28th July 2026
We have three years to protect our constitutional arrangements before a possible radical illiberal majority at the next General Election
There is enough time left, just about, to fix parts of our constitutional arrangements before the next general election. This is important, as there is a non-trivial possibility of a radical illiberal majority at that general election.
Of course, given our (largely Victorian) doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, and given the general deference our courts give to the executive, there is little which could be ultimately done to prevent the damage which a radical illiberal majority could do.
But the damage could be slowed down significantly.
For example, our current constitutional arrangements make it easy for ministers and departments to change and make law by statutory instruments, without any meaningful parliamentary involvement.
Making such secondary legislation subject to a distinct process involving parliamentary consideration would at a stroke check any attempt by an incoming government to inflict a raft of Trump-style executive orders on day one. Eventually a new administration could get round this obstacle, but it would reduce the speed of the assault.
Similarly, making it easier for citizens to challenge disproportionate executive decisions and secondary legislation would similarly make it harder for a new government to push through excessive measures.
And there many other things that could be done too, from making public procurement more transparent, to giving teeth (or even a tooth) to freedom of information laws, to limiting the powers of a new Prime Minister to create peers.
We could do so much strengthen the roof before this incoming storm. There may not, of course, be a storm. Maybe everything is going to be ok. Nonetheless, it would be worth doing anyway.
But we will not do any of this, even with three years to go of the current parliament, a period which provides more than enough time to force things through the House of Lords if need be.
*
*
Over at Prospect I have reviewed an interesting paper by the Constitution Unit at University College London: Safeguarding the Constitution: Key Steps to Strengthen UK Democratic Resilience.
It is a paper well worth reading, and if TL;DR you can read a summary here.
There are some good proposals in there, and some nice-to-haves, but as I set out at Prospect, I think the recommendations are incomplete.
And as aver at the end of that article: our constitutional arrangements are vulnerable, and it is complacent to think otherwise.
***
Comments Policy
This blog enjoys a high standard of comments, many of which are better and more interesting than the posts.
Comments are welcome, but they are pre-moderated and comments will not be published if irksome, or if they risk derailing the discussion.
More on the comments policy is here.
One repeatedly ignored problem is the power a Prime Minister who professes neither the Roman Catholic faith nor the Jewish faith to appoint English bishops.
The present arrangement of a name being given to the PM by a Committee of the Church of England is not statutory. It has no more authority than “the usual channels” whereby Parliamentary business is agreed. The statutory position is that the King takes a number of steps – which now means that the Prime Minister decides what the steps should be.
The Church Commissioners are not all appointed by the Crown (i.e. the Prime Minister) but if a Prime Minister were to appoint two subservient Archbishops then between them they would be able to nominate 14 of the 27 members of the Board of Governors.
Archbishops have a retirement age of 70. The Archbishop of York is 70 on 31 August 2028 making it uncertain as to whether a new archbishop will be in post before the next election. The Archbishop of Canterbury is 70 on 26 March 2032.
Putting the process for nominating bishops on a statutory basis will not be easy. However this is the only way of removing a prerogative power that could and one suspects under a reform Prime Minister would be used to mould the Church of England probably into an ethno-nationalist form.
One option would be for the General Synod to pass a Measure placing the present arrangements for appointing bishops on a statutory basis. This may be problematic. The present arrangements have serious weaknesses and the Committees charged with recommending names are battlefields in the current civil war raging both over sexuality and women’s ordination. The arrangements are far less transparent and open to lay scrutiny than those proposed (although not adopted) at the Council of Trent. They are slow compared to the Roman arrangements and of course far less accountable. There is a powerful case for reforming the system. Getting a measure either with the current or a reformed system through the General Synod is by no means certain (we do not know its composition as it will be elected in the autumn amidst a battle between “traditionalist” and “progressives”). Even if a draft measure is agreed, it will have to survive scrutiny by a distinctly (and rightly) cantankerous Ecclesiastical Committee (a Committee of both Houses) and then have to be approved by both Houses.
An alternative would be primary legislation. This probably requires prior amendment of the legislation preventing a Roman Catholic or Jew playing a role in advising the King although this might form part of a single Bill. . The substantial content of any legislation is not immediately obvious – there would be serious opposition to simply enacting the current arrangements.
Assuming that this Parliament goes on ay least until the summer of 2028 there is time for a Convention to consider the issues and legislation to be enacted.