could invoke nominal checks and balances.
Elections are also rigged or, if the results are unwelcome, discredited.
With diligence, this political machine and methodology can become a formidable and irresistible political force.
And it has, of course, much in common with Faragism in the United Kingdom and Trumpism in the United States, as well as with illiberal political movements in many other countries.
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And one feature of the Orbán illiberalism was that it was open and unapologetic.
As this blog has previously described, Orbán expressly stated that democracy could and should be at odds with liberalism – undermining the cherished assumption of progressives and liberals.
Orbán – and his political machine and methodology – was a one-man rebuttal, if not refutation, of the happy notion of liberal democracy.
He showed their could be a darker illiberal version of democracy too.
And because of his success, Orbán became a poster-boy for illiberals everywhere.
What he could implement in Hungary, could be put in place by others elsewhere.
Illiberal dominance of a democratic polity was possible.
Orbán showed the way.
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But illiberalism within a democracy can only go so far, before it ceases to be a democracy. And while there is still opposition parties and politicians, and relatively free elections, there is always scope for push-back.
For example, while Hungary remained in the European Union, Hungary had at least the form of a democracy.
Magyar was not arrested, his party not prohibited.
And so outside-of-the-machine something came along that would meet the task of taking on and defeating that machine.
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It seems that Magyar may be more liberal in policy than his predecessor, and it looks like that he will embrace rather than hinder the European Union.
That would be a welcome policy shift.
But the significance of his victory is not so much in policy terms than that it happened at all.
He showed that an entrenched and diligent illiberal political machine and methodology can be defeated – and in the glare of international interest and in the faces of those like Trump and Putin who supported Orbán.
The international significance of this defeat of illiberalism is immeasurable.
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“How can we get rid of you?”
Like this.
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One of the many reasons I loathe our exit from the EU is that we can no longer rely on EU protections of our human rights if and when it’s the UK government that wants to remove them.
Amen
>> “Elections are also rigged or, if the results are unwelcome, discredited.”
My first thought when I read that was of our 2016 referendum, following which great efforts were made by parts of the British Establishment to discredit the unwelcome result – those of us who voted to leave were dismissed as stupid, racist, or simply unaware of what we were voting for. I’m not sure that was intended.
As ever, the devil is in the linguistics. Some say “liberal democracy”, and they mean something that could equally be described as libertarian democracy – a democracy in which people are free to express opinions, discuss ideas, start new movements, and live or die by the extent of their popular support. I doubt many of us would disagree with that, at least publicly. Others might lean towards the more US-biassed meaning of “liberal”, and (intentionally or unintentionally) mean a democracy that results in an administration that lies somewhere between gently left-leaning and radically left. In that context, a “departure from liberal democracy” is likely to be interpreted as covering any tendency to disagree with the contention that the optimal solution to most societal problems is a taxpayer-funded government intervention.
We’ve had a “liberal democracy” of the second type for at least 25 years now, and it is not serving us well. Living standards are declining both in absolute terms and relative to our neighbours, and the nation’s finances are becoming decidely unstable. We are testing this approach to destruction.
None of the above is a disagreement with your underlying view of Orban, though. The solution to our ills is not to adopt an illiberal democracy, it is to retain the libertarian instincts of our democracy but be realistic and honest about issues such as our finances, what government intervention can feasibly achieve, and how widely we can spread our kindness. I don’t see an honesty of that type in any of our current political leaders, liberal or illiberal. If that lack of honesty breeds the dissatisfaction that enables illiberal would-be leaders to gain popularity while posing as libertarians, it will not be exclusively their fault.