Category: Policy and Policy-Making

The bare “necessity” – how the legal position of the United Kingdom on the Northern Irish Protocol Bill makes no sense

13th June 2022

The government of the United Kingdom published this evening the Northern Irish Protocol Bill.

This Bill is so the government can breach (or “not perform”) its obligations under the Northern Irish Protocol.

The government has also published not the legal advice in support of the Bill, but their legal position.

But it is not even a legal position.

It is a lack of a legal position.

As a legal justification placed into the public domain this is even weaker than taking a lockdown journey to Barnard Castle to test one’s eyesight.

The government is legally even weaker than many legal commentators thought.

We were expecting some clever whizz-bang argument, desperate but perhaps just about plausible.

But we have got this instead.

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Let us look why this is so weak to the point of non-existent.

The government’s “position” is as follows.

Step one – the government sets out what it sees as “necessity”.

“The doctrine of necessity provides a clear basis in international law to justify the non-performance of international obligations under certain exceptional and limited conditions. It has been accepted by the International Court of Justice and is reflected in the International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility, which successive UK governments have regarded as generally reflective of customary international law. By way of summary, the term ‘necessity’ is used in international law to lawfully justify situations where the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest is the non-performance of another international obligation.”

Step two – the government sets out that “necessity” means it has “no other way” than to put forward this legislation:

“… the strain that the arrangements under the Protocol are placing on institutions in Northern Ireland, and more generally on socio-political conditions, has reached the point where the Government has no other way of safeguarding the essential interests at stake than through the adoption of the legislative solution that is being proposed. There is, therefore, clear evidence of a state of necessity to which the Government must respond to.”

Step three – the government ties the two steps together to assert that “in light of the state of necessity” the “non-performance” (ie breaching) of its obligations under the Northern Irish Protocol would be justified under international law:

“The Government recognises that necessity can only exceptionally be invoked to lawfully justify non-performance of international obligations. This is a genuinely exceptional situation, and it is only in the challenging, complex and unique circumstances of Northern Ireland, that the Government has, reluctantly, decided to introduce legislative measures which, on entry into force, envisage the nonperformance of certain obligations. It is the Government’s position that in light of the state of necessity, any such non-performance of its obligations contained in the Withdrawal Agreement and/or the Protocol as a result of the planned legislative measures would be justified as a matter of international law. This justification lasts as long as the underlying reasons for the state of necessity are present. The current assessment is that this situation and its causes will persist into the medium to long term.”

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Ah, the bare legal doctrine of necessity.

The general issue with “necessity” at law is that any of us can at any time assert that it is “necessary” to breach an obligation.

This means that, in legal practice, “necessity” is made very difficult, if not impossible, to rely on as a defence for breaking any obligation.

In the domestic law of England and Wales, for example, every law student is introduced to the singular facts of the 1884 case of R v Dudley and Stephens to show how limited the defence of necessity is to a criminal charge.

And now, in 2022, “necessity” is being invoked in respect of a different type of shipwreck: the government’s post-Brexit policy.

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In international law, the principle of “necessity” is similarly limited in its scope.

Here is Lord Anderson QC, whose tweets should be read carefully:

 

Anderson links to a digest of the applicable law which sets out the four conditions that all have to be met together:

– the State’s act is to safeguard an essential interest against a peril;

– the peril shall be grave and imminent;

– the course of action followed shall be the only way available; and

– no other essential interest shall be seriously impaired as a result of the breach.

The digest also states that the excuse is unavailable where the State has (substantially) contributed to the situation of necessity.

These are high hurdles to meet.

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But there is more.

The parties to the Northern Irish Protocol – the United Kingdom and the European Union – have already expressly agreed a scheme for dealing with any problems under the protocol.

This mechanism is set out in Article 16:

And this annex to Article 16:

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The United Kingdom and the European Union contemplated the possibility of problems and agreed a way of dealing with them, which would enable parts of the protocol if – ahem – necessary to be temporarily disapplied.

It makes no sense – whatsoever – for the government to race to seeking to rely on the principle of “necessity” under international law for breaching the protocol without triggering the Article 16 process first.

As one tweeter said:

There is no answer to this point – and there can be no answer to this point:

There are no possible circumstances where the United Kingdom can resort to the the principle of “necessity” under international law without going through the Article 16 process first.

And the government – despite many threats – has not triggered the Article 16 process.

The “position” published today even admits the government believes that the Article 16 were met:

“In July 2021, however, the Government assessed in the Command Paper that, as a result of both diversion of trade and serious societal and economic difficulties occasioned by the Protocol, the conditions for the exercise of the rights provided for under Article 16 of the Protocol were already met.”

But the government then did nothing under Article 16 on that basis.

For the government to not trigger Article 16 instead of resorting to the the principle of “necessity” under international law is beyond rational comprehension.

Wookies coming from Endor makes more sense.

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And there is even more.

So “necessary” is this proposal that the legislation will take at least months, if not a year to pass into statute.

Such a leisurely timeline does not indicate urgency – and it does not show that the problem is “grave and imminent”.

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Putting what is said today together with this blog’s recent posts (here and here) on the strange way that the government is claiming to have legal cover for this proposal, it seems that the First Treasury Counsel was asked to accept as an assumption that it was “necessary” for the United Kingdom to break its international obligations.

The so-called Treasury Devil then questioned that assumption, and he was correct to do so.

This “legal position” does not provide any legal cover.

It makes no sense, even on its own terms.

It is a contrivance.

As my University of Birmingham colleague Dr Adrian Hunt avers:

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The reality is that the problems which the government mention were entirely foreseeable when they negotiated and signed the protocol, and were indeed foreseen.

The government then just wanted to “get Brexit done” – everything else was detail.

And the problems which have arisen are the main reason the protocol included Article 16.

So not only were the problems foreseen, a solution was also envisaged.

It is difficult to conceive of a weaker basis for the government of the United Kingdom to assert “necessity” as a breach of international obligations.

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Dominic Raab says “fiddling with the rules when you don’t like the result is a bad look” – but that is what this government does again and again

7th June 2022

Dominic Raab, the Lord High Chancellor and Deputy Prime Minister, was on the media this morning after yesterday’s calamitous confidence vote.

A vote which – politically – was the worst possible political outcome for the current Prime Minister, though the possible constitutional (as distinct from political) crisis of which I warned was averted.

Raab was asked about whether the party rules could be changed so as to allow a further such vote within the next year.

His reply, with a straight face, was:

This lack of political self-awareness is priceless.

For changing – or seeking to change – the rules because of unwanted outcomes is what this government does again and again.

And again.

Indeed, looking from the outside, it is the nearest this government has got to an organising principle.

If there is such a thing as ‘Johnsonism’  it is a description of this ongoing push to remove the checks and balances, and to change or neuter the rules and processes, that stop this government from doing whatever it likes.

In Raab’s own department – the Ministry of Justice – there is a constant move towards changing judicial review rules and human rights law because of a (perceived) dislike of what judges are deciding.

Indeed, this is the very point of Raab’s rather pathetic proposal for a so-called “Bill of Rights”.

There are other examples from this government:

https://twitter.com/MarinaPurkiss/status/1534070376359251968

https://twitter.com/LLocock/status/1534089725027426304

And, of course, there is Brexit itself.

The politics of the Northern Irish Protocol is, at bottom, about how the current government wishes to resile from the agreement that it had negotiated and signed.

The current prime minister Boris Johnson and his ministers do not want to be held to the rules that came from lengthy negotiation and compromises.

To echo Raab, they do not like the result.

And so they want to fiddle around with those rules – an Internal Market Bill here, a threat to trigger Article 16 there, an Attorney General’s advice in the middle.

Constant fiddling – and just because they do not like the result.

Once you realise that this is what this government does – not least because it cannot think of doing anything more substantial – you see this in almost every area of policy.

But there is one thing that the Lord High Chancellor is correct about.

It is not a good look.

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The Prime Minister who is not there – what happens when there is an absence at the centre of government

31st May 2022

“Yesterday, upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn’t there!
He wasn’t there again today,
Oh how I wish he’d go away!”

– from Antigonish, by William Hughes Mearns

The constitution of the United Kingdom is as much about absences as about content.

Other constitutions have gaps – for example the constitution of the United States does not mention judicial review, the key means by which the federal courts provide a check and a balance to the executive and the legislature.

But in the constitution of the United Kingdom, there are many more absences – things which are not there.

Take the office of Prime Minister – if you were only to look at the statute books, you would find little trace of the role and almost no express provisions conferring powers.

Indeed, until the early twentieth century you would find no legislative trace at all – even though the office had then existed for nearly two hundred years and been occupied by such powerful figures as Walpole, Pitt, Peel, Disraeli and Gladstone.

The power of the Prime Minister’s office comes from other elements of the constitution – by acting on behalf of the Crown (and thereby exercising the Royal Prerogative) and by having a majority in the democratic house of Parliament (which is important as Parliament is held to have legislative omnipotence with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy).

The Prime Minister – or at least the governing party – can also often derive power from the electorate, with the notion of a ‘mandate’ if a party wins a majority of seats, and this mandate means that the non-democratic house of Parliament must yield when there is a conflict.

All this power – and for a position that, legally speaking, barely exists.

This means that the office can be pretty much what its occupant wants it to be.

For example, Boris Johnson when he became Prime Minister dynamically used the office in five ways to force through the Brexit withdrawal agreement and ‘get Brexit done’ :-

– he changed the policy from his predecessor;=

– he negotiated a revised agreement with the European Union;

– he then signed that agreement;

– he fought an early general election to get a mandate for his negotiated, oven-ready agreement; and

– he used his mandate and his overall majority to force the revised agreement through Parliament and into law.

Few Prime Ministers have used so many of the powers of the Prime Minister in so short a time.

But.

Since that agreement became law, the Prime Minister has become the proverbial dog that has caught up with the car.

It would appear Johnson does not now know what to do with the office – or with his majority.

And remember – a substantial Parliamentary majority is the greatest prize which the constitution of the United Kingdom can bestow on any Prime Minister – and it is not as common as you would think.

Indeed – after John Major lost his working majority not longer after the 1992 general election, it was not until 2015-17 and after 2019 that the Conservatives had an overall majority; and since 1977, Labour has only had an overall majority between 1997 and 2010.

What has the Prime Minister done with this overall majority, which has flowed from the Brexit referendum result for which he campaigned and the General Election at which he promised to get Brexit done?

Almost nothing – and, indeed, the ongoing politics of the Northern Irish Protocol show that he did not even get Brexit done.

Johnson has gone from using the office of Prime Minister to the full to doing almost nothing with it.

The last Queen’s Speech – like a football team defence not impressing Alan Hansen – was all over the place.

The nasty ‘anti-woke’ noises from various ministers do not indicate a programme, but a lack of one.

The government is at one a high-spending, large-state levelling-up government that also now, somehow, wants to substantially cut the civil service.

A government that thinks nothing of partying at Number 10 while imposing the most illiberal restrictions on the rest of us ever known in peace time.

The only theme is that the government will pick fights with and seek revenge on any entity of the state which offers any check or balance.

This is not ultimately about a government or a Prime Minister, but about the lack of a government – and a lack of a Prime Minister.

And so, match our constitution of absences, we now have a government of absences, and a Prime Minister who may be in office, but who is not really there.

Perhaps it is time for him to go away.

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“Yesterday, upon the stair,
I met a man who wasn’t there!
He wasn’t there again today,
Oh how I wish he’d go away!”

**

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The Prime Minister says he “takes full responsibility” – but what does this mean in constitutional terms, if anything?

25th May 2022

Today we take in the now-published Sue Gray report.

The quick-takes have already been given and a parliamentary statement has come and gone, as the rest of us who have an interest digest the details of the report.

This post is not about the report in detail, but about the current Prime Minister’s response.

It is a response that Boris Johnson often gives at times of trouble.

It is the response of saying that he ‘takes full responsibility’.

What could this phrase mean?

Note the ‘responsibility’ he purports to take is ‘full’ – and so, presumably, this is intended to mean something (or to convey that it means something) distinct from taking mere responsibility.

Oh no – this is ‘full’ responsibility.

Rhetorically, it is an impressive statement – to which some may even nod-along.

But it is hard, if not impossible, to see what it means.

For example: what actually is different as a consequence of Johnson saying he ‘takes full responsibility’?

What things change that otherwise would not change, but for the Prime Minister saying that he ‘takes full responsibility’.

What is different from the Prime Minister saying instead “I am not taking full responsibility” or “I am not taking any responsibility whatsoever?”.

There is not any real difference; nothing changes.

If the Prime Minister instead said a sequence of nonsense words, it would have the same constitutional import.

This is because, in constitutional terms, when the Prime Minister says he is taking ‘full responsibility’, he is saying nothing meaningful.

In constitutional terms, the position is exactly the same after the moment Johnson says it, as when he does not say it.

It is instead a rhetorical device – a political tactic to get him through an awkward moment, cynically giving the impression to the listener that something grave is being conceded or admitted, when nothing is being accepted at all.

For, in constitutional terms, a Prime Minister taking ‘ full responsibility’ for a serious wrong is to perform an action, rather than to say a thing.

The action the Prime Minister would perform is to resign.

And if there is not a resignation after a serious wrong then ‘ full responsibility’ has not been taken.

Indeed, by using it as a deft rhetorical trick, Johnson evades taking full responsibility.

So next time you hear the current Prime Minister assure you and others that he ‘takes full responsibility’, substitute for that phase a sequence of random words and sounds, for it will have the same constitutional meaning.

That is to say: no constitutional meaning at all.

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The only ultimate solution to the problem of the Northern Irish Protocol may be a united Ireland

20th May 2022

Sensible conservative-unionists – and, no, that is not necessarily a contradiction-in-terms – used to abide by the maxim that politics was ‘the art of the possible’.

And one thing that the European Union did was make certain things possible, which otherwise were not possible.

With Gibraltar and Spain, for example, the border issue became less of an issue.

And with the island of Ireland, the border issue too became less of an issue.

Because both Ireland and the United Kingdom were both members of the European Union – and thereby both members of the internal market and customs union – a hard border, with infrastructure and bureaucracy, was unnecessary.

This created the conditions that made the Good Friday Agreement possible – though, of course, there were many other factors.

But now Brexit has come along, there is a problem.

There has to be a border somewhere where one entity is inside a pan-European internal market and customs union and the other entity is not.

Had Brexit not been so extreme – with the United Kingdom staying inside the internal market and/or the customs union (which is the position with some other non-EU states) – then the Irish border issue would be less of a problem.

But the Brexit which Theresa May insisted on, with the United Kingdom outside the internal market and customs union, meant there was going to be a problem.

May eventually realised this – and so she supported the ill-fated ‘backstop’ arrangement, which meant that – if there was no post-Brexit trade agreement – the cross-border arrangements of European Union membership would continue as a default.

But May’s proposal was rejected heavily by the House of Commons (including by ‘remain’ Members of Parliament).

That left one other option – the border in the Irish Sea, which was supported by the new Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and enshrined (ahem) in the Northern Irish Protocol.

And, as this blog has set out many times, Johnson here changed the policy, negotiated the Protocol, signed the withdrawal agreement containing the Protocol, fought a general election so as to get a mandate for the Protocol, and rushed the relevant legislation through parliament.

Johnson could have not done more, as Prime Minister, to have brought the Protocol into existence and to pass it into law.

But.

The Protocol is a solution to one problem but not to another.

It is a solution to the political problem of late 2019 where Brexit needed to be ‘done’ – and the Protocol was the only possible way to do so avoiding a hard border on the island of Ireland.

But it is not a solution to the deeper problem of how Brexit is compatible with the on-going existence of the union that is the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Either one has Brexit (at least without continuing membership of the internal market and the customs union) or one has that union, but one cannot easily have both.

This is not to say that a united Ireland is likely – there are many solutions to political problems that never are adopted.

It may be that the problem continues, and continues, and is never resolved.

But a united Ireland is the only ultimate solution to there not being a border somewhere in respect of the north of Ireland.

Of course, special arrangements would need to be made for the non-nationalists in Northern Ireland – and one would hope that those protections serve that community better than the (lack of) protections for the nationalists in the north of Ireland after 1922.

Having watched Brexit from the beginning, I am still bewildered why supposed unionists did not see this problem coming – and indeed strongly campaigned for Brexit.

The European Union provided a means by which Northern Ireland could have continued in the United Kingdom, regardless of demographic changes and the gradual fall in unionist support.

But some forgot that politics was the art of the possible, and they pursued the politics of the impossible instead.

 

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Four possible consequences of Partygate

19th May 2022

Partygate, again.

Today the Metropolitan Police announced the end of their investigation.

This means that, in small part, the Partygate issue comes to an end.

But there are at least four things which may now flow from the circumstances of the unlawful gatherings at Number 10 during the pandemic.

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The first, of course, is publication of the Sue Gray report.

This unseen report now has many expectations loaded onto it.

It is useful to remind yourself of her terms of reference.

Whatever is – and is not – in her published report, it is more likely than not to be in accordance with these terms of reference.

It is also useful to remind yourself of her truncated interim ‘update’.

That update indicated – though not in any definite way – where there may be problems for Downing Street when the final report is published (see this blog’s previous post here).

Two paragraphs of the update, in particular, are worth reminding yourself of:

“ii. At least some of the gatherings in question represent a serious failure to observe not just the high standards expected of those working at the heart of Government but also of the standards expected of the entire British population at the time.

“iii. At times it seems there was too little thought given to what was happening across the country in considering the appropriateness of some of these gatherings, the risks they presented to public health and how they might appear to the public. There were failures of leadership and judgment by different parts of No 10 and the Cabinet Office at different times. Some of the events should not have been allowed to take place. Other events should not have been allowed to develop as they did.”

Whether the report leads to any political change – and whether it is, in fact, the timebomb suggested by the earlier post – is, of course, determined by politics and the remarkable capacity of the current Prime Minister to evade accountability.

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The second consequence of Partygate is – on the face of it – potentially more significant constitutionally.

This is the House of Commons committee’s investigation into whether the Prime Minister misled parliament.

Here a difficulty for the Prime Minister is not so much whether he realised the parties he attended were unlawful gatherings, but when he knew.

This is important because, as this blog has previously set out, it appears that the Prime Minister is not only under an obligation to put the record straight, but also to do so at the earliest opportunity.

This point was well explained by Alexander Horne in this thread:

Even if the Prime Minister did not realise at the time the gatherings were unlawful, he no doubt knew once he saw the Sue Gray report and/or was advised in response to the Metropolitan Police investigation.

The committee may perhaps find that Boris Johnson did tell parliament at the first available opportunity, or it may hold the rule somehow does not apply, or it may censure him.

Again, the political consequences of any censure – or sanction – are not predictable with the current Prime Minister.

But misleading the House of Commons and not correcting the record as soon as one can are still serious matters, even in this age of Johnson, Brexit and 2022.

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A third possible consequence of Partygate is the worrying normalisation of politically motivated reporting of opponents to the police.

This blog recently set out this concern – and the concern has also been articulated by newspaper columnists:

This is an issue distinct from the obvious truth that politicians should not be above the law.

This issue is about when there is political pressure for there to be police intervention in respect of opponents, where such pressure would not be applied in respect of one’s own ‘side’.

Unless a report would be made to the police in the same circumstances when it was a political ally rather than an opponent, the report is being made on a partisan basis.

And routine goading of police involvement – and their coercive powers – on a partisan basis is not a good sign in any political system.

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The fourth possible consequence is more optimistic.

The covid regulations were an exercise in bad and rushed legislation, where – even accounting for it being a pandemic – insufficient care was given to the rules imposed and to how they were enforced.

This was pointed out at the time – by this blog and many other legal commentators.

The fact there was a pandemic was used as an excuse for shoddy drafting rather than it being the reason.

And part of the shoddiness was, no doubt, because these were seen by those in the executive as being rules for other people – that is, for the rest of us.

One perhaps positive thing about Partygate is that senior officials, politicians and advisers in the government now are aware that such rules can apply to them.

This may mean that in the event of another pandemic requiring similar rules, the provisions will have more anxious scrutiny before being put in palce and enforced.

That said, of course, it is perhaps also possible that the government will just make sure that future rules expressly do not apply to Whitehall.

But we have to take what possible positives that we can from this gods-awful governmentally-self-inflicted political, legal and constitutional mess, known as Partygate.

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The outlaw ministry

12th May 2022

From time to time on social media you will get people asking about the difference between something being ‘unlawful’ and being ‘illegal’.

And whenever this happens you will invariably get some wacky funster replying that the difference is that one means someone is acting outside the law and the other is a sick bird.

Ho ho, every time.

But.

The real problem with this government is not that it acts unlawfully or illegally.

The problem is that it acts as if it is an outlaw – that for the government, law does not apply in the first place.

It is not so much that the government cares about breaking any law, or about whether it has any legal basis for what it does.

Instead, the government does not see law as even applying to it.

To use a lovely Scottish word – the government acts as if it is ‘outwith’ the law.

The law applies to little people, and not this government.

‘Law and Order’ is a campaigning slogan, but not a principle of government.

As this blog has previously averred, this government engages in three types of lawlessness.

First, it often conducts itself without any lawful basis.

Second, it seeks to introduce legislation that will enable it to freely break the law.

Third, it permits law-breaking at the highest level.

It is difficult to imagine a government with less respect for law, and for the rule of law.

This is not so much a government of law breakers, but a government of outlaws.

The law is an inconvenience which can be disregarded as and when it is inconvenient.

Such an approach has its hedonistic attractions, but it cannot end well.

Brace, brace.

 

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This is not a proposal for “a Bill of Rights” – this is semi-waffle in support of vanity legislation

10th May 2022

Today it was announced in the Queen’s Speech that there will be a “Bill of Rights”.

Some are alarmed at this proposal – and warn darkly (and perhaps correctly) that this will be a fundamental attack on the Human Rights Act 1998 and on the protections we have under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which that Act gives effect in domestic law.

One plausible consequence of the proposal is that there will no longer be a a law called ‘the Human Rights Act’ in our statute books.

This post, however, will take a sightly different approach.

This post is one more of derision than of alarm.

For the proposal set out today is all rather pathetic.

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Let us start with the Queen’s Speech.

The relevant portion of the speech was this:

“My Government will ensure the constitution is defended. My Ministers will restore the balance of power between the legislature and the courts by introducing a Bill of Rights.”

There is already a Bill of Rights – at least in the law of England and Wales.

That law from 1688 or1689 (depending on how pedantic you affect to be) is famous and significant, and it is one of few ancient pieces of legislation that those with an interest in such things can name.

Any government bringing forward a new (or revised) Bill of Rights would presumably be proud, promoting the legislation as a highlight of its new parliamentary schedule.

But this latest “Bill of Rights”?

It was 800 words into a 940-word speech

Even in the accompanying briefing for journalists, it made only page 118 of a 140-page document.

The Bill is not so much an initiative, but an afterthought.

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And now we turn to content.

There is no real content.

The government has not published the proposed legislation, and indeed the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is not in a position to publish the proposed legislation.

The MoJ told me today that the consultation on the reform only closed on 19 April and the responses are still being reviewed.

This lack of content can also be seen in the briefing note:

“The purpose of the Bill is to:

● Introduce a Bill of Rights which will ensure our human rights framework meets the needs of the society it serves and commands public confidence.

● End the abuse of the human rights framework and restore some common sense to our justice system.

The main benefits of the Bill would be:

● Defending freedom of speech by promoting greater confidence in society to express views freely, thereby enhancing public debate.

● Curbing the incremental expansion of a rights culture without proper democratic oversight, which has displaced due focus on personal responsibility and the public interest.

● Reducing unnecessary litigation and avoiding undue risk aversion for bodies delivering public services.

● Tackling the issue of foreign criminals evading deportation, because their human rights are given greater weight than the safety and security of the public.

The main elements of the Bill are:

● Establishing the primacy of UK case law, clarifying there is no requirement to follow the Strasbourg case law and that UK Courts cannot interpret rights in a more expansive manner than the Strasbourg Court.

● Ensuring that UK courts can no longer alter legislation contrary to its ordinary meaning and constraining the ability of the UK courts to impose ‘positive obligations’ on our public services without proper democratic oversight by restricting the scope for judicial legislation.

● Guaranteeing spurious cases do not undermine public confidence in human rights so that courts focus on genuine and credible human rights claims. The responsibility to demonstrate a significant disadvantage before a human rights claim can be heard in court will be placed on the claimant. 

● Recognising that responsibilities exist alongside rights by changing the way that damages can be awarded in human rights claims, for example by ensuring that the courts consider the behaviour of the claimant when considering making an award.”

*

These three groups of bullet-points – ‘purpose…main benefits…main elements’ – indicate padding, and indeed the bullet-points are interchangeable between the sections.

Almost none of the bullet-points are concrete.

If anything they are almost all talking-points.

Some are semi-meaningless waffle – “restore some common sense” and “responsibilities exist alongside rights” are slogans rather than thoughts.

And to the extent any of these bullet-points do have meaning, their import is not to protect rights but to limit rights.

This is not a “Bill of Rights” but a Bill to, as far as possible, remove or restrict rights.

Only one bullet-point – and you can check if you doubt me – is even positive about substantive rights: “● Defending freedom of speech by promoting greater confidence in society to express views freely, thereby enhancing public debate”.

*

Most significant of all – and this is what the government wants you to miss – is that this Bill of Rights will not substantially affect the position of the ECHR in the United Kingdom.

And this is because the Good Friday Agreement requires the United Kingdom to give effect to the ECHR in Northern Ireland.

If you look carefully at the proposals, there is mention of making sure the courts do not go further than the ECHR – “UK Courts cannot interpret rights in a more expansive manner than the Strasbourg Court” – but there is not (express) mention of getting rid of the ECHR in domestic law or any (express) suggestion that the United Kingdom follow Russia in leaving the Council of Europe.

So this proposal is, in part, an exercise in misdirection – an attempt to make it look like the government is ending the Human Rights Act but pretty much keeping the ECHR in domestic law.

*

Perhaps the government will put forward a Bill with more concrete proposals.

Perhaps the Lord Chancellor – facing chaos and crises in the court and prisons systems – will achieve his own political priority of replacing the Human Rights Act with some law that does much the same with a different name, but with added (and pointless) tinkering.

Perhaps any of this is worth the effort of new primary legislation – where (if needed) any changes could be done by amendment to the existing legislation.

Perhaps.

But.

The impression given by this proposal is that the new “Bill of Rights” is legislation for the mere sake of legislation.

None of the bullet-points – you can check – individually or together add up to the need for a new statute – let alone something with as hallowed and grandiose a title as a “Bill of Rights”.

On the face of today’s proposals, this is mere vanity legislation.

**

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The false and misleading statements of Boris Johnson and Matt Hancock about the Covid care homes judgment

29 April 2022

On Wednesday the prime minister was asked by Daisy Cooper MP about the high court decision holding that the government had acted unlawfully in its covid guidance for care homes.

Hansard sets out the exchange as follows:

Note that key phrase from the prime minister:

“…we did not know in particular was that covid could be transmitted asymptomatically in the way that it was. I wish we had known more about that at the time.”

The former health secretary Matt Hancock gave an interview to ITV News, where he said:

“I wish that the knowledge about asymptomatic transmission had been…had been…I had known it earlier.”

(The switch midway that sentence is interesting – he seems to go from wanting to say that knowledge about asymptomatic transmission had not been known earlier to carefully stating that he personally did not know.)

Hancock then put out a statement to the press as follows:

“This court case comprehensively clears ministers of any wrongdoing and finds Mr Hancock acted reasonably on all counts. 

“The court also found that Public Health England failed to tell ministers what they knew about asymptomatic transmission.”

So: is what the prime minister and the former health secretary said in response to this judgment true?

Let us see.

*

The judgment contains evidence about what was said and done, and when.

The evidence does not appear to have been contested by the government in the hearing, though the government’s lawyers would dispute the weight and meanings to be placed on that evidence.

What did the evidence say?

At paragraph 65 of the judgment (emphasis on date added):

“…on 9 March [2020] the Health Minister Lord Bethell, said in the House of Lords that “large numbers of people are infectious or infected but are completely asymptomatic and never go near a test kit.” “

At paragraph 69 of the judgment (emphasis on date added):

“On 12 March [2020] the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) published a paper entitled ‘Novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic; increased transmission in the EU-EEA and the UK- 6th update.’ It made a number of observations about asymptomatic transmission. It noted that “over the course of the infection, the virus has been identified in respiratory tract specimens 1-2 days before the onset of symptoms…”. Referring to the Japanese National Institute of Infectious Diseases’ field briefing entitled ‘Diamond Princess COVID-19 cases update March 10, 2020,’ it observed that the virus has “been detected in asymptomatic persons. On a rapidly evolving cruise ship outbreak where most of the passengers and staff were tested irrespective of symptoms, 51% of the laboratory confirmed cases were asymptomatic at the time of confirmation”.

At paragraph 73 (emphasis on date added):

“On the morning of 13 March [2020], on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, Sir Patrick Vallance, the Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor, said this about the means of transmission of the virus:

” “It looks quite likely that there is some degree of asymptomatic transmission. There’s definitely quite a lot of transmission very early on in the disease when there are very mild symptoms”.”

At paragraph 78 (emphasis on date added):

“on 15 March [2020], an important paper from Imperial College and Columbia University was published. ‘Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of novel coronavirus’ by Li and Pei et al. discussed the transmission rate of undocumented infection.”

And so on.

The judgment also lists various papers that were published in March 2020, including a paper published on 31 March that stated:

“between a third and a half of transmissions occur from pre-symptomatic individuals.”

*

That was all in March 2020 – now let us turn to April 2020.

Paragraph 286 of the judgment:

“On 2 April 2020, a week after the lockdown had been given legal effect (by the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (SI 2020/350)) , the Admissions Guidance was published. As noted above, this included the following about new admissions (emphasis in the original):

” “Some of these patients [admitted from a hospital or from a home setting] may have COVID-19, whether symptomatic or asymptomatic.  All of these patients can be safely cared for in a care home if this guidance is followed.  If an individual has no COVID-19 symptoms, or has tested positive for COVID-19 but is no longer showing symptoms and has completed their isolation period then care should be provided as normal. … Negative tests are not required prior to transfers/admissions into the care home.” “

The court then states in the next paragraphs about this April guidance:

“there is no evidence that the Secretary of State or anyone advising him addressed the issue of the risk to care home residents of asymptomatic transmission. […]

“Since there is no evidence that this question was considered by the Secretary of State, or that he was asked to consider it, it is not an example of a political judgment on a finely balanced issue. Nor is it a point on which any of the expert committees had advised that no guidance was required. Those drafting the March Discharge Policy and the April Admissions Guidance simply failed to take into account the highly relevant consideration of the risk to elderly and vulnerable residents from asymptomatic transmission.”

“It is notable that on 25 and 28 March, days before the publication of the 2 April Admissions Guidance, the Minister for Social Care (Ms Whately) was raising concerns about this aspect of the guidance.

“It was not until 15 April in the Action Plan of that date that the Department recommended both testing and isolation for 14 days for new residents admitted to care homes, whether from hospital or from the community. Such isolation was to be either in the care home itself or using “local authority-based arrangements”, that is to say quarantine facilities.

“This was a significant delay at a critical period.

“We consider that the decision to issue the 2 April Admissions Guidance in that form was irrational in that it failed to take into account the risk of asymptomatic transmission, and failed to make an assessment of the balance of risks.

*

And so, as this blog set out yesterday, the court held that the April guidance was irrational in that it failed to take account of a relevant consideration – and at a time where the government was seeking to discharge as many as possible from hospital and into care homes.

This is not about whether the government knew with absolute certainty whether there would be asymptomatic transmission.

But it is about that the government knowing there was a risk before the guidance was issued.

Government ministers and their advisers had spoken expressly of the risk.

Mounting scientific evidence stated there was a risk.

Given that all this can be shown as being known in March 2020, there can be no sensible reason for the April guidance to care homes not to have referred to this risk.

*

And now let us come back to the statements from the prime minister and the former health secretary.

The prime minister:

“…we did not know in particular was that covid could be transmitted asymptomatically in the way that it was. I wish we had known more about that at the time.”

The former health secretary:

“I wish that the knowledge about asymptomatic transmission had been…had been…I had known it earlier.”

Both these statements are misleading, and indeed false.

The judgment puts together all the evidence possessed and available to the health department (and the health secretary) at the time.

The passages in the judgment where the court considers the government lawyer’s attempts to explain all this away (paragraphs 272 to 278 and 290) show just how weak the government’s position on this was.

Either the accumulated detail of the judgment of what was known and when – undisputed by the government in court – is true or the statements of the prime minister and the former health secretary are true.

But not both.

The government said it was throwing its protective arms around the care homes at that critical moment, when it was seeking to discharge as many as possible from hospital into care homes.

But the government instead issued guidance that made no mention of a risk that it knew existed – and that can be shown that the government knew existed.

And so people died.

Far from ‘clearing’ the former health secretary of ‘wrongdoing’, the judgment sets out that what was done was very wrong indeed.

**

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How one paragraph in the significant Covid and care homes judgment describes Matt Hancock’s lethal, unlawful policy

28th April 2022

One of the most outstanding lawyers I know works a lot with care home clients.

Sometime ago they told me about what happened when the hospitals started seeking to release patients into care homes at the start of the pandemic.

A hospital was trying to force a care home to take a potentially positive patient.

The lawyer advised their care home client to lock all the doors, and to not accept anyone from the hospital untested.

Robust advice yes – but it was a bleedingly obvious problem – and now the High Court has said, in effect, my friend’s legal advice was correct.

The Covid and care homes judgment handed down this week is long and complicated – 75 pages and 299 numbered paragraphs.

But one paragraph stands out – and goes to the heart of the relationship between policy on one hand and law on the other.

It is paragraph 289:

“Since there is no evidence that this question was considered by the Secretary of State, or that he was asked to consider it, it is not an example of a political judgment on a finely balanced issue. Nor is it a point on which any of the expert committees had advised that no guidance was required. Those drafting the March Discharge Policy and the April Admissions Guidance simply failed to take into account the highly relevant consideration of the risk to elderly and vulnerable residents from asymptomatic transmission.”

This is not an example thereby of a hard policy decision being made between competing options.

Most sensible people would say that is a matter for the government and not for the courts.

It was instead a decision which failed absolutely to take account of a relevant consideration.

As such, it was a policy decision that was not lawfully open to the decision-maker.

As those bringing the case set out, the secretary of state was the relevant decision-maker “and the public law duties fell on him personally to consider relevant considerations, exclude the irrelevant ones and be sufficiently informed”. 

How the court applied this legal principle in this case is interesting:

The court has held, in effect, that by the time the relevant guidance was issued, the risk of asymptomatic transmission was obvious and well-known – it was even being mentioned publicly by government scientific advisers.

But the government blithely put out guidance to care homes that did not even consider that risk, let alone provide for what care homes should have done to manage the risk.

The court elsewhere in the judgment rejects challenges on other grounds – and the court is careful to say that earlier stages of the pandemic, it would not have been fair or realistic for the government to have known that there was a risk.

But by the time of the April 2020 guidance, this was not the case – and the government could not pretend that was the case.

The government instead published guidance on which care homes were supposed to rely and did not care to consider the risk of asymptomatic transmission.

That took the decision out of the realm of administration and policy and into the realm of public law.

The judgment does not refer expressly to the famous Wednesbury principle, but this is an example of a decision so unreasonable no reasonable decision-maker could have made it.

And that is even after giving due latitude and deference to a government dealing with a pandemic – that offers no excuse to have got this guidance so completely – lethally – wrong.

Far from throwing their arms around the care home sector, the department of health instead threw their hands over their eyes.

And care homes should not have been placed in the dreadful predicament of having to decide whether it was safe to follow department of health guidance, or whether they should have locked their doors instead.

**

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