Category: International Agreements

A first glance at the Bill of Rights Bill

22nd June 2022

The new Bill of Rights Bill 2022 has been published.

On the face of it, this is a very significant move.

The Bill even tells us that when enacted it will be known as the “Bill of Rights 2022”.

Note this means it will now be one of a small group of statutes which will not be known as Blah Blah Act Date.

No, this legislation demands comparison with the (actual) Bill of Rights of 1688.

Portentous stuff.

But.

In broad terms, this new legislation makes no real difference to the Human Rights Act 1998.

For example, schedule one to the Human Rights Act 1998 sets out the articles of the European Convention of Human Rights:

And Schedule 1 to the new legislation also sets out the articles of the European Convention of Human Rights:

The proposed Bill of Rights does not create any new ‘British’ rights instead of the European Convention.

The fundamental purpose of the 1998 Act and the new bill are the same: to provide a basis in domestic law for giving effect to the convention rights in the European Convention.

And the key operative provision is the same.

Here is section 6 of the 1998 Act:

And here is clause 12 of the proposed bill:

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So.

Both the 1998 Act and the new legislation place the rights under the European Convention of Human Rights into English law by means of a schedule.

And the 1998 Act and the new legislation provide – in identical language – that public bodies must comply with those rights.

Even the defintion of “Convention rights” are the same.

The 1998 Act:

The new Bill:

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You may wonder what is the point of an entirely new enactment that does, at the fundamental level, exactly the same as the legislation it is supposed to replace?

And the answer to that is there is no real point.

The new legislation does make a difference in respect of how the convention rights can be enforced in certain situations.

The overall effect – odd for legislation which will be called ‘The Bill of Rights”, if you think about it – is to make it harder practically for convention rights to be enforced.

But that is done by the means of various processes and other tinkering – but nothing which warrants such a legislative overhaul.

Those new provisions can be looked in detail at as the bill proceeds.

But in respect of the fundamentals this new bill gives effect to the same Convention rights with the same key obligation and with the same defintion of convention rights.

The rest is detail and symbolism.

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Compliance not confrontation: a possibly significant rhetorical shift in the Foreign Secretary’s statement today on the Northern Irish Protocol

17th May 2022

As any good regulatory lawyer will tell you, ‘compliance’ is better than contravention or challenge.

The question is what can constitute compliance.

From time to time a regulatory lawyer will get a new or inexperienced regulated client who want to challenge or contravene a regulatory rule or policy.

‘Let’s go to court’,’ the novice will say, or ‘let’s tell them that we will see them in court’.

The regulatory lawyer will shake their wise head and say: ‘well, if you do this instead, then you will be complying, and then all the bother will go away’.

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Compliance is usually a better overall legal strategy than confrontation.

And with that view in mind, let us now look at the statement by the Foreign Secretary today to the House of Commons about the Northern Irish Protocol.

Instead of the statement once (notoriously) made by a cabinet minister that the United Kingdom would only break international law “in a very specific and limited way”, the Foreign Secretary said that the government would comply with international law in its new legislation:

“That is why I am announcing our intention to introduce legislation in the coming weeks to make changes to the Protocol.

“Our preference remains a negotiated solution with the EU.

“In parallel with the legislation being introduced, we remain open to further talks if we can achieve the same outcome through negotiated settlement.  […]

“The Government is clear that proceeding with the Bill is consistent with our obligations in international law – and in support of our prior obligations in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement.”

In other words, the government is to ‘comply’ with international law – though no doubt in a very specific and limited way.

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So much for rhetoric – on information currently available, it seems the government is threatening what it has threatened before.

The significant difference is that the government is now to threaten this while maintaining it is complying with international law rather than candidly admitting that it is seeking to break it.

It seems that the basis for this intellectual exercise in gymnastics is that the Good Friday Agreement takes priority over the protocol.

That this is the tactic is supported by the references to the Good Friday Agreement at the beginning of the statement and from statements from government supporters:

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As one Northern Irish writer put the notion of such priority in a fantasy context, there can sometimes be “deeper magic”.

What the government appears to be developing is a contention that any unilateral amendment of the Norther Irish Protocol cannot really be a breach of international law if that amendment is by reason of the Good Friday Agreement.

Of course: this is all sophistry and illusion.

The policy substance has not changed, and the proposed breach has not changed, all that has changed is that the proposal will not now be described as breaking international law.

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Yet such a rhetorical shift is possibly significant.

For it may signify that although the United Kingdom government has no fresh ideas about how to resolve the issue with the Northern Ireland Protocol, ministers may now realise that the rhetoric of challenges and outlawry is not necessarily helpful.

And, if this is the case, this could become a useful habit – for the government may find other things that can be brought under the label of ‘compliance’ that may allow it to shift its position in substance.

Smudgery and fudgery, perhaps.

And somewhere in Whitehall, a foreign office lawyer nods their head wisely.

It is all about what ‘compliance’ means, you see.

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What the Home Secretary’s Ministerial Direction on Rwanda signifies – and what it does not signify

18th April 2022

The home secretary has issued ‘a ministerial direction’ for her proposal for a ‘migration and economic development partnership’ with Rwanda for the processing of asylum claims.

Such a direction is significant – but it is also important to realise what it does not signify.

The direction by itself does not mean that the proposal is wrong, or will not work, or is unlawful.

What it does mean is that there is sufficient concern within the home office that the most senior official wants Priti Patel to own the decision to go ahead with it.

And this is worth exploring.

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The partnership proposal was published last (Maundy) Thursday – which is odd, given that parliament was not sitting and we are around the time of the start of the central government ‘purdah’ for the local election campaigns.

Also published was a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Rwanda.

In general terms, an MoU is a document that is supposed to impress you as as being effective and formal, but is not actually effective nor formal.

A political (and legal) sleight of hand (SoH).

And followers of this blog will enjoy the wording of paragraph 2.2 of the MoU:

“2.2 For the avoidance of doubt, the commitments set out in this Memorandum are made by the United Kingdom to Rwanda and vice versa and do not create or confer any right on any individual, nor shall compliance with this Arrangement be justiciable in any court of law by third-parties or individuals.”

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So that was (Maundy) Thursday.

On (Easter) Saturday, in the late afternoon, two letters were published by the government.

These letters were dated 13 April 2022, that is the Wednesday before the proposal and the MoU were published on the Thursday.

The first letter was from the most senior civil servant at the home office.

He was insisting on a ministerial direction.

Why?

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To answer that question we need to understand government policy on ‘managing public money’.

This policy is not the sort of partisan policy which politicians announce or publish in a manifesto.

It is instead the sort of policy which any government has, regardless of which part is in power.

And within each department the most senior official – in this case the permanent secretary – is the ‘accounting officer’ responsible for ensuring the policy is complied with.

When I was a government lawyer fifteen years ago, it was known as ‘VFM’ – value for money.

Part of the ‘managing public money’ policy provides:

The fine folk at the Institute of Government have provided this excellent explainer on ministerial directions which you should now read.

And this is the government’s own page for such directions.

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Now we go back to the permanent secretary’s letter.

You will see the first three paragraphs set out his understanding of the policy and what it is seeking to achieve – and this is set out in positive terms to which the home secretary herself cannot object.

The fourth paragraph then sets out his role as the accounting officer, and the fifth paragraph sets out the extent to which he sees there is no problem with the Rwanda proposal (emphasis added):

“The Accounting Officer advice that I have received comprises a rigorous assessment of the regularity, propriety, feasibility and value for money of this policy, drawing on legal, policy and operational expertise.  I have satisfied myself that it is regular, proper and feasible for this policy to proceed. We have incorporated learning from Windrush in developing this policy and the plans for its implementation.”

So, according to the official it is generally “regular, proper and feasible” for the proposal to proceed.

But.

There is something about which he as accounting officer is not satisfied, and this is set out out in the next paragraphs (which I have separated out for flow):

“However, this advice highlights the uncertainty surrounding the value for money of the proposal.

“I recognise that, despite the high cost of this policy, there are potentially significant savings to be realised from deterring people entering the UK illegally.

“Value for money of the policy is dependent on it being effective as a deterrent.

“Evidence of a deterrent effect is highly uncertain and cannot be quantified with sufficient certainty to provide me with the necessary level of assurance over value for money.

I do not believe sufficient evidence can be obtained to demonstrate that the policy will have a deterrent effect significant enough to make the policy value for money.

“This does not mean that the MEDP cannot have the appropriate deterrent effect; just that it there is not sufficient evidence for me to conclude that it will.”

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The proposal has a “high cost” – but there is no sufficient evidence that the high cost will be offset by savings from it having any deterrent effect.

The evidence for such an effect is not only uncertain but “highly uncertain”.

He therefore cannot sign off on the policy as accounting officer.

He instead needs to escalate it to the minister to sign off personally.

And so (again broken up for flow):

“Therefore, I will require your written instruction to proceed.

“I consider it is entirely appropriate for you to make a judgement to proceed in the light of the illegal migration challenge the country is facing.

“I will of course follow this direction and ensure the Department continues to support the implementation of the policy to the very best of our abilities.

“Should you issue a direction, I am required to copy all relevant papers to the Comptroller and Auditor General (who will inform the Public Accounts Committee) and the Treasury Officer of Accounts.

“I anticipate publishing our exchange of direction letters as early as practicable.”

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So this is not any usurpation of ministerial responsibility and democratic control, but a reinforcement of the priority of minister over officials.

The minister will get their way – but they have to take the decision themselves.

And so the home secretary replied, giving the direction.

Her letter is also worth looking at – though this time for what it does not say.

Her letter does not engage with the value for money points but sidesteps them (again broken for flow):

“While we understand it is not possible for HMG to accurately model the deterrent effect from day one, together with Rwanda, we are confident this policy is our best chance at producing that effect.

“It is only by introducing new incentives and effective deterrents into the system, as our international partners like Denmark, Greece, and Australia have succeeded in doing, that we can take on the criminal gangs facilitating illegal entry and break their lethal business model.

“I recognise your assessment on the immediate value for money aspect of this proposal.

“However, I note that without action, costs will continue to rise, lives will continue to be lost, and that together we have introduced safeguards into our agreement to protect taxpayer funding.

“And while accepting the constraints of the accounting officer framework set out by HM Treasury, I also think there are credible invest-to-save arguments in the long term.

[…]

…I also believe there is an imperative to act now to mitigate the impact on staff wellbeing as well as departmental operational and financial pressures in the longer term.

“It would therefore be imprudent in my view, as Home Secretary, to allow the absence of quantifiable and dynamic modelling – which is inevitable when developing a response to global crises influenced by so many geopolitical factors such as climate change, war and conflict –– to delay delivery of a policy that we believe will reduce illegal migration, save lives, and ultimately break the business model of the smuggling gangs.

“I am therefore formally directing you as Accounting Officer to take forward this scheme with immediate effect, managing the identified risks as best you can.”

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For the home secretary, the lack of sufficient evidence of any deterrent effect does not matter.

She believes the Rwanda proposal will work, and so it shall be taken forward.

She is confident that in the longer-term there will be value for money, and – in any case – modelling is not easy for this sort of things.

Her decision; her call.

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Of course, one should be wary of taking documents such as these two exchanged letters seriously at face value.

Such exchanges can be choreographed and it sometimes (though not here one suspects, given the disjoined nature of the reply) the same official will draft both letters – ‘sign here minister’.

It could be that the request for a direction here is a manifestation of deeper unease within the home office at this proposal – and that such a request, framed in VFM terms, was the only way of signalling publicly this unease.

The bureaucratic equivalent of the blinking hostage.

On the other hand, the home office is certainly capable of nasty and expensive policies.

And the permanent secretary in his fifth paragraph goes out of his way to say it is “regular, proper and feasible for this policy to proceed”.

Who knows?

Perhaps the permanent secretary knew the value for money objection could not be gainsaid and that it would not look like he was criticising the merits of the proposal.

Perhaps, perhaps, perhaps.

We do not know the realities behind the scenes.

The request for a direction is significant – but what it signifies generally is not clear.

But what we do know from this exchange of letters is that on the very eve of the publication of the proposal, the most senior official in the home office said that there was not sufficient evidence that the proposal would have any deterrent effect, and in response to this the home secretary could not provide any such evidence but wanted to go ahead with the policy anyway.

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Two reasons why today’s ‘Reclaim these Streets’ high court decision is significant

11th March 2022

The ‘Reclaim these Streets’ decision was handed down by the High Court today.

In a welcome judgment, it was held by the High Court that the Metropolitan Police had acted unlawfully in respect of blanket banning a vigil during lockdown.

The ruling is detailed and thorough, but on the first reading there are two points that seem worth making.

First, the court placed the police decision-making under anxious scrutiny.

This was instead of the court’s usual deference to police decision making – where the long arm of the law is kept at more than arm’s length.

This is refreshing approach instead of the more familiar nodding-along by judges at police conduct.

Second, and just as refreshing, the court took the legal right to freedom of expression  – under Article 10 of the ECHR – seriously.

This was rather than the common lip-service paid by judges – who invariably mention free expression rights only to allow them to be interfered with.

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This must have been a challenging case to bring, to prepare for and to argue, and so there should be considerable credit for the applicants and their legal team for doing so.

Indeed – in getting the court to overcome its traditional deference to the police and in getting that court to then take free expression rights seriously – it is difficult to imagine a harder such case to fight and to win.

Well done to all who were involved.

https://twitter.com/davidallengreen/status/1502252517631135752

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Realpolitik v universal war crimes jurisdiction?

2nd March 2022

Just a quick post tonight to ask a question to which I do not know the answer.

If – as a matter of Realpolitik – the invasion of Ukraine could be brought to an end by an amnesty for Putin, would that be a price worth paying?

Would it be worth excusing him from any war crimes prosecution just so as to bring the invasion to an end?

Or should there be an absolute insistence that, whatever happens, Putin must face a war crimes prosecution?

What do you think?

Realpolitik or universal war crimes jurisdiction?

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The invasion of Ukraine – autocracy, democracy, constitutionalism and rationalism

25th February 2022

There are two common errors in politics and human conflict.

One is to believe your opponents are caricatures – to assume that they are not rational.

The other is to believe there must be some reason in what your opponents do – to assume that they are actioning rationally.

The problem is knowing when you are making these errors in any given situation.

Take Putin, for example.

Some think he is currently being rational:

While others think he is unhinged:

At an early stage of this conflict, I saw some merit in the view that Putin was rationally acting to set up a ‘frozen conflict’ – as he had done in Georgia and Moldova:

But while that may have explained the initial parts of the current conflict, it does not explain the escalation to a full invasion.

And so we do not know whether (and, if so, how) what Putin is doing is rational – and whether there is any way to comprehend why Putin is acting in this way.

But what we do know is that this conduct – rational or otherwise – flows from Putin as an autocrat.

This is evidently his policy – and not one that is being pushed on him by others – and there is nobody in the Russian polity with any formal power to check him.

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Over at the outstanding Comment is Freed blog, the doyen of war and strategic studies Lawrence Freedman sets out what we know and do not know so far about the invasion.

It is exemplary commentary on an unfolding (and, for us, confusing) event and it is worth reading for its own sake.

But there is one passage that is worth considering on this here law and policy blog:

“At times in democracies we lament the flabbiness, incoherence, short-sightedness and inertia of our decision-making, compared with autocrats who can outsmart us by thinking long-term and then taking bold steps without any need to convince a sceptical public, listen to critics, or be held back by such awkward constraints as the rule of law.

“Putin reminds us that that autocracy can lead to great errors, and while democracy by no means precludes us making our own mistakes, it at least allows us opportunities to move swiftly to new leaders and new policies when that happens.

“Would that this now happens to Russia.”

The great thing about checks and balances (when they work) is that, well, they check and they balance.

In the United Kingdom, for example, prime ministers as different as Asquith, Chamberlain, Churchill and Thatcher have all been removed from office at a time of international tension or war.

Effective checks and balances mean that those with political power can always be prevented from exercising their power – and even removed from power.

And this accountability tends to improve the quality of policy and decision making.

As Freedman avers, in a democracy there are the means by which leaders can be replaced and policies changed.

In Russia – whether Putin is rational or not, and whether his policy is rational or not – there are no formal mechanisms by which Putin can feasibly be replaced or his policy halted.

So it does not matter much whether he and his policy are rational – whether there is some grand plan.

He is going to (try to) do what he wants anyway.

And so we come to the ultimate check and balance that all tyrants risk encountering, regardless of any constitutional arrangements.

The check and balance on Hubris that is often (but not always) provided by Nemesis.

Putin will not be the first (or last) dictator to overreach himself in trying to spread their power westwards or eastwards on the land mass of Eurasia.

The problem is that waiting for Nemesis can be like waiting for Godot – and sometimes it does not come in time, or at all.

And that is why, as Freedman implicitly suggests, conflicts are not a time to release leaders and their polices from any scrutiny – but a time where leaders and policies should be most scrutinised.

Would that this now happens to the United Kingdom.

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“Not waving, but drowning”

 24th February 2022

Here is a tweet worth pondering:

In its form and content the first couple of sentences of Farage’s tweet evoke one of the greatest English poems of the last century, the first verse of which is:

“Nobody heard him, the dead man,

But still he lay moaning:

I was much further out than you thought

And not waving but drowning.”

For at the moment everyone involved in the Ukraine invasion – Putin included – seem to be going much further out than others would have thought.

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In the United Kingdom we are facing this international crisis with perhaps the weakest cabinet in British political history.

And this is not a party political point – for some Conservative cabinets have been very strong indeed.

One example of this weakness is the Foreign Secretary whose idea of escalation is to contrive (effectively) photo-opportunities:

And so we ended up with a photo-opportunity, but in words:

The only thing this exercise showed is that we have a rather gullible Foreign Secretary:

This lack of seriousness by the United Kingdom government can be seen elsewhere:

7 March is over ten days away.

“hobble”

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The fundamental problem, of course, is that there is little that the United Kingdom can actually do in this situation.
As this blog averred a couple of days ago, ‘sanctions’ are often things we use so as to pretend to ourselves that we are not politically impotent.
Any ‘sanction’ that would have any significant effect will adversely affect us at least as much as Russia – and there is no real political stomach for such self-inflicted pain.
And any military (mis)adventure is capable of ending in disaster.
The stark truth is that sometimes there is nothing that can be done when something must be done.
Of course: Ukraine must be given any aid and assistance it requests.
And we can hope that Putin and Russia will implode from their misadventure.
In these circumstances, sanctions and other measures can be public goods, worthwhile doing in and of themselves.
But we should have no illusion that they will have the direct effects that are wanted.
For in practice, ‘sanctions’ are likely to be mere pebbles and boulders being placed against the flow of Russian money.
The river will just find its way round such impediments.
And in the face of that torrent of money, we are not waving, but drowning.

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Thinking about “sanctions”

22nd February 2022

Let’s consider the word ‘sanctions’.

The word is in the news because of Russian imperialist aggression against Ukraine.

(And yes, what Russia is doing is imperialism – the notion that only the English can be imperialistic is just another way of being Anglocentric.)

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One common response to this aggression is to demand ‘sanctions’.

A demand, in effect, that ‘something must be done’.

Those demanding sanctions may not have any clear idea – or, indeed, any idea -as to what should be done as a sanction or what effect it may have.

It is enough, for them, that they are demanding ‘sanctions’ – almost as a form of political therapy.

A thing to call for, instead of admitting that there is little or nothing that can actually be done – at least short of a military (mis)adventure which would, in turn, likely be a fiasco.

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In reality, ‘sanctions’ rarely work.

They are the Yellow Cards of international affairs.

And, as in football, such Yellow Cards rarely deter – still less eliminate – foul play.

They are instead little more than a cost of business.

In practice – and I have advised as a lawyer on sanctions – they are usually business inconveniences and irritants that can be addressed and navigated.

There are many creative and ingenious ways with which a ‘sanction’ may be complied with.

Any sanction that would actually have the desired political effect would adversely affect the sanctioning state as well as the sanctioned state.

And this is because of the nature of sanctions in an economically interdependent world.

Unilateral commercial relationships are rare and so – almost by defintion – an economic sanction will have domestic effects as well as on the sanctioned adversary.

And so it unlikely that the United Kingdom would sanction Russia in a way that would significantly disrupt the flows of Russian money into London.

But.

Serious sanctions can be done – as Germany has impressively shown today with reconsidering Nord Stream 2 – although perhaps this is not a ‘sanction’ as such but a fundamental (and sensible) reconsideration of energy policy and strategy.

And that will hurt Germany – yet they are willing to take the hit.

The United Kingdom has instead merely talked the talk of tough sanctions – and so today’s announcement of a ‘package’ was unimpressive.

It is always easier to talk tough sanctions than, well, convert that tough talk into meaningful sanctions.

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One response to such scepticism about ‘sanctions’ is to ask: what else can be done?

Some even resort to saying ‘sanctions’ would have ‘symbolic’ importance.

But this is akin to ‘enshrining in law’ nonsense.

What can be done is to be wary of this form of magical thinking.

To realise that we risk misleading and bewitching ourselves.

To realise that sanctions, as with legal prohibitions, are not magical spells.

And to accept the stark hard truth that – unless we place ourselves at a severe disadvantage, or risk military (mis)adventure – there is little or nothing that can be done.

To admit to our own political impotence.

We may as well ‘tut’.

But.

Because we do not want to do that, we will blithely demand ‘sanctions’ instead.

For something must be done.

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The unforced error by Boris Johnson of publishing the letter to the French President

26th November 2021

Yesterday Nick Fletcher, a little-known member of parliament (with his own taste for time travel), tweeted a daft statement on headed paper about whether casting a female Doctor Who was the cause of a real-world crime surge.

And yet that was not the most stupid thing on headed paper tweeted yesterday by a politician.

The current prime minister surpassed even that missive.

What was stupid about this prime ministerial letter being tweeted was not so much the content – though the content was bombastic and demanding.

The letter had all the quality of an English person outside a Parisian café ordering in English slowly and loudly, with hand gestures.

The real stupidity of the letter was in its tweeting.

And so what then happened was almost inevitable.

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Le whoopsie (with *hand gestures*).

There are two observations to make about this latest pratfall.

The first is personal to the current prime minister: there is no policy predicament so bad that it cannot be made worse by his intervention.

This is yet another unforced error by perhaps the greatest political manufacturer of unforced errors.

The second is that it demonstrates a tension – if not a contradiction – at the heart of Brexit and post-Brexit politics and policy: the political need for the United Kingdom government to play to its domestic audience and the policy need for it to cooperate with European states.

Often the United Kingdom government gets away with it, as those in Europe care little or nothing about the front pages of British newspapers.

But in this instance, the play for the domestic audience was at the direct expense of cooperation.

The café door has slammed shut.

And the loud English man is left outside gesturing to nobody in particular, while trying to assure himself that nothing has gone wrong.

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By ‘taking back control’ of your borders, you can lose control of your borders – the lesson of Brexit

25th November 2021

Brexit, we are often told by its supporters, was about taking back control – especially control of our borders.

But think about borders for the moment.

For every border there is – perhaps axiomatically – another side.

Else it would not be much of a border.

This means that if you take back control as an exercise in unilateralism then you may lose control – or influence – over what will be happening to your border from the other side.

And so you will not be taking back control – but losing control.

For an effective border usually requires there to be shared policies on both sides.

Therefore, without cooperation, you lose control or influence over what will be happening to your border.

This is obvious – if you think about it.

The issues with the borders in the island of Ireland and in the English channel both have a common basis in that Brexit-supporting politicians underestimated the importance of cross-border cooperation and shared policies in making borders work in practice.

Control of any border is rarely achieved – at least without lethal enforcement.

And even the borders of totalitarian regimes dissolve.

The policy of the current governing party of the United Kingdom used to be about bringing down walls and promoting shared policies – the Single Market owed much to Lady Thatcher and Lord Cockfield, and the expansions of both NATO and the European Union was promoted by successive Conservative governments.

Short of repression, the only way to take (or have) control of any border is by cross-border cooperation and shared policies.

And so, in this and many other ways, Brexit is an expensive and painful exercise in the United Kingdom government finding out just how interdependent things are in a complex world.

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