Why weren’t officers’ war crimes concerns reported to the military police at the time?

2nd April 2026

How Trump has created a situation he cannot get out of

26th March 2026

The choking of the Strait of Hormuz and an unwanted regime change in Iran mean Trump cannot simply walk away

There is a proverb about what is the difference between a clever person and a wise person.

A clever person can get themselves out of situations that a wise person would not have got into.

(There are other answers, but this is the best.)

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Political history provides many examples of leaders who, on the way up, are savvy and cautious but when corrupted by power become over-confident and reckless.

In this way, hubris often tends to be visited by Nemesis.

Not always: there will be those like Tito or Stalin or Franco who remain careful with absolute power so as not to expose themselves to the risk of downfall: the price of tyranny, like of liberty, is eternal vigilance.

But with President Trump, who has so often created uncertain situations for others to deal with while he invariably moves on, his usual streetwise cunning seems to have departed him with the attack on Iran.

And so he has created a situation out of which he cannot get.

Iran now has nothing to lose with choking the Strait of Hormuz. There is nothing currently which Trump can do with with either bluster or bullying to get the strait re-opened as before.

And – as this is a blog about polities – the state in Iran has reconfigured. There has been regime change, but not to the United States’s advantage.

As this outstanding piece in the Economist explains, the military-political leadership in Iran has fragmented and decentralised. There is thereby nobody with overall control, just disconnected and local forces with only loose central direction.

As such, there is also effectively nobody for Trump to bluster or bully.

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The United States attack on Iran is almost a perfect model of stupidity, to place alongside the Pyrrhic victory or the marches on Moscow.

And even if Trump tries now to move on, the Strait of Hormuz will still be choked and there will be deep, lasting instability in the region.

So we have a contradiction between what Trump wants to do and what he cannot do. He wants to walk away, but this is one mess he cannot escape.

A wise person would not have got into this situation, and it is now a situation a clever (or at least cunning) person cannot get out of.

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The Mueller report was a turning-point where United States history failed to turn

24th March 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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The cynical reframing of the report by Trump’s administration worked in our low attention span age

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The historian AJP Taylor once described the 1848 revolutions as a turning-point where German history failed to turn.

In the recent political and constitutional history of the United States there have been a few of these non-turning-points.

Most glaringly, one can point to those two failures by the Senate to convict the twice-impeached President Donald Trump.

But the death a few days ago of Robert Mueller reminds us of a particular media-political-constitutional non-turning-point: what happened and did not happen in 2019, when his report into on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election was published.

Front page of Mueller report

 

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The content of the report was damning of in its details. On this see the useful and important post by former federal prosecutor Joyce Vance published today.

But as with all formal texts, we need to understand both the purpose of the text and its context.

It was a report, and nothing other than a report.

It was not an indictment, and still less a judicial determination.

And the report did the job of a report, leaving it to decision-makers to make decisions based on the report.

The evidence and findings in the report would speak for themselves.

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But.

The evidence and findings in the report did not get to speak for themselves: they were drowned out.

The report was stymied on release by an effective and cynical countering operation involving the then attorney general William Barr and others.

The report had little chance in our low-attention-span age.

The report had 448 pages and no sound-bite summary.

In contrast, the Barr letter sent to Congress (mis)characterising the report and (mis)describing the content of the report was a mere 4 pages and was packed with quotable lines.

Top of the Barr letter

It was a sign of our times that the Barr letter got traction in politics and in the mainstream media and on social media and the throrough investigation set out in the report did not.

Trump even asserted that the report had cleared him.

But Trump’s response to Mueller’s death suggests that he never really believed that to be true.

Trump social media post saying “Robert Mueller just died. Good, I’m glad he’s dead. He can no longer hurt innocent people! President DONALD J. TRUMP”

“Robert Mueller just died. Good, I’m glad he’s dead. He can no longer hurt innocent people! President DONALD J. TRUMP”

If Trump genuinely believed he had been cleared by Mueller he really could not have posted that graceless response.

But he doesn’t, so he did.

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In a way, the intensity of Trump’s response is a testament to Mueller’s diligent work on the report.

As is said on Christopher Wren’s tomb: si monumentum requiris, circumspice (if you seek a monument, look around).

If you want a monument to Mueller’s report look at Trump’s unpleasant response.

But what you don’t have as a monument was any adverse consequences for Trump.

Trump carried on as if the report never was published.

Trump was never held accountable for what was detailed in the report.

The Mueller report and the response to it was a turning-point where American history failed to turn.

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Why the United States attack on the school in Minab matters

23rd March 2026

The facts of the incident point to a breach of international law

 

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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Let us assume the following facts:

1. that there was a guided missile;

2. that this guided missile had a pre-selected target; and

3. that this guided missile struck that pre-selected target as it was intended to do so.

If the missile was not a guided missile, or that it struck a target that was not the pre-selected target, then one or more of the facts posited above would not be true. But let us assume those facts are the case.

Let now assume the following additional facts:

4. that a school was the pre-selected target;

5. that the guided missile struck that pre-selected target as it was intended to do so; and

6. that over one hundred schoolchildren were killed in that strike.

If these facts are also true then there is a question about fact (4): was the school a deliberate target? Was the building selected for the strike by someone (or something) knowing it was a school?

If so, then there would be a war crime, as schools are protected from such attacks under international law – on this see the able article by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown here.

But what if the school was selected by someone (or something) without realising it was a school?

Then the question becomes whether that someone (or something) should have known it was a school.

And if they did not do everything feasible to verify the status of a targeted object then the targeter is also culpable and in breach of international law.

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Over at Prospect – click here – I have done a post on whether the attack by the United States on a school in Minab is a breach of international law.

It would appear that from 2016 onwards, public domain and open source information would have shown that the school was no longer part of an adjacent compound of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

screengrab of new report on opensource material

This means that anybody (or anything) that bothered to check what they were actually doing with this $3.5 million piece of hardware, of which the United States only has a limited number, would have realised that the school was not a military target.

On costs grounds alone one would have thought they would check whether a missile would be ‘wasted’ – let alone humanitarian grounds.

But, as this New York Times report reveals, it seems that the United States did not bother to check up-to-date information. Instead the United States relied on out-of-date information, and so over one hundred schoolchildren were killed.

screengrab of NYT article

And Reuters now reports that United States military now realise they have a problem over this strike and have elevated the status of their internal inquiry.

At least the incident is being investigated.

Of course, few will feel confident that such an inquiry will lead to any open admission of culpability or any sanction against any individual.

You will probably have the Jean Charles de Menezes sort-of-situation where there was an overall, system failure – a lethal failure – but no particular person will take any blame.

But as the Prospect article concludes: in the current context of Artificial Intelligence, it would seem the application of human intelligence to public domain, open source information would mean over one hundred schoolchildren would probably still be alive today.

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This post is also cross posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The prospect of “executive orders” being used by an incoming illiberal government

Spring Equinox, 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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Last weekend there was a news article about the Reform party which contained this passage:

“Nigel Farage’s party has promised it will enact a radical programme. One senior member said this would be modelled on the second Trump administration. The US president made many changes via executive orders rather than via Congress.”

Readers of this blog (and of my stuff elsewhere) should not be surprised by this.

Last year this blog set out how an incoming illiberal administration would have significant constitutional powers to do illiberal things with few or no checks and balances, as such legal instruments receive little or no parliamentary scrutiny.

In particular, such a new government would have the power of issuing at scale statutory instruments and other delegated legislation:

“The possibly third constitutional super-power is the sheer range and wealth of discretionary powers of the government not under the Royal Prerogative but already existing under perhaps thousands of legislative provisions.

“Some of these provisions under Acts of Parliament even allow ministers to change the law by ministerial discretion, as well as to issue statutory instruments and other instruments (such as statutory guidance) with legal effect.

“Every successive government has added more of these provisions, even if they complained about them in opposition.

And it would be open to a government under the first constitutional super-power – the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy – to add even more of these powers

“One suspects various “think-tanks” are already collating the discretionary powers that already exist, ready to arm – DOGE-style – an incoming radical and illiberal government.

“Such an incoming government would not need to break the law – for the law already will provide almost all the powers such a government could want.”

These legal instruments are not called “executive orders” – that is an Americanism.

But the sentiment is the same.

And the problem is that the current government – as with all governments whatever the parties in office – likes these legal instruments far too much to give them up.

A sensible government would prudently pass measures to limit the power of ministers to rule by fiat – to reduce the scope of discretionary powers to (for example) make, amend or repeal legislation.

But, of course, we do not have a sensible government acting prudently to make more difficult for a possible illiberal administration.

And so those who have warned about these powers and of how they could misused will only have the dubious consolation of saying “we told you so” if an incoming illiberal government uses these powers in illiberal ways.

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This post is also cross posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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Comments Policy

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The Palestine Action proscription case and the botched prosecution of Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh – how the Home Office, the police, and the prosecutors, are not taking terrorism law seriously

13th March 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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Terrorism law is important and should be credible

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Let us start with the most basic point about terrorism law.

Terrorism law should be credible and taken seriously.

Terrorism law is a special body of law, in addition to the general laws of the land, conferring special powers and creating special rules in respect of the threat of terrorism.

As such, of all areas of law, it should be taken seriously and it should be credible.

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The United Kingdom never really used to have terrorism law, at least in permanent form.

Instead we had, for example, a succession of temporary Prevention Of Terrorism Acts, of deliberately limited duration, renewed as and when by parliament.

And it was on this improvised legal basis that the United Kingdom dealt with the the terrorism that flowed from the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, which came to an end to a large extent with the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

Somehow those threats had been dealt with and a sort of resolution achieved without the need for any permanent terrorism legislation.

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And then something changed.

And after 2000 the United Kingdom, year-on-year, created a body of permanent terrorism law, creating a security state within the state.

This was partly because of 9/11 and what followed – though the 2000 Act received royal assent before that dreadful tragedy.

And it was partly because of (perhaps counter-intuitively) the Human Rights Act 1998, which required all interferences with the fundamental rights of individuals to have an express legal basis. In other words, some of this stuff had been going on before, but there had been no statutory framework, as it had not been needed.

But after 2000, and for whatever reasons, permanent terrorism legislation grew like topsy.

Looking at the titles of the primary legislation, you may think that the “anti-terrorism” and “counter-terrorism” Acts would cancel out the “terrorism” Acts, but: no. The effect is accumulative.

In addition to the eleven Acts listed above from 2000 to 2025, we have had other extensive primary legislation on surveillance and data retention and national security.

According the the legislation website we have also had 163 items of secondary legislation with “terrorism” in the title since 2000.

Huge piles of new legislation on terrorism since 2000.

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But, still, terrorism legislation should be taken seriously and be credible. Even if one can be concerned at the ever-growing extent of terrorism law, it serves – or should serve – an important legal purpose.

Terrorism legislation provides – or should provide – a special body of law for dealing with terrorism which cannot be done with the general law of the land.

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The problem is that recent events have shown that terrorism legislation is not being taken seriously – and it is not being taken seriously by those who should take it seriously: the government, the police, and the public prosecutors.

And this is obvious from how section 13 and related provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000 (as amended) are treated by those with public power.

Here are three examples.

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First, the proscription of Palestine Action by the Home Secretary was been ruled unlawful by the High Court.

(On this, see my posts here and here.)

The details of the High Court judgment show a Home Office that did not take the proscription seriously, imposing the sanction on flimsy or non-existent basis.

Even if the Home Office reverse this ruling on appeal, this is the sort of measure that should not have come anywhere close to a successful legal challenge.

The courts are usually deferent on matters of national security, and the judges were not impressed by Palestine Action, but even the High Court could not buy this proscription.

And this was because the Home Secretary and the Home Office did not take terrorism legislation seriously.

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Second, the botched prosecution of Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh, the Kneecap rapper, shows the police not taking terrorism legislation seriously.

(See my Prospect post from yesterday here.)

The police did nothing about an alleged incident for six months, even though supposed breaches of terrorism law should presumably be dealt with swiftly and diligently.

And then the police panicked at the six-month deadline for the relevant offence – and royally mucked up because they had not got the relevant consent in time.

From Kneecap to Keystone.

These are the same anti-terrorism officers who, of course, are supposed to be keeping us safe.

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And then we have the public prosecutors in the same case.

When the defendant’s lawyers rightly pointed out that the prosecution was void for want of jurisdiction – because the requisite consent was not in place in time – the Chief Magistrate of England and Wales (no less) threw out the prosecution.

But the public prosecutors could not accept this decision.

Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh simply had to be prosecuted for the alleged incident, no matter the cost to the public purse, and no matter the effect on settled case law.

The Director of Public Prosecutions resorted to the rarely used appeal by case stated to get the High Court to reverse the decision of the Chief Magistrate of England and Wales.

One would think that given the substantial delays and backlogs in the criminal justice system – some now lasting years – and which are seemingly so bad that the jury system itself may be dismantled – would mean that the Crown Prosecution Service would have better things to do.

But no, Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh simply had to be prosecuted.

The High Court, however, were not impressed with the appeal.

The High Court pointed out that siding with the Director of Public Prosecutions in this matter would disrupt plain statutory provisions and settled caselaw.

The High Court even went to the extent of stating its “concern” at the “mistake” for which there should be “blame” in a classic passage of judicial understatement (emphasis added):

“It is a matter of concern that a charge which both the DPP and the Attorney General considered met both parts of the Full Code Test for Crown Prosecutors will never now be determined. There was, they decided, a realistic prospect of conviction and the prosecution was in the public interest. We have not investigated the reasons for this failure and nor do we seek to attribute blame. That is not because these circumstances are not worthy of consideration but because they are irrelevant to our decision.”

Ouch.

The Director of Public Prosecutions, of course, should not have wasted their department’s scarce (and valuable) resources on this hopeless appeal. The Crown Prosecution Service should concentrate on putting cases together, not trying to cover its back for when a mistake was made.

By the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service pretending no mistake had been made (with an appeal based on an extraordinarily unconvincing case theory with no basis in any authority), they too showed they did not take the applicable terrorism law seriously.

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By saying terrorism law should be taken seriously one is not denying that there is a purpose to terrorism law.

It is to say that terrorism law should not be taken lightly.

Credibility of any area of law can be fragile, and terrorism law deserves better than recent antics of the Home Office, the police, and the public prosecutors.

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This post is also cross posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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Comments Policy

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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What is not happening with constitutionalism in the United States and the United Kingdom

11th March 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog on law, policy, and lore – the new name of which is explained here.

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A look at constitutionalism (and the lack of it) in the United States and United Kingdom, with reference to a 1980s computer magazine column

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The first journalist who I knew by name was Lloyd Mangram, the writer of a monthly round-up of news for that wonderful 1980s magazine for Sinclair Spectrum users, Crash.

(Yes, I was a Speccie – less earnest than the BBC micro users, less bombastic than the Commodore 64 users, and less exotic than a Dragon 32 user.)

The Merely Mangram column was cheerfully discursive and leisurely, and it gave a better sense of what was going on (and not going on) generally in that world – especially for this then-teenage reader – than the news reports, interviews and reviews elsewhere in the computer press.

So you can imagine the devastation when I discovered one day that Lloyd Mangram did not actually exist – that this supposed author was actually a composite persona put together by the other magazine writers.

Lloyd Mangram was a fiction!

This was when I first learned to be cynical about the media.

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Nonetheless, there is merit in that sort of discursive commentary – especially about human affairs.

News reports are necessarily narrow; op-eds often promote a preconceived “angle” with motivated reasoning; explainers invariably work backwards from what topical particular point needs to be quickly explained.

But if [A] has some connection to [B], and in the meantime [C] is not happening, then a discursive approach can sometimes give more insight in what is going on, than any news report, an op-ed, or explainer.

And as Kenneth Tynan (who I think definitely existed?) says somewhere, the job of a critic is not only to say what is happening, but also to say what is not happening. This must also be true of a commentator.

Yet commenting on something which is not happening is not really what our media is geared to do, if you think about it. There is enough going on report and analyse, without setting out what is not happening.

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In respect of the United States, what is not happening explains a great deal of what is happening.

What is not happening is any overall sense of constitutionalism.

President Trump and his circle are doing the worst of things, at home and abroad. There is a general approach of cruelty and violence, from Minnesota to the Indian Ocean .

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But.

There are always Trumps. There are always Vances and Millers and Hegseths and Noems.

There are always knaves and fools, and there always those those who will serve knaves and fools.

The question is how constitutional arrangements – the division of powers, the checks and balances, the rule of law and the guarantees of certain fundamental rights – have failed and are failing to prevent what is happening.

The arrangements are there: Trump and his circle could face removal by impeachment at a stroke, and their antics could be consistently held to be unlawful.

Yet that is not happening.

What is not happening is any constitutionalist approach to restrain Trump and his circle.

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Here in the United Kingdom we have a different sort of thing which is not happening in respect of constitutional matters.

We have a supposedly left-of-centre government with a former human rights lawyer as Prime Minister – and with similar lawyers and ex-lawyers in prominent positions.

But we do not have any consistent overall view to constitutionalism and constitutional reform.

Yesterday – hurrah! – there was a vote passing the removal of hereditary peers from the House of Lords, some 115 years after such peers were allowed to remain in the legislature with what was intended to be a temporary stay.

This reform is the minimum required – and a great deal of Lords reform is undone, as is any (and arguably more important) Commons reform.

And also yesterday – boo! – there was a vote restricting trials by jury.

This change, of course, will make little or no difference to court backlogs, which to deal with requires resources at scale.

And as this blog has said many times, juries are less important for the powers that they have, than for the powers that they prevent others from having.

Again, this change is not part of any overall constitutional vision.

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Many of the problems in the United States and United Kingdom come about from what is not not being done.

And in our focus of twenty-four news and doomscrolling, we are perhaps less able to notice what is not happening.

As one Speccie computer game character would have said:

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”

“To the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime.”

“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”

“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

Sherlock | The Digital Antiquarian

(Source)

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This post is also cross posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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Comments Policy

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

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The curious section 3 of the new National Security Act

10th March 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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A broad and vague provision may be a cause for concern

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Last week I was asked to write a piece on the arrests of three individuals in respect of Chinese espionage. One of the individuals was noteworthy, partly because they are married to a member of parliament. It was quite a news event and the New Statesman wanted someone to explain the relevant law.

As is my general approach, I did not mention the individuals or comment on the potential merits of any legal aspect of the case. The individuals are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, and the recent history of espionage arrests indicate that there is a fair chance the cases go no further. The job of the responsible legal commentator in such circumstances is only to set out the applicable law.

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I assumed this would be straightforward: an exposition of section 1 of the new National Security Act 2023, which more-or-less replaced the old (and infamous) section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.

But when I looked at the Metropolitan Police press release (always look at original documents when you can, rather than relying on reportage) I noticed something curious.

The arrests were not under section 1 of the new Act.

The arrests were instead under section 3 of the new Act.

Three people arrested under National Security Act Three people have been arrested as part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation into suspected National Security Act offences. The men [A-C] were arrested on Wednesday, 4 March on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to section 3 of the National Security Act, 2023. The country to which the investigation relates is China.

With emphasis added:

“Three people arrested under National Security Act

“Three people have been arrested as part of a Counter Terrorism Policing investigation into suspected National Security Act offences.

“The men [A-C] were arrested on Wednesday, 4 March on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence service, contrary to section 3 of the National Security Act, 2023. The country to which the investigation relates is China.”

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Section 3 of the new Act is in respect of “Assisting a foreign intelligence service” as opposed to section 1 which is in respect of “Obtaining or disclosing protected information”.

It is a fascinating provision, which you should read in full. In essence it provides for two similarly worded but significantly different offences.

First section 3(1):

“(1) A person commits an offence if the person—

“(a) engages in conduct of any kind, and

“(b) intends that conduct to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.”

And then section 3(2) (emphasis added):

“(2) A person commits an offence if the person—

“(a) engages in conduct that is likely to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities, and

“(b) knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, that their conduct is likely to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities.”

Section 3(3) then provides (emphasis added):

“Conduct that may be likely to materially assist a foreign intelligence service includes providing, or providing access to, information, goods, services or financial benefits (whether directly or indirectly).”

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The section 3(1) offence is an “intention” offence.

If you look carefully, however, you will notice something which is not there. The person does not actually need to communicate anything to the foreign intelligence service. The person merely has to engage in “conduct of any kind” – even if not communicated.

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The section 3(2) offence is not an “intention” offence.

Here, the person does not even need to intend to assist foreign intelligence service. Indeed, the foreign intelligence service may not even be aware of it.

The conduct only needs to be “likely” to assist, regardless of intention.

They do not even need to know they are doing it, but “ought reasonably to know”.

And again there does not need to be any communication with the foreign intelligence service – the foreign intelligence service may not even be aware of it.

On the face of it, the section 3(2) offence would cover a hobbyist following foreign affairs or even a journalist, “indirectly” providing access to information on (say) their website or reportage, even if they do not intend to assist a foreign intelligence agency, but in the opinion of the courts “ought” to have known that it would assist a foreign intelligence agency.

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There are some statutory defences to the section 3(2) offence, listed at section 3(7), but these are strictly limited in scope.

Perhaps there are provisions elsewhere in this complex legislation which mitigate the potential effect of this provision – and if so I will update this page.

Perhaps the the courts will anxiously scrutinise any application of the section 3(2) offence when it impacts upon freedom of expression and the right to share and impart information on matters of topical and public interest.

(Ho ho.)

Perhaps there is nothing to worry about.

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But.

Section 3(2) is a broad and vague provision.

One can see why the government and the security services want a broad “conduct” approach which would capture any imaginative ploy used by the culpable.

But in doing this there is a risk – as elsewhere with terrorism and national security legislation – that the prosecutorial convenience of the government and the security services is at the expense of clarity and free expression rights.

It will be interesting to see how this section 3(2) offence is used in practice.

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This post is also cross posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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Comments Policy

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Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.

More on the comments policy is here.

But what about international law – continued.

4th March 2026

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Hello and welcome to The Empty City blog, the new name of which is explained here.

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From time-to-time this law and policy blog touches upon international law.  The last time a post was devoted to it was only in January this year, though that already seems a long time ago.

The argument put forward in that post was that even if international law cannot readily be enforced, it still nonetheless can be recognised.  This means international law, like any body of law, still exists, even if it is being disregarded.

The tree still makes a noise when it falls in the forest.

But.

It is also fair to say that many are sceptical and dismissive about international law, and even some (eminent) lawyers regard it as essentially a fiction.

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One problem about international law is that it can often seem one-sided.

Take for example the inability of many (though not all) European countries to say plainly that the attacks on Iran by Israel and the United States were not in accordance with international law, let alone in breach.

When a European territory (like Greenland) and a European country (Ukraine) are threatened or attacked, then European leaders are ready to invoke international law.

But when it is not a European territory or a European country at stake, there is an awkward silence.

Of course, the United Kingdom government know that the attacks on Iran were illegal – it is the necessary implication of the stated position on the validity of “defensive” attacks.

And, of course, we know why as a matter of realpolitik the United Kingdom government thinks it cannot say this aloud.

No sensible person is under any illusion on either point.

But.

One can also see why elsewhere in the world many do not take the West’s professed attachment to international law seriously.

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Iran’s scattergun retaliations against those not concerned with the American and Israeli attacks are plainly against international law.

And that these retaliations are against international law is said aloud, including by the United Kingdom government.

We thereby have one without the other.

We openly say one thing is against International law, but are closed-mouthed about the other.

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Yet unless international law applies to all nations (the clues are in the words “international” and “law”) then it can hardly be called international.  Or law.

But in something akin to “victor’s justice”, it is a standard we only seem to invoke plainly against some countries and not others.

From the perspective of this liberal blog, international law is a good thing.  In general the more international law is recognised and even enforced the better.

But international law will never get real traction when it is deployed in such a one-sided way.

A thing cannot be both universal and partial.

And so to condemn Iran for breaching international law in its reckless retaliations to attacks, but not the countries making those attacks, means you end up with a position that is neither coherent nor compelling.

Yet for international law to gain purchase in the world, the case for it needs to be coherent and compelling.

Else, like the cynics maintain, it is (or will be seen as) little more than fiction.

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This post will also be cross-posted at The Empty City substack, which is run in parallel with this blog.

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About ‘The Empty City’ as a title for this blog

3rd March 2026

As you may have noticed this blog has a new name to go with its new domain. The name is the same as my Substack, but I thought I should explain it as the title of a blog about law (and lore) and policy.

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(Spoiler warning for Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities.)

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Compare and contrast these two paintings.

The first is one of the Renaissance “ideal city” paintings.

Nobody knows for certain who the painter is, so I will call them “the Renaissance Master” for this post.

You will notice that the painting has regular lines of perspective and a set vanishing point; it also has proportionate, idealised architecture; and it has welcoming and well-lit colonnades and arcades.

And you will notice it has no people.

Nor shadows.

For me this painting conveys a place (and polity) in its idealised form: how it should be, at least to some people.

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The second painting is Mystery and Melancholy of a Street by Giorgio de Chirico.

Here there are no regular lines of perspective and no vanishing point; the architecture is not idealised and not proportionate; and the arcades are dark and sinister.

The painting has people (or at least a person), and you are scared for who is playing with the hoop, as the shadow of another person (or of a statue) is foreboding.

And the shadows generally don’t quite add up.

(Curiously, the sky is not that different.)

This is also a painting of its time: 1914, as Europe and elsewhere fell into the Great War.

For me this paining conveys a place (and polity) in its actuality: how it is – confusing and incoherent.

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I use both paintings regularly as banners and avatars and so on.

Taken together they seem to show the job of a commentator on law and policy: explaining things as they are, but with reference to how rules and principles insist those things should be.

But…

…it was not until recently I realised something about the two paintings.

And this realisation was triggered by re-reading Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities.

In that book some fifty-five cities are described in all their vivid variety.

But, as the narrator reveals midway in the book, they are all depictions of the very same city (Venice).

And so I realised that the Renaissance Master and Giorgio de Chirico were also not painting different cities…

…but painting the very same city, but with a different outlook.

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Thank you for following this blog as it transforms into The Empty City.