Why ‘A House of Dynamite’ is a good film about how those with power make decisions

28th October 2025

This unconventional nuclear thriller does something rare in movies

What follows are some thoughts about A House of Dynamite (Netflix).

*

This is not a review as such, but the response of someone who regularly commentates on decision-making by those with political power to a rather good film depicting a decision-making process.

This is a film where spoilers really do need to be avoided, so please be careful with what follows if you intend to watch it.

*

SPOILERS BELOW

*

A House of Dynamite is a film about decision-making by those with power during a crisis.

The crisis is that an intercontinental ballistic missile is suddenly discovered heading towards the United States from the north Pacific – more particularly, heading towards Chicago.

The launch of this missile was not detected at launch – it is instead discovered mid-flight over the Pacific – and we join the action minutes away from impact.

*

Often thrillers follow a conventional beginning-middle-end structure, with a resolution, one way or the other.

This film does not.

It instead has a middle-middle-middle structure, with no (clear) resolution.

We are not told how this crisis arose. We never find out who fired the missile, or why.

We are also not expressly told how the story ends. There is no explicit confirmation of whether the missile strikes Chicago or not.

(Though one can perhaps infer what happens from the final two scenes.)

The film is entirely about the middle bit: from the discovery of the missile to moments before the expected strike.

We are told the story of what happens in this middle bit from three overlapping perspectives – hence middle-middle-middle – with each segment concentrating on particular decision-makers, advisers, and providers of information.

*

Usually thrillers about those in power attribute a great deal of autonomy to those at the top.

In this film, however, we are shown how information flows from the bottom, about what information is shared and reported upwards, and that information can be incomplete or even misleading.

We also do not have one decision-maker, but several in video conference, jointly and urgently sharing and assessing incomplete information.

And in assessing this information they resort to established processes and policies. Books and folders are pulled out, charts and graphics are used to illustrate options.

But these processes and policies involve choices to be made – they are not railroads, and so it is then back to the individual decision-makers struggling with only having incomplete information.

Various decisions are made: the coin-toss firing of interceptors (which miss), the triggering of a continuity protocol and various evacuations (which interfere with efficient decision-making more than anything), and so on.

(These formal decisions are dramatically placed alongside personal decisions where the same individuals, with the same information, decide to break protocols and contact loved ones.)

When the strike on Chicago becomes a virtual certainty it becomes apparent that one ultimate decision needs to be made, and that decision can only be made by the President: whether to retaliate – and, if so, to what extent and against whom, and on the basis of what (if any) information and for what purpose.

The President is kept off-screen until the final segment – but when he appears we see him dealing with the incomplete information we have watched being put together, and the policies and processes and options that have been briefed to him.

We are not told what ultimate decision he makes.

But we know what materials he has before him. We have seen those materials being pulled together from the bottom up. We know what he has been told and not told. We know what decisions he could make at that point given what evidence has been provided and the choices put to him.

To have this as the end of the film, rather than whether the missile strikes and whether there is a strike-back, is a brave and good way to bring the film to an end.

And it means that it is this final predicament which lingers – an unsettling end, rather than a means to a neater end.

*

What was for me satisfying about this film is how it showed the ongoing interaction between information and processes and human agency. Not one of these three things ever took absolute priority. This balance is rare in any political or indeed legal thriller.

Sometimes a film will come down to the individual brilliance (or otherwise) of a key character, or to the (sometimes suddenly) revealed information being overwhelming, or to the leaden deadening deployment of laws and rules or of bureaucracy.

The full spectrum from a Perry Mason trial to Franz Kafka’s The Trial.

But for there to be a constant balance (and imbalance) between information and processes and human agency from beginning to end is as rare in fiction as it is common in reality.

In practice: information will point in various directions; procedures require the use of discretion with no clearly correct answer; the human beings involved will often be all too human when faced with the horrible predicament they are in – and force of personality will usually only have a limited effect.

As one key exchange in this film puts it, a practical but grave political (or legal) crisis can seem to those involved to be a unstable mix of insanity and realism.

*

This is not a film review blog, and so there is little for me to say about the acting and cinematography other than they were of the high standard you would expect of a production with such resources.

But there was one dramatic detail which the film got right again and again.

Much of the action in this film was in big wide interior spaces – situation rooms, conference rooms, a large politician’s office.

But for those practically in those settings the rooms do not seem large – their perspective is not that of the establishing shot. Instead, being in such spaces quickly becomes closed and claustrophobic.

If you are busy (and stressed) in, say, the grand conference rooms of Westminster and Whitehall, or in the ornate court rooms of the Royal Courts of Justice and Supreme Court, you very quickly forget the quaint environments. You instead become focused on what is immediately in front of you and beside you. The grand and ornate setting is quickly out of mind.

This film similarly shows those in situation rooms and conference rooms from a close perspective – what the individuals can see and hear (and not see and hear).

Films which show a political (or legal) exchange in wide-span can be misleading, for none of those involved will be thinking or acting in wide-span.

To understand decision-making it helps to see what it looks like to the decision-maker, and the information before them.

*

Of course, what does not ring true with this film is that you have a president and a US defense secretary agonising about anything – and it is significant that production of this film began well before the current incumbents of those offices were in place. This is more a Obama or Biden era film rather a Trump one.

One wonders what a similar film with a Trump figure and company would would be like.

***

Comments Policy

This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.

Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

34 thoughts on “Why ‘A House of Dynamite’ is a good film about how those with power make decisions”

  1. One thing that occurred to me is that it is never established (or even considered) whether the missile is, in fact, real. Given that its origin is unknown, it’s possible that it’s some kind of AI construct/system hack by a malign actor leading to a devastating “retaliation”. With what motive? Who knows? But interesting that in an AI World this option isn’t considered.

    1. That is an interesting observation that has a real-world story dating to WW2. From late 1944 when V2 rockets were used to attack England, there were attempts to detect the rockets mid-flight with radar. This often gave rise to false-positive detections; that is, radar reflections/echoes that were not from a V2 rocket but something else. An investigation at the time and its secret report, authored I believe by Bernard Lovell, found that the reflections were caused by the ionised trails of meteorites. Post-war research by Lovell (using ex-military radar to study cosmic rays) showed that radar echoes could be obtained at any time of the day/night from the ionised trails of very small meteorites that randomly entered the earth’s atmosphere and ionised the surrounding air. This meteor research became a major focus at the new observatory at Jodrell Bank and ultimately led to the building of the large Lovell Radio Telescope there. It also laid the foundations for the study of a new mode of long-range VHF radio communication called Meteor Burst Communications (MBC) that has civilian and military applications to this day.

    2. It took us 3 yrs to figure out that a virus that 1st showed up in Wuhan probably came from the local virology lab. The decision time in nuclear war is 6 minutes, No time to chase down AI angles.

  2. I saw it the other week and 100% agree with your description. My big takeaway was indeed how utterly incomprehensible it is that the current incumbents would behave in a rational way in such a situation.

    1. The last President was clearly senile. Is that better? The last president green lighted missile strikes into Russia. That means Russia is going through a version of this drill pretty often. Thanks to Biden, your life depends on Russian tech & Putin’s decision-making.

      And you’re supposed to understand that it doesn’t matter if its a comatose Biden or diet Coke wired Trump. There is no good decision to be made.

      What would you do? Launch or no? You know what Idris knew.

  3. The film also shows, more than anything else, what is currently being dismantled or is already missing in Washington DC. That was my thought during the watching of this film.
    And I really liked the (non-)ending!

    1. Dismantled? Is there a belief out there that we ever had protection from nuclear attack? We don’t. Never did. MAD is it. And MAD is violated at the beginning of the movie. That’s why everybody in the movie is freaking. They know the choices are to take one for the species and likely have all of the US destroyed or blow somebody up in hopes it deters more missiles. that’s all we’ve got.

      The myth of nuke defense may explain our crazy involvement in Ukraine. Putin is having to do some version of this move fairly often now. Fortunately, no mistakes. All it takes is one & I’m dead for sure.

  4. Thank you for these reflections, I’d agree it reveals the psychology of decision-making.

    Without wishing to challenge the plot, one additional angle is how there was a deadline imposed by the narrative. In reality no decision on retaliation would be made for hours, days or even months. There was no pressure to trigger a response before the presumed warhead struck (which frustrated me throughout).

    Why rush to make a decision ahead of a deadline you control?

    Please insert your own political analogy.

    1. This was my only gripe with the film – the artificial deadline to presumably provide additional dramatic tension. A slight case of “something must be done (now)”?!

      1. I think the “Sir, we will lose the window” bit explained the impending deadline to most viewers.

        I also had quibbles. I suspect most informed people would do with a film like this! But focusing on the quibbles seems to me a bit disproportionate.

      2. Agreed and I did enjoy the film 🙂 Although if a window is open, we don’t /have/ to jump out of it.

    2. The classic doctrine in these contexts is that (assuming you are facing down another super-power – e.g. China, Russia) you need to respond before or around the first impact – because the missiles they will fire will target all of your ‘assets’. E.g. all ground based missiles, air fields, supporting infrastructure like power, water etc. There’s also the general sense that with a bit more time, you can limit the impact of these weapons, so best to strike back hard and fast to maximise their impact and avoid any sheltering of humans or other things. Give North Korea/China/Russia days to prepare for a strike? No.

      Obviously the film shows that if you have a single missile inbound, the logic of those Cold Ware era plans start so creak a bit. If it’s just one missile from North Korea (plus maybe another potential 10-100 more to come?), there isn’t quite as much of a deadline. But all of the STRATCOM/Bunker crew and the guy with the nuclear football with the president are primed for that big confrontation. So that’s why they are pushing those plans and response times, because it’s the original MAD logic and expected inevitable response.

      Worth reading Annie Jacobsen’s book for more on this – her scenario in the book starts with a single missile too.

      1. Jeffrey Lewis’s novel ‘ The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against The United States’ is also an excellent imagining of responses to a nuclear strike. He’s an arms control wonk and knows the field well.

      2. Jacobsen’s scenario allots 72 minutes from a rogue state’s launch to total devastation. That’s 18 minutes shorter than Tom Lehrer’s estimate of “an hour-and-a-half from now” in his 1967 song “So Long, Mom.”

    3. The writer’s choice of Chicago as target introduced some doubt. If it were DC the policy is to launch before impact. The POTUS is involved for 6 minutes. That’s the far more likely and accepted scenario. Six minutes, not hours.

      Trickier in this deal because losing Chicago would cripple us but not completely. The explanation is that this may have been a test. No response means MAD is off, We’re blinking. So we are now sitting ducks. Or you take it & essentially beg Kim not to do it again. You were just on a basketball court & 6 min later its time to digest all of this & decide. Very little chance of success.

  5. Chicago is lost whatever happens. Where do we go from here? Reacting quickly on uncertain information likely to do more harm than good – appears no more missiles are coming so time to consider in the aftermath.

    After the bang scientists can tell you where it is likely to have been made. Question is, if an accidental launch why no ‘whoops’ phone call. In the past some nuke bombs were found to be easily triggered by a battery and a bit of wire if you knew the trick.

    Chicago is only one city, there are others. A US president may not survive the political fallout but presidents are a dime a dozen. More important is not to get into a Holocaust. Revenge is a dish best taken cold. A bit like catching one’s wife in delecto flagrente, a lot hangs on what you do next.

    I hope someone powerful somewhere has considered this as a possible scenario.

    1. They suspect it may be a combined effort. The concern is that the 1st missile may test resolve. If we blink, that green lights more missiles & we are wiped out. They also suspect our systems are all compromised even before the massive EMP of a nuclear explosion.

      Plenty of reason to launch. But does he? He has all of 6 min to get all the info & decide.

  6. I have a background in technology… and have extensive experience both employing and teaching the “Kepner Tregoe” methods, practices that include “Problem Management” and “Decision Analysis”. I’ve also worked extensively with Technology Resiliency and Business Continuity planning for global multi-billion-dollar organisations.

    Of all the lessons I’ve learned, it is that the greatest uncertaintly almost always boils down to the individual. I’ve helped companies write class-leading resiliency plans – and watched them fly out the window as an on-duty shift manager decides they know best. I’ve watched minor hiccups on massive, enterprise-wide changes turn in to disasters of biblical proportions just because some random database analyst convinced themselves that they knew how to fix that random error message.

    I’ve even applied Prospect Theory [that’s the behavioural economics model that trader Nic Leeson used to bring down Barings Bank] to show how minor technology glitches fail.

    It all comes down to the person. Every time. In my experience, it usually comes down to the *ego* of the person who becomes the heart of the problem. And for reasons known only to my deeply twisted subconscious, I always revert back to a cartoon I saw drawn of the Iran-Contra crisis. In a 2-box drawing, the first box contained, “The Structure of the US Government” – and showed the 3 main branches, and the Executive and subordinate departments. In the second box, the drawing contained 3 elements: “Ron” (Ronald Regan, President), “Ollie” (Colonel Oliver North), and “Shredder”.

    Robust prior planning helps maintain discipline among the rank-and-file when they need to be on their game to carry out the orders of the decision maker. No amount of *planning* [only hard training and good experience] can prepare the decision-maker for the role they will be needed to play.

    It all comes down to the person. Always.

  7. This is the best review and set of comments I’ve seen. Thank you.
    Yes, clearly the impetus to respond immediately is a little contrived.

    But what it shows very well is that even pretty competent and well trained people fall down in times of extreme stress (and as the original reviewer says, we don’t have even that at the moment). Or that some problems simply don’t have a neat solution without the benefit of hindsight.

    1. I guess I don’t see where anybody falls down in a way that matters. Chicago’s doom is sealed from the get go. And we don’t know for sure what the president decides. We see rooms full of people realizing that there is really nothing they can do & it doesn’t matter how stoic they are.

  8. Just suppose country A accidentally launches a nuke on Chicago (country B). After the scientists have given evidence and been cross examined and the lawyers and diplomats have squabbled, does country B get a ‘free kick’. Do you let on that is what it is or would you have to dress it up a bit to look like respectable governance.

    BTW, never heard of Kepner Tregoe, but a look reminded me of The Minto Method, popular among consultants in the ’80s and ’90s. She liked triangles too. Always something new to learn on this blog.

  9. It was a gripping, chilling drama, and all the better for its lack of a conventional linear filmic structure, or ‘satisfying’ resolution. We were constantly aware that momentous decisions were being made by humans, not titans.
    In its setting, its claustrophobia, its awareness of human fallibility, and the vital role of junior staff, it reminded me of the wonderful Sidney Lumet film Failsafe.
    The only thing that jarred was the cameo role played by Kaitlyn Dever, who has such star-wattage that her 2-minute appearance forced attention and focus away from the main protagonist at a time when the audience was intensely focused on his mental anguish.

    1. *googles Kaitlyn Dever*

      *sees she was the defense secretary’s daughter*

      I disagree. I had no idea who the actor was, and I think she played that role very well, and without her performance the final act of her father made little sense. For me, it was the opposite of jarring – it was seamless yet important.

      1. I agree that the character making an appearance (going about her normal life) was crucial, and if one didn’t know who the actor was then that didn’t matter. My point is that the Defence Secretary’s daughter could have been played by anyone: to have it played by an actor who has been the lead, and excelled, in a number of films (notably Unbelievable and Apple Cider Vinegar) was a distraction.
        Or maybe its simply a reflection of our viewing habits: when she appeared, my wife and I both said “it’s her, from thing” *or words to that effect*. Same with Idris Elba. Sometimes a lesser-known face aids the suspension of disbelief.

  10. I agree absolutely with your analysis of the movie and its non-ending, which was indeed brave and challenging. I would say however that I thought the filmmakers were reflecting the current Presidency by keeping POTUS behind a black screen and hearing him say things that were at times on the surface idiotic and infuriating (‘This reminds me of when I was in college”) until in the final act we realise he is a good man trying to make a decision, as you say, on partial and tenuous information, desperate for guidance. The most horrifying aspect, ultimately, is that thought of how this story would play out with the current administration, who have already fired half of the expert staff depicted trying to cope with the crisis…

    1. The last POTUS was senile. Some of us knew a lot about this nuke scenario & were infuriated that some wanted a demented person to make this decision if needed. UnAmerican.

      But as the movie shows, it doesn’t really matter. There is no good decision.

      Nobody involved in this has been fired. And if you have 10 extra experts, when do you talk to them? Best estimates are that the POTUS has 6 min to decide.

      The only political aspect to this is that it SHOULD demonstrate the ultra stupidity of risking this scenario over an East European gang war. Right now Putin and his guys are having to do this drill with much crappier tech. One mistake & we’re all dead. Thanks Joe.

  11. Big thank you to DAG for highlighting Bigelow’s brilliant drama

    The way that POTUS was given three broad scenarios to retaliate was somehow both trite and entirely believable

    Military advisers give the ‘decision maker’ two absurd options, and one that they believe is the correct option, and hope they go for that, but the ‘Wait and Consider’ option was missing, because of course it was

    Everyone has a predetermined path to follow, I think that was the kernel of the story – Nuclear War is Inevitable

  12. I purposely did not read past the “Spoiler Alert” until I had watched the film this evening.
    And…Wow…It was brilliant.
    My wife is fuming that we didn’t get to see the outcome, the decision or whether the missile hit, but I think it was an absolutely perfect ending, because it doesn’t try to second-guess what anyone would do. To do so would immediately push it over the line from realism into fantasy.
    I think David has hit the nail on the head with the close-in shots and the tunnel-vision effect (without any FX). I’m an ex-firefighter and I recognise that claustrophobia in space.

Comments are closed.